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INTRODUCTION 
 
The problem of transboundary river basins in international relations 
 
All living things run on water. While the amount of accessible freshwater in the world is limited 
and remains constant, it has to satisfy the ever growing demands of an ever growing number of 
users, be it human beings, the economy or the natural environment. Moreover, the various 
human-induced pressures of our era – population growth, urbanisation, climate change to name 
a few – are leading to a massive degradation of the quality and quantity of freshwater resources 
worldwide. As a result, by 2030, the world is projected to face a 40% water deficit, if current 
trends remain unchanged1.  
 
Consequently, water security in the broadest sense of the term will be one of the critical 
questions of development, peace and stability in the 21st century. Not surprisingly the World 
Economic Forum has repeatedly identified water as one of the top global sources of risk. The 
US National Intelligence Council in a recent report also concluded that “water may become a 
more significant source of contention than energy or minerals out to 2030 at both the intrastate 
and interstate levels”2.  
 
Changing hydrological conditions are further complicated by the geography of water: around 
47% of the Earth’s surface waters lie in basins shared by at least two countries. These basins 
are home to some 40% of the world’s population and account for about 60% of the global river 
flow3. Thus, the bulk of world’s unfolding water crisis will have to be solved in an international 
context. 
 
The rise and fall of the water wars thesis 
 
In view of the conflict potential of shared waters, the 1980s and early 1990s saw the emergence, 
in mainstream political discourse and scientific literature, of a widely held conviction that wars 
for water were both inevitable and imminent. The rise of the water wars thesis, however, 
                                                          
1 See section I.5.2.2. below. 
2 See section I.5.5.3. below. 
3 See section I.1.3. below. 
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inspired not only political speculation, but also gave impetus to a new wave of empirical 
research into the drivers of interstate conflicts over shared river basins. Such research has laid 
the foundations of a new discipline coined hydropolitics that is concerned with the study of the 
resilience of co-riparian relations in transboundary basins. The basic findings of the various 
schools of hydropolitics are probably best summarised by Aaron T. Wolf, a leading authority 
in the field, as follows: 
- in recent history shared water resources have been a driving force of cooperation, rather 
than conflict. Thus water tends to connect nations more than it divides them; 
- the stability of co-riparian relations, in other words: hydropolitical resilience, is not 
determined by one single hydrological or political factor, such as scarcity in the basin 
or the ambitions of a downstream hegemon. Rather, it is defined by the legal and 
institutional arrangements riparian states have put in place to manage the shared 
resource; 
- if a given legal and institutional arrangement is sufficiently robust and flexible, it may 
absorb even very significant changes in the basin without negatively affecting the 
efficiency of cooperation among riparian states; 
- the chance of serious conflict emerges, if the magnitude and/or the speed of change (be 
it physical or political or both) in the basin exceeds the absorption capacity of a given 
governance regime. The absorption capacity of a governance scheme is thus not a 
stationary condition, riparian states can always adapt it to changing hydrological or 
political circumstances4. 
 
The case of the European Union: a cause for complacency or concern? 
 
The fact that the stability of co-riparian relations is, to a large extent, a function of certain legal 
and institutional variables makes it possible to subject it to systematic measurement. 
Consequently, an impressive array of hydopolitical assessments has been conducted in the past 
decade at various depths and geographical scales5. Most of these studies seem to suggest that 
Europe, and most prominently the European Union (EU), is a true paradise of water 
cooperation. The intricate web of multi- and bilateral water conventions and, most importantly, 
the crown jewel of the EU’s indigenous water policy: the Water Framework Directive, create a 
                                                          
4 See section I.5.4. below. 
5 See section I.5.4.3. below. 
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comprehensive transboundary water governance regime that will save Europe from the evil of 
inter-state water conflicts.  
 
Not surprisingly, these positive, but somewhat unsophisticated conclusions seem to have led to 
a loss of political and scientific interest in the study of the EU’s own affairs. While EU 
institutions, governments, think tanks and NGOs travel the world to preach the European model 
of prudent transboundary water cooperation elsewhere, very little attention is being paid to the 
future political stability of shared river basins inside the European Union.  
 
This complacency seems grossly unjustified on several grounds. Although the relevant 
hydropolitical assessments confirm the relative stability of the cooperation frameworks in the 
EU, many of them also pinpoint to emerging risks. These risks are of multiple origins. The most 
obvious is the fact that much of EU’s relevant legal and institutional apparatus was laid down 
in the well-watered, densely populated and heavily industrialised north-western Europe in the 
1980s and early 1990s. Naturally, these frameworks reflect the hydrological challenges 
prevailing at the time and place of their births. Also, existing governance regimes are based on 
a dominant technocratic water management paradigm that presumes the stationarity of the 
underlying hydrological conditions. Yet, the “age of man”, the Antrophocene brings about new 
challenges that are likely to alter the natural hydrological cycle beyond recognition6. With 
stationarity being declared dead by science, the policy and governance frameworks must move 
on too.  
 
All the more so as the relevant forecasts by the EU’s environmental monitoring centre, the 
European Environment Agency, projects that the most important changes in hydrology in 
Europe will be manifested through increased fluctuations in river flow, a rise in hydrological 
extremes and, in many parts of the continent, loss of precipitation and prolonged droughts. This 
is in sharp contrast with the dominance of water quality considerations and the (almost) 
complete ignorance of water quantity management under contemporary European water law. 
In other words, the focus of collective action problems in shared EU basins is gradually shifting 
from transboundary pollution towards cross-border water quantity management. If, however, 
interstate competition for the shared, but limited resource becomes the main challenge in the 
numerous European watersheds, the one-sided ecological programme of today’s EU water 
                                                          
6 See section I.5.2. below. 
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policy is likely to prove inadequate to prevent differences, disputes or even serious conflicts in 
co-riparian relations. 
 
The research question  
 
This study aims to investigate the nature and the magnitude of the growing misfit between the 
objectives and tools of contemporary European water law and policy and the emerging 
hydrological realities. Challenges to the adequacy of the actual transboundary water governance 
regime may emerge not only as a result of the discrepancy between the regime in place and the 
hydrological conditions they are supposed to handle. They may also develop as a result of the 
inability of the governance system to adapt to new circumstances. These represent two 
interconnected, yet autonomous aspects that can be expressed through the following questions: 
- is the existing governance regime fit to handle current and emerging hydrological and 
political challenges in a transboundary context? 
- is the existing regime capable to dynamically adapt to new hydrological and the ensuing 
political challenges or its evolution is blocked by systemic legal, institutional or political 
obstacles? 
 
The first question represents the static dimension of the issue. In this narrower sense the 
resilience (and its antonym: vulnerability) of transboundary water governance is understood as 
the presence (or the lack) of risks of political dispute over shared water systems in the European 
Union. This condition can be best analysed through the various legal and institutional indicators 
developed by different schools of hydropolitics.  
 
The second question relates to the dynamic aspect of resilience, i.e. the ability of the governance 
system to evolve so as to perform its original functions under new circumstances without major 
disruptions. This condition can be best evaluated by various indicators developed by resilience 
science to measure the adaptive capacity of socio-economic systems.  
 
Scope, methodology and terminology clarified 
 
As already mentioned, the stability of co-riparian relations is very much determined by a 
number of normative  factors. Therefore, the main focus of this study is the analysis of the legal 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2019.003
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frameworks that govern the interaction of states in shared river basins within the European 
Union. Thus, the analyses to follow are predominantly normative in nature, i.e. drawing 
conclusions from the existence (or lack) and the content of relevant legal norms. Where the 
sheer content of norms does not permit to come to conclusive findings, an assessment of the 
actual application of the legal rule at issue will also be undertaken from the perspective of 
administrative structures, political circumstances, cultural conditions, etc. as the latter also tend 
to influence the behaviour of basin states significantly. Following the established terminology 
of the relevant literature these legal and non-legal factors will be referred to collectively as 
“transboundary water governance”. While “water governance” on its own is a somewhat fluid 
construct, it is nonetheless widely used as an umbrella concept encompassing the institutional, 
legal, political and policy framework of water management7. Consequently, in this context 
water law will be referred to as a sublet of water governance that comprises legally binding 
norms.  
 
Given the inter-disciplinary character of the research questions, this study will also borrow the 
applicable terminology of other disciplines such as international relations, resilience or system 
science. Wherever the specific technical content of these terms so requires, a definition or 
explanation will be provided.  
 
The geographical focus of this study is confined to international river systems shared fully or 
partly by the member states of the European Union. This implies two important limitations. 
First, not all transboundary movements of water will be covered, only those taking place as a 
result of the hydrological cycle in natural (or man-made) catchment areas. Consequently, the 
impact of the import or export of water as a stand-alone commodity (through pipelines or in 
bottles) or as a component of other commodities (in foods or other drinks) on international 
relations will not be analysed. Also, the (otherwise critical) issue of transboundary aquifers will 
be addressed only as an ancillary subject. This is due to the fact that the bulk of the regulatory 
regimes studied have been designed from a clear surface water perspective. As a result, the 
rules governing transboundary groundwater management are either very general in nature or 
very narrow in terms of geographical coverage. These conditions significantly constrain the 
                                                          
7 SZILÁGYI, János Ede (2018): Vízszemléletű kormányzás – vízpolitika – vízjog [Water governance – water policy 
– water law], Miskolc, Miskolci Egyetemi Kiadó, p. 23. PAHL-WOSTL, Claudia, GUPTA, Joyeeta and PETRY, Daniel 
(2008): Governance and the Global Water System: A Theoretical Exploration, Global Governance 14, pp. 419-
436, p. 419. 
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scope for generalisation as opposed to the case of surface water. Second, the below analysis 
will not cover European rivers basins that lay entirely outside the European Union (Volga, 
Dnepr, Dniester, etc.). Thus, the term “Europe” and “European Union” will not be used 
interchangeably: Europe will refer to the European continent, while the European Union will 
denote the territory of the European Union or the EU as supranational legal and political entity. 
In turn, “European water law” will be used to encompass four regulatory layers of 
transboundary water governance: (i) the treaty framework of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE), (ii) the European Union’s sui generis legislative framework 
as well as (iii) multilateral and (iv) bilateral water treaties to which at least one EU member 
state is a party. Although these regulatory regimes do not form a comprehensive corpus of law, 
they nonetheless have to be applied by national water managers even against occasional internal 
collisions.  
 
In view of the above qualifications the first research question will be answered through the 
application of a number of well-established formal legal and institutional indicators to all four 
layers of European water law. This implies a detailed analysis of UNECE and EU law as well 
as multilateral basin and bilateral water treaties. Given the straight-forward character and the 
wide use of these indicators, their application to the EU situation provides clear-cut and easily 
comparable results. The second research question will be answered through three indicators 
relating to the adaptive capacity of natural resource governance systems as developed by 
resilience science. Here, the more fluid nature of the topic does not permit to draw unambiguous 
conclusions. Yet, by way of identifying certain critical legal, institutional and political obstacles 
the resilience indicators chosen may nonetheless provide useful information about the capacity 
of EU water governance to adapt to emerging hydrological and political challenges.  
 
Structure 
 
This study comprises four parts.  
 
Part I provides a summary of the general questions of transboundary water governance, 
including the geography, the theories, the laws and institutions of transboundary water 
cooperation. Part I closes with a detailed analysis of the challenges posed by the Antrophocene 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2019.003
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to co-riparian relations and introduces the notions of water security and hydropolitical 
resilience.  
 
Following an exposition of the geography and hydrology of shared river basins in the European 
Union, Part II contains an introduction to the specific European model of transboundary water 
governance. This includes the detailed description of all four layers of European water law as 
well as a critical analysis of the interaction among them.  
 
Part III contains the bulk of the research underpinning this study. The first research question is 
analysed along the following indicators: management of water quantity, management of water 
quality, cooperation over planned measures and the management of hydrological variability in 
shared river basins as well as dispute settlement within the European Union. It is followed by a 
qualitative assessment of the adaptive capacity of the European system of transboundary water 
governance along three additional indicators: coordination among the different levels and actors 
of governance, transfer of information and feedback and the authority and flexibility in 
decision-making and problem-solving.  
 
Part IV summarises the main findings of the study and formulates recommendations to 
European and national decision-makers with a view to eliminating the hydropolitical 
vulnerabilities identified.  
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PART I 
GENERAL QUESTIONS OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Chapter 1 
Geography of transboundary water governance 
 
I.1.1. Transboundary river basins defined 
 
Following commonly accepted geographical definitions8 a “river basin” is understood in the 
context of this study as an area which contributes to a first order stream9. First order streams 
are those that communicate directly with the final recipient of water (oceans, closed inland lakes 
or lakes). As a result, subsidiary basins are not accounted for as independent hydrological units 
however sizable they may be (e.g. the entire Sava catchment forms part of the Danube basin).  
 
A river basin is considered “transboundary” (“international”, “shared”, etc.) when it intersects 
or demarcates political boundaries. Such intersection or demarcation can take several forms. In 
fact, the relevant literature distinguishes no less than 14 (!) geographical configurations just for 
rivers shared by two countries10. Importantly, a river basin qualifies as transboundary not only 
where a particular stream effectively flows through or creates state borders, but where political 
borders intersect parts of the catchment area that discharges water into the basin only through 
downhill drain of rain or snow melt or through the subsoil. Such broad construction of a 
“transboundary” or “international” river basin is supported by relevant international legal 
instruments, including the UN Watercourses Convention11, the UNECE Water Convention12 or 
the EU’s Water Framework Directive13. This is an important condition as earlier political and 
                                                          
8 WOLF, Aaron T. et al. (1999): International river basins of the world, International Journal of Water Resources 
Development 15:4 pp. 387–427, p. 389. 
9 The terms “catchment”, “drainage area” “river” and “watercourse” will be used interchangeably with “river 
basin” throughout this study.  
10 DINAR, Shlomi (2008): International Water Treaties – Negotiation and cooperation along transboundary rivers, 
London, Routledge, Appendix B, p. 132. 
11 “Watercourse means a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical 
relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus”. Article 2.a., Convention on the Law 
of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, New York, 21 May 1997. 
12 “Transboundary waters means any surface or ground waters which mark, cross or are located on boundaries 
between two or more States; wherever transboundary waters flow directly into the sea, these transboundary waters 
end at a straight line across their respective mouths between points on the low-water line of their banks”. Article 
1.2, Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes, Helsinki, 17 March 1992. 
13 „River basin means the area of land from which all surface run-off flows through a sequence of streams, rivers 
and, possibly, lakes into the sea at a single river mouth, estuary or delta.” Article 2.13, Directive 2000/60/EC of 
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judicial practice followed a much narrower approach, attaching legal relevance only to the 
navigable sections of international rivers. Although this is no longer the case today, some 
countries have, until relatively recently, used this argument to deny the international character 
of the basin14.  
 
While this study does not address the issue in any length, mention also must be made of “federal 
river basins”, i.e. basins that are shared by the constituent units of the 28 or so federal or quasi 
federal countries of the world15. While in the eyes of international law, these basins lay within 
a single constitutional system (i.e. they are not international), they too are governed by multiple 
jurisdictions displaying characteristics similar to those of the “proper” transboundary 
watersheds. Some of the largest river systems of the world are actually both “transboundary” 
(international) and “federal”16. 
 
I.1.2. Delineating transboundary river basins: the methodological 
challenges 
 
Delineation of transboundary surface waters is a complex cartographical and political exercise 
and, as such, it is not completely free from controversy. Given the potentially contentious nature 
of the issue research on the precise extent of international river basins has, until relatively 
recently, been somewhat neglected17. Thus, up to the year 2000 the most commonly used data 
source was a 1978 United Nations compendium – the Register of International Rivers18 (the 
“1978 Register”) – developed by the now defunct Centre for Natural Resources, Energy and 
Transport of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The 1978 Register – 
essentially a desktop study using solely maps available at the time at the UN Map Library, – 
grossly underestimated the number of transboundary basins, giving an erroneous impression of 
the overall magnitude and extent of the phenomenon19.  
                                                          
the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water 
policy. 
14 ALLOUCHE, Jeremy (2005): Water Nationalism: An Explanation of Past and Present Conflicts in Central Asia, 
the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent? Ph.D. Thesis No. 699, Geneva, Université de Genève, p. 11. 
15 GARRICK, Dustin et al. (2013): Federal rivers: managing water in multi-layered political systems, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, p.2. 
16 See section 1.1.3. below. 
17 BISWAS, Asit K. (2007): Management of Transboundary Waters: an Overview. In VARIS, Olli, TORTAJADA, 
Cecilia and BISWAS, Asit K. (Eds.): Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, Berlin, Heidelberg, 
Springer, pp. 1-21., p. 6-8. 
18 UNITED NATIONS (1978): Register of International Rivers, Oxford, Pergamon Press 
19 BISWAS (2007) op. cit. p. 7. 
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This knowledge base has been substantially refined by Aaron Wolf and his team in the late 
1990s using modern satellite mapping technologies20. The results of this seminal research is 
summarised and regularly updated in the frame of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database (“TFDD”) maintained by the Oregon State University21.  
 
Yet, despite recent political attention dedicated to the subject and the massive improvement in 
digital mapping, the most widely referenced international databases that exist on the subject 
today contain slightly different figures on the scale and distribution of international river basins. 
Some of these variations are attributable to differences in map coverage and technology. Others 
are due to deliberate choices over the classification of various fluvial sub-systems. For instance, 
geographers usually consider river systems to form a single basin solely on the basis of their 
confluence into a single coastal unit (e.g. the Rhine/the Meuse/the Scheldt), while others treat 
such rivers as autonomous22. In many cases the catchment area of a river is located almost 
exclusively in one country (e.g. 99% of the river Seine can be found in France). Thus, in view 
of the insignificant contribution of the lesser riparian such a basin is unlikely to qualify as 
international, even though in the strict sense of the term it should be considered so. Changes in 
or uncertainties over political boundaries evidently complicate the picture too (e.g. the gradual 
disintegration of Yugoslavia since 1991 increased, in several steps, the number of international 
basins in the Balkan region significantly). Finally, the rapid development of satellite imaging 
technologies also necessitate the regular refinement of the core geographical information 
relating to international river basins that may eventually lead to the minor corrections in existing 
databases. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the above uncertainties and minor discrepancies it is widely recognised 
that today we have a reasonably precise knowledge of the key relevant indicators, such as the 
location and number of transboundary river basins around the world23. In the context of this 
study, however, figures relating to international rivers systems are only used for illustrative 
purposes. Differences among various datasets therefore do not influence the substance of the 
underlying research objective and methodology.  
                                                          
20 WOLF et al. (1999) op. cit. 
21 http://transboundarywaters.science.oregonstate.edu/content/transboundary-freshwater-dispute-database 
(accessed 12 February 2019). 
22 E.g. the TFDD considers the river Meuse/Maas as part of the larger hydrological system of the Rhine, while it 
Europe it is commonly treated as a distinct river system. See WOLF et al. (1999) op. cit. p. 389. 
23 BISWAS (2007) op. cit. p. 6. 
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1.1.3. Distribution of transboundary river basins in the world 
 
Transboundary river basins are ubiquitous around the world. The Transboundary Freshwater 
Dispute Database identifies 263 international river basins (Figure 1). According to this dataset 
the European continent has the largest number of international basins (69), followed by Africa 
(59), Asia (57), North America (40), and South America (38). The number of countries that 
contribute to transboundary basins is 145, thus the majority of countries share at least one 
transboundary river basin with neighbouring countries. 33 of these, including such sizeable 
countries as Bolivia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Hungary, Niger or Zambia have 
more than 95% of their territories within the hydrologic boundaries of international river basins.  
 
Transboundary basins cover about 47% of the Earth’s surface (Antarctica excluded). These 
basins account for about 60% of the global river flow. About 40% of the global population lives 
in basins shared by at least two countries24.  Countries with no shared basins are either islands 
or microstates, except for the countries of the Arabian Peninsula where no permanent 
watercourses exist25. 
 
All basins differ in terms of size, political complexity, hydro-logical conditions, etc. Some, 
however, are extremely complex, the most notable of which is the Danube basin in the European 
continent with 19 riparian states26. There are three other basins shared by more than 10 
countries: the Congo (13), the Niger (11) and the Nile (11). The Rhine, Zambezi, Amazon, Aral 
Sea, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, Jordan, Kura-Araks, La Plata, Lake Chad, Mekong, 
Neman, Tarim, Tigris-Euphrates-Shatt al Arab, Vistula, and Volga basins each extend to the 
territory of at least five countries. Yet, the vast majority of international basins (176) are just 
shared by two states27.  
 
Needless to say, these raw figures conceal important differences among the various basins. E.g. 
there are some 100 rivers that flow from one country to another without ever forming a common 
border (through-border or contiguous rivers), while 17 rivers have been identified that define 
                                                          
24 WOLF et al. (1999) op. cit. p. 391-392.  
25 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT GROUP (2015): Water Cooperation Quotient, Mumbai, p. 37. 
26 See section II.2.2.3. below. 
27 WOLF et al. (1999), op. cit. p. 392-393.  
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the entire border between two countries without ever entering either of those (border-creator 
rivers)28.  
 
Figure 1: Transboundary river basins  
 
Source: Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database29 
http://transboundarywaters.science.oregonstate.edu/content/data-and-datasets (accessed 12 February 
2019) 
 
 
Rivers and lakes that are shared by the constituent units of federal or quasi federal countries 
serve around 40% of the global population30. They include some of the world’s largest river 
basins (Indus, Ganges-Brahmaputa, Amazon, etc.), a great number of which are international 
rivers at the same time (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 1. 
29 Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric 
Sciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found 
at: http://transboundarywaters.science.oregonstate.edu. 
30 GARRICK et al. (2012) op. cit. p. 1.  
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Figure 2: Federal river basins 
 
Dark green: domestic rivers falling with a single federal country, light green federal portion of a river 
basin shared by two or more countries (at least one being federal), yellow: non-federal basin units of 
international federal rivers, light orange: domestic rivers in unitary countries.  
Source: GARRICK at al. (2013) op. cit., p. 13, Figure 2.  
 
I.1.4. River basin typology  
 
Naturally, all river basins, transboundary or not, vary largely with regards to their particular 
hydro-climatic conditions. Based on such conditions rivers can be classified along three broad 
categories: highly variable/monsoonal, arid and semi-arid, and temperate31:  
- highly variable/monsoonal basins are characterised by extreme intra-annual 
variability (unpredictable seasonal and annual rainfall and runoff) and, 
consequently, a high degree of hydrological uncertainty that often implies severe 
floods and droughts. As their name suggests, they are mainly located in tropical 
monsoon areas. Historically these rivers have been a major source of rainfed and 
floodplain agriculture so the basins tend to be very densely populated (e.g. Ganges-
Brahmaputra or the Mekong basins). Monsoonal basins also happen to be relatively 
poor and underdeveloped, 
- arid and semi-arid basins face challenges of high freshwater variability and, 
ultimately, absolute scarcity. Chronic scarcity normally leads to intensive 
groundwater exploitation and extensive surface water infrastructure development, 
                                                          
31 Based on the classification by SADOFF, Claudia W. et al. (2015): Securing Water, Sustaining Growth: Report of 
the GWP/OECD Task Force on Water Security and Sustainable Growth, Oxford, University of Oxford, p. 29. 
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putting the ecological conditions of the river under severe strain. Arid and semi-arid 
basins are scattered in both developed and developing regions of the world. 
Examples include the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia, the Murray-Darling system in 
Australia, the lower Nile or the Colorado river in the US, etc.,  
- temperate basins are relatively evenly watered with moderate seasonal variations 
both in terms of precipitation and river flow. Many of such rivers systems can be 
found in the western hemisphere (e.g. the Rhine, the Great Lakes, the Danube) and 
have contributed very significantly to the development of modern economies and 
statehood. 
 
The above typology also provides a rough indication about the character and magnitude of the 
hydrological complexities – a combination of natural and human-induced water challenges – 
that are associated with particular river basins. Thus, temperate basins, especially with no 
radical and/or rapid changes in water use by riparian states, are relatively easy to govern 
collectively. On the other end of the spectrum lie those shared arid basins where fierce 
competition for water resources often lead to complex collective action problems, rendering 
political cooperation over transboundary basins cumbersome or almost impossible32.  
 
  
                                                          
32 See section I.2.2.4.a) below. 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of transboundary water governance 
 
I.2.1. The context: collective action problems and the hydropolitical 
cooperation dilemma 
 
While geography defines the possibilities for where, how and when water can be developed and 
used, political boundaries impose serious constraints on the actual water management choices 
available to national governments33. The disconnect between political and geographical scale – 
often coined as “spatial misfit” – gives rise to complicated cooperation dilemmas among 
riparian states of international river basins.  
 
At the core of such cooperation problems lies the natural asymmetry between upper and lower 
basin states created by the downstream motion of water that creates externalities that are mainly 
of negative and unidirectional in character. The changes in water quantity and/or flow timing, 
water quality, river morphology, etc. induced by one upper riparian can trigger widespread 
consequences on fluvial ecology, irrigation, agriculture, fisheries, energy production or 
navigation in downstream states. Consequently, upstream and downstream basin states are 
likely to have divergent interests, especially when reaping the benefits of the river is perceived 
as a zero-sum game. 
 
Externalities however do not always unfold in an upstream-to-downstream direction, neither 
are they necessarily negative in terms of their impact34. Measures taken by upstream countries 
to improve water quality (e.g. pollution prevention or flood control) have beneficial effects on 
downstream states too (without having to pay for it). A downstream riparian can also influence 
the use of water by upstream parties in a significant manner. The most evident domains of 
action include navigation (e.g. control of access to the recipient sea) and ecology (e.g. blocking 
fish migration)35.  
 
                                                          
33 ELHANCE, Arun (1999): Hydropolitics in the 3rd World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins, 
Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 15. 
34 MOELLENKAMP, Sabine (2007): The ”WFD-effect” on upstream-downstream relations in international river 
basins? insights from the Rhine and the Elbe basins, Hydrology and Earth System Sciences Discussions, European 
Geosciences Union 4 (3), pp.1407-1428, p. 1410. 
35 Ibid, p. 1411. 
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In summary: transboundary river basins are necessarily characterised by so-called collective 
action problems where all concerned players (basin states) would benefit from cooperation, but 
the magnitude and/or the difference in the associated costs to be borne by the parties can create 
an impediment to joint action. 
 
What are the typical collective action problems relative to shared rivers?  
 
Susanne Schmeier, a monographer of transboundary water cooperation, identifies the following 
12 broad categories of collective action problems: 
a) water quantity and allocation problems relating to the use of and the competition over 
water resources; 
b) water quality and pollution problems stemming from the intrusion of pollutants; 
c) hydropower and dam construction affecting the watercourse as a consequence of 
electricity generation; 
d) infrastructure development and its environmental consequences (other than d)); 
e) (other) environmental problems; 
f) climate change consequences; 
g) fishery problems (overfishing, competition for fishing grounds, etc.); 
h) economic development and the exploitation of river basin resources; 
i) invasive species; 
j) flood effects; 
k) biodiversity protection issues; 
l) navigation and transport-related problems36. 
 
Naturally, these collective action problems appear at different frequencies and represent very 
different levels of political complexity. Based on the study of 116 international river basins 
Schmeier concludes that issues related to water quantity and allocation clearly stand out both 
in terms of frequency and complexity. This is followed by concerns related to water 
                                                          
36 SCHMEIER, Suzanne (2013): Governing International Watercourses - River Basin Organizations and the 
sustainable governance of internationally shared rivers and lakes, London, Routledge, p. 68. Although such 
categorisation displays some inherent inconsistencies (e.g. how to distinguish between environment protection, 
invasive species, biodiversity etc.), it nonetheless does provide a representative collection of the main issues 
riparian states regularly face in shared river basins.  
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quality/pollution. Other collective problems, such as hydropower development or fisheries 
emerge in much smaller numbers (Figure 3)37.  
 
Figure 3: frequency of key water-related collective action problems 
 
    Source: SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 68, Figure 3.3. 
 
Moreover, different collective action problems influence the prospects of conflict or 
cooperation in very different ways. Certain issues may touch upon vital national interests (e.g. 
the presence or lack of water downstream), while others, such as navigation or fisheries, usually 
represent a much lower level of conflict potential38.  
 
The hydro-political cooperation dilemma, i.e. why some countries cooperate over shared 
watercourses while others do not, is therefore very much influenced by a number of variables 
relating to the underlying hydrological conditions of the basin at issue as well as the nature of 
the collective action problems prevailing in given co-riparian relations.  
 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, p. 71. 
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I.2.2. Theories of conflict and cooperation over transboundary 
watercourses 
 
I.2.2.1.  Overview 
 
The 1970s brought environmental preoccupations into the forefront of the study of interstate 
relations, elevating water among the mainstream subjects of international security discourse39. 
Early studies relating to the international politics of water, however, almost exclusively focused 
on the conflict potential of transboundary basins and relied on the analytical and linguistic 
apparatus of such established concepts of international relations as realism, liberalism and their 
multiple variations. The expansion of empirical research on the subject in the 1980s and 1990s 
gave new impetus to the “the systematic study of conflict and cooperation between states over 
water resources that transcend international borders”, commonly referred to as hydropolitics40.  
 
Within the first generation of hydropolitical studies two distinct schools of thought emerged: 
one concentrating on the potential of conflicts triggered by competition for water and one 
focusing on the cooperative imperative over transboundary water resources41. Over time, the 
initial “water wars” literature has largely been proven unfounded by the relatively low number 
of water-related interstate incidents and the growing number of cooperative arrangements 
worldwide. Yet, the so-called institutionalist approach – underlining the importance of formal 
cooperative arrangements – has also failed to provide a comprehensive explanation of the 
grossly divergent quality of co-riparian relations. More recently, a new wave of research has 
emerged with a view to overcoming the conflict and cooperation divide. Scholars of this branch 
recognise the inherent complexity of water relations, underlining that the empirics of 
hydropolitics suggest that conflict and cooperation are not necessarily contradictory, but can 
occur simultaneously42.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 ALLOUCHE (2005) op. cit. p. 39. 
40 ELHANCE (1999) op. cit. p. 3. 
41 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 10. 
42 Ibid p. 13. 
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I.2.2.2. Theoretical foundations: realism, liberalism and the management of transboundary 
water resources  
 
a) Realism and neorealism: cooperation as an anomaly 
 
The realist and neorealist schools of international relations are based on the proposition that 
interstate relations are fundamentally anarchical in nature as countries are driven by egoism, 
the need for survival and power43. States are considered rational actors, although their behaviour 
largely reflects human nature. Short of an overarching global authority states are left to their 
own devices, a condition that favours self-help, suspicion and insecurity. Under these 
circumstances international relations are nothing, but a constant struggle for power and relative 
gains. In this harsh environment, cooperation is an anomaly. Therefore, cooperation only 
emerges where a regional power takes the initiative to formulate a cooperative regime on its 
own terms (hegemonic stability theory). Cooperation arrangements may be concluded in the 
absence of a regional hegemon too. They will, however, be a mere reflection of the existing 
distribution of power. Cooperation may also emerge where the agreement favours the 
participants in equal measure, but that is considered an exception44. 
 
The realist approach to transboundary water governance is eloquently formulated by Lord 
Birdwood, a senior British colonial army officer, who in 1954 summed up the political character 
of co-riparian relations as a zero-sum game burdened with suspicion and distrust:  
 
“[o]f the elements that make for political controversy in human affairs, the control of 
water is one of the most persistent… The last community to get the water is always 
suspicious of the intentions of those upstream”45.  
 
b) Liberalism, institutionalism: cooperation as a rational choice 
 
The liberal school of international relations views interaction among states through the lens of 
positive mutual interdependencies. Thus, states cooperate not because of coercion or a sense of 
vulnerability, rather, out of mutual interest. As such, unilateralism and sheer power politics, 
                                                          
43 GOODIN, Robert E. (2010): The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
p. 133. 
44 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 12. 
45 Lord Christopher Birdwood, quoted by DINAR (2008) op. cit.  p. 37.  
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projected by the realist theory, may turn counterproductive as in reality no state may act 
completely freely without some kind of cooperation with others46. It follows that in international 
river basins the various water-related and non-hydrological interdependencies among upstream 
and downstream countries create powerful incentives to cooperate so as to collectively 
maximise the benefits of water in the entire basin. In other words, states seek to maximise their 
absolute benefits through cooperation and are less concerned with the relative gains of other 
countries47.  
 
Within the liberal school the so-called institutionalism is one of the most relevant theories. In 
the institutionalists’ view the creation of formal institutional arrangements greatly enhances the 
success of cooperation as these institutions provide states with a platform of discussion, 
decision-making, information gathering, technical assistance, etc. They also contribute to 
confidence building and a culture of compliance thereby creating an atmosphere conducive to 
collaboration48.  
 
I.2.2.3. Modern hydropolitics: schools of water wars and the water cooperation 
 
a) The water wars thesis 
 
The water wars literature flourished in the 1980s and 1990s during and after the demise of the 
bi-polar global political system that gave rise to new global security challenges49. However, the 
water war prognostics gained fresh currency in more recent times in the light of the 
intensification of climate change whose impacts are mainly manifested through changes in 
hydrology50.  
 
                                                          
46 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 13. 
47 DOMBROWSKY, Ines (2009): Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in the management of transboundary 
rivers, Water Policy 11, pp. 125-140, p. 125. 
48 REES, Gerdy (2010): The Role of Power and Institutions in Hydrodiplomacy: Does Realism or Neo-Liberal 
Institutionalism offer a stronger theoretical basis for analysing inter-state cooperation over water security? MA 
paper, London, School of Oriental and African Studies, p. 13. 
49 TURTON, Anthony (2008): The Southern African Hydropolitical Complex. In VARIS, Olli, TORTAJADA, Cecilia 
and BISWAS, Asit K. (Eds.): Management of Transboundary Rivers and Lakes, Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer, pp. 
21-80, p. 22. 
50 DINAR, Shlomi et al. (2014): Climate Change, Conflict, and Cooperation – Global Analysis of the Resilience of 
International River Treaties to Increased Water Variability, Policy Research Working Paper 6916, The World 
Bank Development Research Group, Washington D.C., p. 3. 
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The starting point of the water wars theory is that water is such a fundamental natural asset that 
competing human, economic, social and ecological needs inevitably lead to competition for the 
same resource. Consequently, when water becomes scarce states may choose to respond to this 
pressure by seeking a solution outside their boundaries. Water scarcity and poor distribution 
therefore magnify the potential for conflict in transboundary basins51. This potential grows 
significantly when the availability of water drops below a critical level (i.e. the downward 
supply curve crosses the demand curve)52. In addition to scarcity, a number of other factors may 
augment tensions among riparian states. These include the relative power of basin states and 
their respective location, the presence of negative transboundary impacts (other than 
unsatisfactory allocation) or interlinkages between water and other issues53. Psychological 
factors, such (the perceived) exposure to unilateral overexploitation or degradation of the 
resource by another riparian also make countries more prone to conflict54.  
 
Despite its popular appeal, however, the water war thesis has turned out to be largely 
unfounded. While the potential for conflict undeniably exists, the water war theorists have been 
rightly criticised as alarmists whose conclusions have been based more on speculation than 
examination of how water relates to conflict. Empirical research by Aaron Wolf and his team 
at the Oregon State University have unambiguously demonstrated that water wars are neither 
prevalent, nor inevitable. Water war theorists wrongly based their arguments on a number of 
water conflicts confined to the Middle East which displays a rare and particularly flammable 
combination of water scarcity and political instability. In reality, cooperative engagements 
among riparian states grossly outnumber water-related incidents worldwide. Armed conflicts 
triggered directly by water are even less common, with the last recorded hostility having ended 
in the 1970s55.  
 
Theoretical arguments also support cooperation, rather than conflict over shared water 
resources. Wolf contends that launching military action for water would only make sense by a 
downstream regional hegemon against a weaker upstream riparian. There are only a few river 
                                                          
51 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 10. 
52 See e.g. COOLEY, John. K. (1984): The war over water, Foreign Policy 54, pp. 3–26, STARR, Joyce R. (1991): 
Water wars, Foreign Policy 82, pp. 17–36; HOMER-DIXON, Thomas (1999): Environment, scarcity, and violence, 
Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press. 
53 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 11. 
54 ELHANCE (1999) op. cit. p. 4. 
55 DELLI PRISCOLI, Jerome and WOLF, Aaron T. (2009): Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, p. 12-14. 
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basins in the world where such a scenario may become plausible at all (e.g. Nile, La Plata)56. 
Even in such cases, however, the political, economic and human costs of an armed intervention 
would be disproportionately high for a natural resource that, in many cases, is relatively cheap 
to obtain through other methods, e.g. seawater desalination57. 
 
b) Institutionalism and the cooperation imperative 
 
The prevalence of the water wars thesis throughout the 1980s and 1990s has given rise to a new 
school of hydropolitical research focusing on the cooperative potential of international rivers. 
The cooperation school significantly expanded the empirical research base of the water wars 
theorists focusing on legal and institutional arrangements that bode for the stability of riparian 
relations. The large body of qualitative analyses carried out by Aaron Wolf, Arun Elhance, 
Anthony Turton, etc. has led to the development of a number of theoretical conclusions that 
provide an explanation as to why cooperation, rather than conflict, dominates co-riparian 
relations in most parts of the world.  
 
They argue that mutual interdependencies among basin states and the limited chance of success 
through violence create powerful incentives for states to cooperate even over the most difficult 
water-related issues. This is eloquently demonstrated by the fact that riparian states of arid 
basins – particularly prone to clashes over water according to the realist view – indeed display 
high level of cooperation under institutional arrangements that tend to survive otherwise 
strained interstate relations58. Thus, the cooperative school of hydropolitics follows an 
institutionalist approach in so far as it views the existence of formal basin arrangements 
(treaties, institutions, mechanisms) as the main token of the stability of co-riparian relations for 
they provide the platform to turn collective action problems into cooperation59.  
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Ibid p. 22. 
57 “Why go to war over water? For the price of one week’s fighting, you could build five desalination plants. No 
loss of life, no international pressure, and a reliable supply you don’t have to defend in hostile territory” (Israeli 
Defence Forces analyst responsible for long-term planning during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon). Quoted in DELLI 
PRISCOLI and WOLF (2009) op. cit. p. 23. 
58 WOLF, Aaron T. (2009): Hydropolitical vulnerability and resilience. In UNEP: Hydropolitical Vulnerability and 
Resilience along International Waters – Europe, Nairobi, pp. 1-16., p. 11.  
59 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 12. 
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c) Moving beyond the conflict and cooperation divide 
 
The institutionalist school of hydropolitics has been hugely successful in disproving the water 
wars theory and in identifying the drivers of transboundary water cooperation. Yet, there are 
several large river basins in the world that experience a “no war, no cooperation” phenomenon. 
These are where significant cooperation gaps exist, yet the situation does not evolve into a 
serious conflict either. This paradox has given rise to a new generation of hydropolitical 
research that relies on the observation that conflict and cooperation are not necessarily 
contradictory, but can occur simultaneously60.  
 
New approaches to transboundary water politics also emerge outside the traditional 
hydropolitical schools. Game theory and economic analyses of basin state conduct have 
recently made important contributions to explaining why states choose to cooperate over shared 
water resources. Several authors have analysed the cooperation of riparian states through their 
strategic interactions (i.e. the impact of basin state behaviour on others) and come to the 
conclusion that states can maximise their use of the shared nature resource (“pay-offs” in game 
theory jargon) by way of establishing cooperative arrangements61. For an arrangement like that 
to be workable, however, it should be based on an incentive structure and institutional design 
that guarantees that no party can gain by leaving the agreement or by failing to comply. In other 
words, the success of cooperation is based on the presumption that the participating states can 
maximise their collective payoffs with regards to the shared river only together62.  
I.2.2.4. Geographical and political variables influencing interstate cooperation  
 
The above theories explain state conduct with regards to shared water resources in broad general 
terms. There exists, however, a number of variables that in specific basins may influence 
riparian behaviour significantly and, as such, may turn out to be critical drivers of conflict or 
cooperation irrespective of the foregoing theoretical premises. The relevant literature clusters 
these factors as follows: 
 
a) Geography and the availability of water  
 
                                                          
60 Ibid p. 13. 
61 E.g. DINAR (2008) op. cit., DOMBROWSKY (2009) op. cit.. 
62 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 14. 
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The starting point of the politics of transboundary water cooperation is that the geography of 
river systems hardly coincides with political boundaries. This discrepancy, however, shows 
significant variations. While in a pure “through-border” configuration upstream-downstream 
asymmetry applies in its fullest, in “border-creator” situations riparian states are exposed to the 
consequences of each other’s actions in equal measure (Figure 4). Consequently, although the 
upstream-downstream dichotomy pervades through most transboundary relationships, each 
basin faces its own unique problems and challenges based on riverine geography.  
 
Figure 4: Through-border and border-creator river configurations 
 
  Source: DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 3, Figure 1.1.  
 
The other geographical/hydrological factor most likely to determine the quality and nature of 
co-riparian relations is the availability of water. Availability of water is, on the one hand, 
determined by supply, i.e. the physical hydro-climatic conditions of the basin (precipitation, 
evaporation, groundwater reserves) as well as accessibility to the resource (infrastructure). On 
the other hand, availability is equally influenced by water demand. When demand exceeds 
supply water becomes scarce. Indeed, water scarcity lies at the core of the water war theory 
suggesting that a high degree of scarcity is directly linked to an increased likelihood of conflict 
and a low likelihood of institutional cooperation63. However, as shown above, while scarcity 
undeniably increases competition for water both domestically and internationally, the causal 
link between water scarcity and conflict has not been proven64. Instead, empirical research 
shows that although the lack of water can become an important irritant in co-riparian relations, 
but it usually acts only as an indirect cause for transboundary conflict at most65.  
 
                                                          
63 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 14. 
64 See section I.2.2.3.a) above. 
65 ALLOUCHE (2005) op. cit. p. 90. 
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b) Sovereignty, territorial integrity and security 
 
Countries often feel that cooperation over transboundary watercourses and lakes affects core 
concerns of statehood such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and security66.  The sovereignty 
implications of the management of transboundary waters, however, vary greatly with region 
and issue.  
 
In regions characterised by high political tensions or a history of unilateralism, entering into 
legally regulated or institutionalised cooperation over shared rivers may give rise to a suspicion 
of external intrusion or a concern to surrender decision-making power to a supranational 
entity67. Such complacency is more characteristic of upstream states, especially, if they follow 
the concept of extreme territorial sovereignty over natural resources or they perceive that a 
planned agreement would cede some control over the flow of water to downstream users68. 
Interestingly, such strong sentiment of exposure and vulnerability often emerges very intensely 
among the constituent units of federal countries, rendering shared river basin management a 
major test of federal systems of governance69.  
 
Naturally, not all water-related issues have strong sovereignty or security implications. 
Empirical evidence suggests that many of the most prevalent transboundary water challenges 
are relatively neutral or even “benign” in nature. The resolution of such issues as navigation or 
flood management is usually perceived by riparian states as mutually beneficial. On the other 
hand, certain questions, especially those relating to water quantity and water allocation have a 
very strong conflict potential, particularly in areas where water resources are scarce or under 
intensive human pressures. Such “malign” water issues are therefore treated as highly relevant 
for national security, a factor that may weaken the prospects of effective cooperation (Figure 
3)70.   
 
 
                                                          
66 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 16. 
67 SUBRAMANIAN, Ashok, BROWN, Bridget and WOLF, Aaron T. (2014): Understanding and overcoming risks to 
cooperation along transboundary rivers, Water Policy 16, pp. 824-843, p. 835. 
68 E.g. in the Ganges basin signing an agreement that guaranteed flows of the river to Bangladesh was perceived 
as a risk by India as it recognised the right of the downstream riparian to certain flows from the Farakka dam, ibid. 
69 GARRICK et al. (2014) op. cit. p. 3. 
70 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 70-71. 
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c) The geopolitical setting and non-water-related political integration 
 
The aggregate political and economic power of the countries concerned may play a crucial role 
in transboundary water relations too. Significant imbalances in regional power relationships 
may impede or foster cooperation, depending on the position of the hegemonic actor in the 
basin. The presence or the lack of major power asymmetries in the watershed and the behaviour 
of the regional hegemon is likely to determine the nature and structure of the relevant 
hydropolitical regime71. E.g. where no major power asymmetries exist, states are likely to create 
egalitarian basin-wide cooperation regimes. Such arrangements normally emerge in wider 
political settings such as the European Union72. However, in regions dominated by a regional 
hegemon such parity may not be in the interest of the hegemonic party, if it implies 
relinquishing existing control or influence over water resources73. Especially, where the 
regional hegemon lays upstream (e.g. China, India, Turkey), the likelihood that it will 
unilaterally exploit its position remains high. In such basins the regional hydropolitical regime 
is likely to be dominative with no pretence of equality. Where the regional power lays 
downstream, it may find it more beneficial to become the engine of cooperation (e.g. South 
Africa in the framework of the Southern African Development Community)74.  
 
It must be underlined, however, that the mere location of a hegemon in the basin is not a 
necessary precursor to either conflict or cooperation. There are positive examples where the 
upstream regional power is a real driver of cooperation (e.g. in the US-Mexico context). 
Equally, experience shows that downstream hegemons can have significant interests in 
blocking, rather than fostering broader transboundary cooperative arrangements so as to exploit 
upstream political division to its own benefit (e.g. Egypt in the Nile basin)75. In any case, the 
lack of major power imbalances in the basin tends to be conducive of creating resilient 
cooperation mechanisms even among a large number of riparian countries (Danube, Lower 
Mekong, etc.).  
 
                                                          
71 ZEITOUN, Mark and WARNER, Jeroen (2006): Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary 
water conflicts, Water Policy 8, pp. 435–460, p. 436. 
72 REES (2010) op. cit. p. 18. 
73 NEWTON, Joshua (2014): “Water, Water Everywhere, Nor any Drop to Drink”: An Exploration of the Lack of a 
Formal Global Water Governance Regime, PhD Thesis, Medford, Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, p. 257. 
74 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 19-21. 
75 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 76. 
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d) The level of economic development and the economic importance of the river 
 
Different levels and/or dynamics of national development in the same basin can also become 
important drivers of tension or cooperation. The increasing water demand of a fast developing 
riparian inevitably leads to a stronger competition for the same resource. Not surprisingly, as 
explained above, most water conflicts are therefore triggered by water allocation and 
infrastructure development76. On the other hand, more developed regions with limited or 
controllable urbanisation/developmental/population pressures tend to have better political and 
technological capabilities to manage a shared river basin77.  
 
The actual economic importance of the shared water resources at issue also influences the 
dynamics of co-riparian relations. Arid downstream countries whose supplies depend on the 
headwaters of large transboundary rivers (e.g. Nile→Egypt, Tigris-Euphrates→Iraq) are 
particularly sensitive to any upstream manipulation of river flow or water quality. The key 
economic importance of a river is not necessarily linked to its central geographical position, 
peripheral rivers can also play vital roles in a nation’s economy (e.g. Moldova only controls 
450(!) meters of the shore of the Danube at the outermost corner of the country, yet it hosts the 
nation’s only port accessible by seagoing vessels). 
 
e) Domestic issues 
 
Internal issues, such as domestic political rivalry, identity or national values may also hamper 
efforts of transboundary water cooperation. The strong political and emotional mobilising 
power of water renders intra-basin cooperation an easy subject for national(istic) political 
rhetoric. Therefore, transboundary water disputes often arise or remain unresolved due to 
domestic political determinations78. Indeed, some authors even contend that it is “water 
nationalism” – an ideological proposition linking water to state-building and nation-making – 
that is the main driver of transbounday water conflicts79. Take, for example, the notorious 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dispute which seems to remain unresolved for decades due to 
competing political narratives in Slovakia and Hungary surrounding the construction of the 
                                                          
76 See section I.2.2.4.a) above. 
77 DELLI PRISCOLI and WOLF (2009) op. cit. p. 18. 
78 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 30-32. 
79 ALLOUCHE (2005) op. cit. p. 91. 
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Gabčíkovo hydropower complex, leaving no room for a common ground acceptable in both 
countries80.  
 
Certain authors underline the central role of political leaders in the emergence or resolution of 
water disputes. Records show that when politicians at most senior level engage in the resolution 
of transboundary water problems the chances of a rapid solution rises significantly81. Likewise, 
national political leaders may choose to exploit the negative mobilising force of transboundary 
water issues in view of its potential impact on the decision-maker’s public image and re-election 
potential82.  
 
f) Capacity shortages 
 
Managing co-riparian relations demands significant administrative and technical capacities. 
Some countries, especially developing ones, however, often lack the resources to establish or 
maintain robust mechanisms for transboundary water cooperation. This does not only pose an 
evident technical barrier, but may also give rise to a fear that they may not be able to negotiate 
an optimal deal or fully benefit from a new or existing governance framework. This is 
particularly problematic, if there are large discrepancies among riparian states in terms of 
aggregate power that usually reflects similar gaps in basin hydrology, ecology, infrastructure, 
economics, etc. Examples include the cumbersome and wary negotiations in the Nile and the 
Zambezi basins, where certain countries deliberately impede or frustrate negotiations, even if 
they are likely to benefit from the eventual cooperation regime83.   
 
g) Cultural factors 
 
Transboundary water issues often revolve around core values and cultural constructions that 
date back to generations. These cultural or psychological factors (or the “national water ethos” 
coined by Aaron Wolf) may determine how a nation “feels” about its water resources. Such 
factors may include the “mythology” of water in national history, the religious dimensions of 
                                                          
80 BARANYAI, Gábor and BARTUS, Gábor (2016): Anatomy of a deadlock: a systemic analysis of why the 
Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros dam dispute is still unresolved, Water Policy 18, pp. 39-49, p. 45. 
81 DINAR (2008) op. cit. p. 31. 
82 SUBRAMANIAN, BROWN and WOLF (2014) op. cit. p. 836. 
83 Ibid p. 833. 
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water, the importance of water in national security discourse, etc.84 The importance of these 
domestic cultural factors tends to intensify in a transboundary context.  
 
Likewise, cultural differences (stereotypes of neighbouring nations, enemy images) can 
become major hindrances to cooperation. This applies particularly between riparian states with 
different religious backgrounds and/or where the river concerned is embroiled in identity 
concerns (examples include cooperation over the Ganges by Hindu India and Islamic 
Bangladesh)85. On the other hand, cultural similarities can be a major facilitator of cross-border 
water cooperation. E.g. the highly sophisticated system of transboundary water cooperation in 
Europe is attributed to a long history of cooperation, high degree of cultural homogeneity 
among the countries and a widely shared ecological consciousness86.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
84 DELLI PRISCOLI and WOLF (2009) op. cit. p. 18. 
85 ELHANCE (1999) op. cit. p. 169-171. 
86 MCCAFFREY, Stephen (2015): The 1997 UN Convention: Compatibility and Complementarity. In TANZI, Attila 
et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
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Chapter 3 
Laws of transboundary water governance 
 
I.3.1. The evolution of international water law 
 
International law started to address the problem of transboundary watercourses in a significant 
way following the Napoleonic wars when the expansion of commercial navigation on 
international rivers necessitated, for the first time, some kind of systematic collaboration among 
riparian states. As other uses, such as irrigation, hydropower or industrial consumption were at 
initial stages of development in the early nineteenth century, non-navigational activities escaped 
the attention of international politics and law altogether until relatively recently87.  
 
The first milestone in the evolution of international water law was the recognition of the 
principle of freedom of navigation on shared rivers by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815. This principle was reinforced and expanded repeatedly by various international treaties 
and was recognised by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1929 in the River Oder 
Case as customary international law88.  
 
Before World War II non-navigational questions, such water allocation, water quality or flood 
defence, were addressed only marginally, despite the fact that Treaties of Versailles after World 
War I already dealt explicitly with such issues as hydropower, irrigation and water supply89. 
E.g. the 1921 Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International 
Concern (Barcelona Convention), adopted under the auspices of the League of Nations, 
recognised the non-navigational uses of international rivers, but it did not go in any length to 
regulate the matter. Also, the 1923 General Convention Relating to the Development of 
Hydraulic Power Affecting More Than One State addressed a non-navigational issue per se, 
however, it never played any significant role in the development of the emerging principles of 
international water law90.  
 
                                                          
87 SALMAN, Salman M. A. (2009): The World Bank Policy for Projects on International Waterways: An Historical 
and Legal Analysis, Law, Justice and Development Series, Washington D.C., The World Bank, p. 10. 
88 Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission for the River Oder, PCIJ, Series A, 
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Following World War II non-navigational uses of transboundary basins have grown in 
importance in view of the multiplication of new and competing demands for water by 
agriculture, industrial, urban users, etc.91 Yet, it was not the riparian governments concerned or 
international organisations who were the drivers behind the development of the relevant 
international norms. Rather, they evolved incrementally through the work of two international 
legal associations and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. Particularly 
critical in this process were two arbitral awards and a judgement by the International Court of 
Justice: the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration92, the 1949 Corfu Channel case93 and the 1957 Lake 
Lanoux Arbitration94. The Trail Smelter case established the principle that no state can cause 
or permit its territory to cause serious environmental damage to another state. The Corfu 
Channel case confirmed the international legal responsibility of states for acts that occur in 
contravention of international law within their territory and result in damage to another states. 
Finally, the Lake Lanoux Arbitration concluded that the rights of downstream riparian states 
must be respected and its interests be taken into account by upstream users in the development 
of a shared waters.   
 
Equally important was the contribution of two international scholarly bodies, the Institute of 
International Law (IIL) and the International Law Association (ILA). The IIL had been active 
on the subject of non-navigational uses of international water since the early twentieth century. 
Its main contribution was its landmark Madrid Declaration that laid down the “no harm” 
principle, a cornerstone of today’s international water law as early as in 191195. The ILA started 
to work on transboundary water governance only in the 1950s, though its influence turned out 
to be even more important in the progressive development of international water law. In 1966 
the ILA adopted the so-called Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers 
whose foundational concept was the principle of equitable utilisation96. Soon after their 
issuance the Helsinki Rules were seen as the most authoritative set of rules concerning the use 
and protection of international watercourses and gradually became accepted by the international 
                                                          
91 ALLOUCHE (2005) op. cit. p. 31. 
92 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada) (1938, 1941) 3 RIAA 1905. 
93 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ Reports 1949, 4. 
94 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) (1957) RIAA 281. 
95 International Regulation regarding the Use of International Watercourses for Purposes other than Navigation - 
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community as reflecting customary international law97. In recognition of the work of these 
academic bodies the preamble to 1997 UN Watercourses Convention makes a special tribute 
for their critical contribution “to the codification and progressive development” of international 
freshwater law98. An updated and extended version of the Helsinki Rules were adopted by the 
ILA in 2004 under the title of the Berlin Rules on Water Resources99.  
 
Interestingly, in contrast to the dynamic evolution of the law of the non-navigational aspects of 
transboundary watercourses in the past decades, international law on navigation has remained 
largely unchanged during these years100. 
 
I.3.2. International water law today 
 
I.3.2.1. Sources 
 
Today, the use and protection of shared watercourses is governed by a number of fundamental 
principles rooted in general international law, two global legal instruments that lay down 
general cooperation frameworks for transboundary river basins – the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention and the 1992 UNECE Water Convention – as well as the considerable jurisprudence 
of the International Court of Justice and other international courts and tribunals101. Most of daily 
cross-border water management, however, takes place through the vast body of regional, basin 
and bilateral treaties that regulate co-riparian relations at various levels of detail. Indeed, the 
latter provides the real skeleton of transboundary water cooperation as the rather general nature 
of international water law and the lack of a robust supranational enforcement framework often 
creates situations where the solemn principles enshrined in the UN conventions provide very 
little guidance for countries to manage complicated intra-basin relations102.  
 
 
                                                          
97 SALMAN (2009) op. cit. p. 56. BRUHÁCS, János (2011): The International River Law in the Early 2000s. In 
KOVÁCS, Péter (ed): International Law – a Quiet Strength, Budapest, Pázmány Press, p. 233.  
98 Recital 10, Preamble, Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 
99 The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, Berlin Declaration, 21 August 2004. 
100 BRUHÁCS (2011) op. cit. p. 232.  
101 Ibid p. 232-237. 
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I.3.2.2.  Principles  
 
There appears to be scholarly consensus over the fact that the contemporary law of international 
watercourses is based on three core principles: equitable and reasonable utilisation, the 
prevention of significant (transboundary) harm and the prior notification of planned 
measures103. While no formal hierarchy exists among these principles, certain authors are 
nevertheless of the view that the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle enjoys 
prominence in international water law104.  
 
a) The beginning: early extreme doctrines  
 
Today’s principles of international water law have evolved in the past two centuries out of 
conflicting doctrines on state conduct concerning the permissible margin of sovereign action 
over shared natural resources.  
 
The first such fundamental concept is the so-called “absolute territorial sovereignty” or 
“Harmon” doctrine. It advocates the unlimited freedom of a state to exploit the waters of 
international rivers flowing through its territory, suggesting that states are not bound by 
international legal obligations whatsoever in relation to such water resources105. In other words, 
as the international river forms part of the public domain of the state concerned it may dispose 
of the water in its territory as it sees fit. A lower riparian cannot thus demand the continued free 
and uninterrupted flow of water from upper basin states106. Historically, the absolute 
sovereignty doctrine has been advocated by upstream regional powers in defence of a free hand 
approach over their section of international rivers.  
 
The second such concept is known as “absolute territorial integrity”. Contrary to the previous 
one, it favours downstream states by way of stipulating a right to demand the continuation of 
the natural flow of an international river into their territories. Such demand is often linked to 
historic appropriations. This theory has, too, been rightly criticised – like the Harmon-doctrine 
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– for it allocates rights without imposing corresponding obligations, favouring one-sidedly 
lower basin states107.  
 
The two extreme concepts have been consistently rejected by recent state practice and general 
international water law, even though a handful of countries continue to advocate them with a 
view to justifying their hegemonic use of complex international rivers (e.g. Turkey’s claim of 
absolute territorial sovereignty over its sections of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers or Egypt’s 
demands on historic allocations)108. 
 
b) Moderate principles 
 
The third early concept of transboundary water governance: the “limited territorial 
sovereignty/integrity” doctrine, curtails the excesses of the previous principles by asserting that 
every riparian has an equal right to use an international watercourse. At the same time, all states 
in the basin remain under the duty not to cause significant harm to fellow basin states109. Out 
of all early principles the limited territorial sovereignty/integrity concept has gained the widest 
endorsement for it encompasses the principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation, no-harm 
and cooperation principles, i.e. the foundations of contemporary international water law110.  
 
Mention also must be made of the concept of the “community of riparian states”. This concept 
envisions international river basins as highly integrated and cooperative communities of states 
where the benefits and the burdens of the management of the shared resource are not allocated 
along a rudimentary upstream-downstream dichotomy. Rather, basin states cooperate on a 
multitude of water management issues with a view to maximising the collective good of the 
river111. The concept was accorded an early authoritative endorsement in the above-mentioned 
River Oder case by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1929112. Despite its 
somewhat idealistic approach the concept received fresh support by the International Court of 
Justice in 1997 in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case in which the ICJ recognised the validity of 
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the “community of interest” concept to all uses of international rivers113. Some authors argue 
that this “community spirit” of riparian states also permeates the EU’s core water legislation, 
the Water Framework Directive114.  
  
c) Principles of contemporary water law 
 
As mentioned above, the foundations of today’s international water law are three principles: 
equitable and reasonable utilisation of shared watercourses, the prevention of significant harm 
(the “no-harm” rule) and the prior notification of and consultation on planned measures with a 
transboundary impact. These principles find their clearest legal expression in the UN 
Watercourses Convention (the principles at issue are discussed in detail in relation to the 
Convention below)115. 
 
d) General principles of international law 
 
Naturally, the above water-related legal principles do not exist in isolation, but form an integral 
part of the corpus of public international law. Therefore, the basic principles of co-riparian 
relations must be implemented hand in hand with a set of core principles governing interstate 
conduct under the Charter of the United Nations. These include the principle of good 
neighbourliness, the commitment to promote peace and security, the duty to cooperate, the 
obligation to resolve disputes by peaceful means or the principle of the “rule of law”116. 
Moreover, certain so-called peremptory norms of international law, e.g. those relating to the 
protection of human rights, humanitarian crises or self-determination, are also applicable in the 
management of shared basins117. Finally, international water law is supplemented by some 
general environmental law principles, such as the precautionary principle, the polluter pays 
principle or the sustainability principle118.  
 
                                                          
113 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgement, ICJ Reports 1997, 7. 
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115 See section I.3.2.3. below. 
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I.3.2.3.  The UN Watercourses Convention 
 
Since 2014 states have at their disposal two multilateral treaties that provide basic frameworks 
for transboundary water cooperation: the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses Convention) and the 1992 Convention 
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE 
Water Convention). The two instruments largely cover the same subjects, although following 
somewhat different approaches119.  
 
The UN Watercourses Convention was preceded by two decades of deliberation and 
codification within the UN’s International Law Commission. The project leading to the 
Convention was initiated in 1970 and was completed in 1997 by the adoption of the Convention 
text by the UN General Assembly. The Convention has generally been received as an authentic 
codification of the principles of international law relating to the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses120 and received immediate judicial endorsement by the ICJ in the 
above-mentioned Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case in the same year121. However, despite the 
lengthy preparatory phase, it took another 17 years to gather a sufficient amount of ratifications 
to trigger its entry into force.  
 
The Convention contains, for the most part, highly general provisions whose fil conducteur is 
the “combination of the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, on the one hand, and 
prevention of significant harm, on the other”122.  
 
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, as codified by the Convention, implies a 
broad range of obligations123. First of all, the use and development of the transboundary rivers 
must take place “with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits 
therefrom”, taking into account the interests of other riparian countries. Second, the principle 
encompasses the right of states to utilise the shared river as well as the duty to cooperate in the 
protection thereof. The Convention also enumerates the most important factors that have to be 
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taken into account in determining whether a particular use can be considered equitable and 
reasonable124. Importantly, there is no set hierarchy among competing water uses, but in the 
case of a conflict among competing uses, special attention must be paid to the “requirements of 
vital human needs”125.  
 
The other overarching principle of international water law enshrined in the Convention is the 
so-called “no-harm” rule that has grown out of the Roman law maxim of sic utero tuo ut 
alineium non laedes126. It implies that states utilising their share of the international watercourse 
must take all necessary measures to prevent causing significant harm to other riparian states. If 
such harm is nevertheless caused, all appropriate measures must be taken to eliminate or 
mitigate it127.  The “no-harm” rule is not a passive obligation. It implies the continuous, long-
term, pro-active and anticipatory engagement of basin states to avert not only large scale and 
apparent incidents, but also the “accumulation of small and isolated modifications of water 
quality and quantity” that may generate unforeseeable adverse effects128. (Evidently, such 
progressive interpretation raises the threshold of due diligence well-above the original 
formulation of the rule by the Train Smelter Arbitration that only called for the avoidance of 
“injuries […] to the territory of another […] when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”129). 
 
The Convention also describes the duties of states to cooperate over planned measures that 
may have a significant negative impact on other riparian states as well as the related procedures 
that include prior notification and consultation130. In fact, the Convention treats this obligation 
                                                          
124 “(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character; (b) 
The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; (c) The population dependent on the 
watercourse in each watercourse State; (d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse 
State on other watercourse States; (e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (f) Conservation, protection, 
development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that 
effect; (g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.”. Article 
6.1, ibid. 
125 Article 10, ibid. 
126 “Do not use your property so as to injure the property of another”. 
127 Article 7, UN Watercourses Convention. 
128 TANZI Attila and KOLLIOPOULOS, Alexandros (2015): The No-Harm Rule. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The 
UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its 
Contribution to International Water Cooperation, Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 133-145, p. 137. 
129 RIEU-CLARKE, Alistair, MOYNIHAN, Ruby and MAGSIG, BjØrn-Oliver (2012): UN Watercourses Convention 
- User’s Guide, Dundee, University of Dundee, p. 116-117. 
130 Articles 11-19, UN Watercourses Convention. 
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equal to the previous ones, actually devoting more provisions (nine) to this subject that any 
other issue in the entire text131. 
 
In addition to the above bedrock principles, the Convention also sets out basic requirements 
concerning pollution prevention and control and the protection of riverine and marine 
ecosystems132. Finally, the Convention introduces detailed mechanisms for dispute resolution. 
Transboundary water disputes must be resolved peacefully bilaterally or through the 
involvement of a third-party, such as good offices, mediation or conciliation, etc. A special 
feature of the Convention is the possibility for any party to trigger the mandatory procedure of 
a fact finding commission that enjoys broad investigative powers. While the outcome of the 
procedure is not binding, the operation of the commission is indeed a major step towards a 
mandatory third-party dispute settlement133. Irrespective of these extra-judicial mechanisms, 
the parties may always refer their dispute to the International Court of Justice or an arbitral 
tribunal134.  
 
The long-awaited entry into force of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention has not been met 
with universal jubilation. It was criticised as being too conservative, just stating the obvious. 
Some authors argue that it was out-of-date even before it was adopted and scarcely attempted 
to address the water challenges of the twenty-first century, in particular those linked to 
environmental protection, human rights and investments135. According to some critiques the 
fact that the Convention draws a stark distinction between the domestic sphere of water 
management and the transboundary dimension defies the daily experience of water 
management136. 
 
                                                          
131 McCaffrey (2015), p. 56. 
132 Articles 20-23, UN Watercourses Convention. BUJDOS, Ágnes (2017): The Analysis of the Rules on 
Transboundary Water Pollution, PhD Thesis, Debrecen, Debreceni Egyetem, p. 90-97. 
133 TANZI, Attila and CONTARTESE, Cristina (2015): Dispute Prevention, Dispute Settlement and Implementation 
Facilitation in International Water Law: The Added Value of the Establishment of an Implementation Mechanism 
under the Water Convention. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation, 
Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 319-329, p. 325. 
134 Article 33, Annex, UN Watercourses Convention. 
135 DELLAPENNA, Joseph. W., GUPTA, Joyeeta, LI, Wenjing and SCHMIDT, Falk (2013): Thinking about the future 
of global water governance, Ecology and Society 18:3, pp. 28-37, p. 33. 
136 CONCA, Ken (2006): Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building, 
Cambridge MA, MIT Press, p. 120.  
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Such criticisms seem somewhat unfair. First, the slow pace of the ratification and the actual 
implementation of the Convention is an eloquent illustration of the complacency of the 
international community to tackle core issues of transboundary water governance in any 
substantial fashion. The (relatively) low level of ambition of the Convention is thus not the fault 
of its draftsmen, it is just an accurate footprint of the difficult political climate surrounding its 
lengthy conception. Second, there is no doubt that the Convention has, even before its entry 
into force, strongly influenced important emerging regional water governance regimes such as 
the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) 2000 Revised Protocol on Shared 
International Watercourses or the 2002 Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin and 
inspired the establishment of basin organisations137. Finally, real implementation has only 
started a few years ago, thus more time will be needed to evaluate its impact on the progressive 
development of international water law. Unfortunately, however, it is unlikely that the 
Convention will reach its full potential so long as the question of institutional structure for 
implementation remains unresolved (uniquely, the Convention itself does not set up institutions 
for its own management)138.  
 
I.3.2.4. Regional, basin and bilateral water treaties 
 
a) Evolution, scope and distribution 
 
While the two global treaties lay down a set of principles as well as basic substantive and 
procedural rules for transboundary water cooperation, real life cross-border water management 
takes place mainly under regional, basin and bilateral treaties139. In fact these latter treaties 
constitute the true laboratories of the development of water law, heavily influencing the 
evolution of universal water governance as well140. This is only natural, if one considers that 
                                                          
137 See sections I.3.2.4.b) and III.2.2.3.c) below. 
138 MCCAFFREY (2016) op. cit. p. 36. 
139 For the purposes of this general overview multilateral and bilateral water treaties will be treated in this 
subsection as a homogenous group of legal instruments (i.e. everything whose geographical scale is below global). 
Evidently, such unsophisticated categorisation hides important structural differences among the regional, basin, 
sub-basin and bilateral treaties. The crucial differences among multilateral and bilateral agreements will only be 
elaborated in the context of European water governance in Part III. For a general account of multilateral versus 
bilateral treaty-making see ESPEY, Molly and TOWFIQUE, Basman (2004): International bilateral water treaty 
formation, Water Resources Research 40, W05S05, doi:10.1029/2003WR002534; ZAWAHRI, Neda A. and 
MCLAUGHLIN MITCHELL, Sara (2011): Fragmented Governance of International Rivers: Negotiating Bilateral 
versus Multilateral Treaties, International Studies Quarterly 55, pp. 835–858. 
140 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, Laurence (2013a): Fresh Water in International Law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, p. 51-53. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2019.003
46 
 
these regional or sub-regional instruments provide the evident framework to deal with the 
geographical, political and sociological particularities of individual watercourses and their 
basins. 
 
The pivotal role of regional and basin treaties in the management of co-riparian relations is 
specifically recognised, on the one hand, by the UN Watercourses Convention141 that 
encourages and, on the other hand, the UNECE Water Convention that even prescribes the 
adoption of new multilateral or bilateral water agreements142.  
 
The past decades have witnessed important positive trends in the institutionalisation of regional 
and basin level water governance. Today, according to the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database there are over 250 proper basin or sub-basin agreements143. According to a recent 
global survey by Giordano et al. the relevant treaties apply to the most significant river basins, 
accounting for 70% of the world’s transboundary areas (42 million km2) and 80% of the people 
living in those regions (2.8 billion). The trend of the past 50 years shows that about 30 new 
treaties are signed every decade144.  
 
Regional, basin-level and bilateral treaties have not only evolved in terms of numbers. The 
purpose and focus of water treaties show promising improvements too. Water allocation issues 
– the cornerstone of early water management agreements – no longer dominate contemporary 
treaty-making. Water quality and environmental considerations are now the most common 
focus area of water agreements145. Procedural rules and mechanism, including conflict 
resolution, have also expanded at the expense of purely regulatory provisions, indicating a shift 
towards cooperative water management146.  
 
Yet, regional and basin treaties offer no panacea to all challenges of transboundary governance. 
In fact, these multi- or bilateral agreements often lack a comprehensive character, covering only 
selected aspects of river basin management147. A large number of transboundary treaties omit 
                                                          
141 Article 3, UN Watercourses Convention. 
142 Article 9.1, UNECE Water Convention. 
143 GIORDANO, Mark et al. (2014): A review of the evolution and state of transboundary freshwater treaties, Int 
Environ Agreements 14 pp. 245-264, p. 252.  
144 Ibid p. 262. 
145 Ibid p. 255. 
146 Ibid p. 255. 
147 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (2013a) op. cit. p. 52. 
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basin-specific issues, either because they are too general in nature or because they apply to all 
waters between riparian states without further specifications148. Geographical coverage may 
also be inconsistent. As Giordano et al. underline only around one-third of multilateral basins 
have treaties have at least three signatories, only 11 basins have treaties that include all riparians 
and only about a quarter of all treaties cover the entire basin to which they apply149. 
Consequently, the proliferation of regional and sub-regional water treaties do not render 
universal water law redundant as they continue to play an important role where no regional 
norm applies150.  
 
b) Examples of major regional, sub-regional and basin treaties151  
 
The origins of transboundary water agreements in Africa are rooted in the colonial past. 
Colonial powers had a preference to use transboundary waters to demarcate their spheres of 
influence. To that effect they concluded a number of bilateral treaties to which today’s 
watercourse states were not parties. Such colonial arrangements had a lasting impact on today’s 
co-riparian relations and can constitute a major impediment to effective basin-wide cooperation 
even today152. In the wake of decolonisation the number of transboundary water agreements 
multiplied quickly, followed by the establishment of the first river basin organisation in 1964 
(Niger River Commission, today: Niger Basin Authority). Such a shift towards joint 
management is, however, attributed more to the influence of international organisations and 
lending institutions that the cooperative spirit of the newly independent African states153. 
Today, while Africa has a growing number of basin treaties, over half of the basins are still not 
covered (at all or comprehensively) by treaties. The greatest progress in this regard has been 
achieved in Southern Africa, where under the auspices of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and the leadership of the Republic of South Africa the treaty framework 
of water cooperation and the related institutional structure have been significantly expanded 
and strengthened154. The SADC adopted its first transboundary water governance agreement – 
                                                          
148 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 255. 
149 GIORDANO et al. (2014), p. 254. 
150 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (2013a) op. cit. p. 52. 
151 This subsection only addresses non-European examples. Regional and sub-regional treaties in the European 
Union and its neighbours is covered in section II.2.2.2. and II.2.2.3. below.  
152 TURTON (2008) op. cit. p. 31.  
153 Ibid p. 32. 
154 Transboundary water management in Africa: challenges for development cooperation (2006), Study for the 
research and consultancy project „Cooperation on Africa’s transboundary water resources“ on behalf of the 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)/Waltina Scheumann et al. (Eds.). Dt. Institut für 
Entwicklungspolitik, p. 3. Members of the SADC include: Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
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the SADC Protocol on Shared Watercourses – in 1995. This was replaced by a Revised 
Protocol155 in 2000 that entered into force in 2003. To a large extent, the Revised Protocol 
mirrors the provisions of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. It is based on the equitable 
and reasonable utilisation principle and the no-harm rule. The Revised Protocol also foresees 
the adoption of basin agreements and commissions. Given that the borders of SADC member 
states intersect 15 major international rivers the implementation of the Revised Protocol has 
global significance156. In addition, in 2018 the countries of the Central African region adopted 
a new regional instrument under the title Convention for the Prevention of Conflicts Related to 
the Management of Shared Water Resources in Central Africa157. The new Convention is 
strongly rooted in the UNECE Water Convention and the UN Watercourses Convention. It lays 
down the governing principles of co-riparian relations such as the equitable and reasonable use of 
shared resources; the prevention of transboundary impact; transboundary and regional 
cooperation; the development of basin agreements and the establishment of transboundary basin 
organizations or the integrated management of transboundary water resources158. Finally, highly 
developed basin-regimes have been put in place other parts of Africa too, such as the Senegal, 
the Niger or the Chad catchment areas. Significant challenges remain, however, all over the 
continent, but most particularly in the Nile basin where there is a fundamental tension among 
the basin states over historic water allocation rights, accentuated by divergent developmental 
needs and policies of upstream and downstream riparians159.  
 
In North America the treaty frameworks addressing transboundary waters between the United 
States and Canada, on the one hand, and the United States and Mexico, on the other, were 
developed over a century ago160. Not surprisingly, North America does not have a continent-
                                                          
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Source: http://www.sadc.int/member-states/ (accessed 12 February 2018). 
155 SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses, Windhoek, 7 August 2000. 
156 KINNA, Rémy (2015): The UNECE Water Convention Viewed from the Perspective of the SADC Revised 
Protocol on Shared Watercourses. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water 
Cooperation, Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 466-485, p. 467. 
157 Convention for the Prevention of Conflicts Related to the Management of Shared Water Resources in Central 
Africa, Brazzaville, 22 December 2018. 
158 https://www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-h/environment/2017/central-african-countries-approve-
regional-convention-on-transboundary-water-cooperation-with-unece-support/doc.html (accessed 12 February 
2019). Contracting parties include Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Rwanda and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
159 DE STEFANO, Lucia et al. (2012): Climate change and the institutional resilience of international river basins, 
Journal of Peace Research 49:1, pp. 193-209, p. 202. 
160 NEIR, Alyssa M., KLISE, Geoffrey T. and CAMPANA, Michael E. (2009): The concept of vulnerability as applied 
to North America. In UNEP: Hydropolitical Vulnerability and Resilience along International Waters – North 
America, Nairobi, pp. 17-22, p. 17.  
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wide transboundary water treaty or organisation (even though both the US and Canada are 
members of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, thus could have become a party to the 
UNECE Water Convention even before its global opening161). Instead, the institutional 
backbone of the North American transboundary water cooperation is comprised by two bi-
national water commissions and a series of treaties adopted since the late 19th century. The US-
Canada International Joint Commission was established by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. 
The Treaty’s geographical scope extends to all waters that flow across or along the US-
Canadian international border. It applies to all infrastructure developments, diversions and other 
alterations affecting the other riparian. The Treaty also places restrictions on transboundary 
water pollution through the stipulation of an early version of the “no-harm” principle. Naturally, 
the original 1909 Treaty does not address a number of topical issues of our current era such as 
the ecological status of waters or groundwater management. The two countries also singed a 
range of additional bilateral treaties addressing transboundary water management in specific 
basins such as the Great Lakes, the Niagara River, Columbia River, Skagit River, St. Lawrence 
River, etc.162 The legal and institutional foundations of US-Mexico cross border water 
cooperation also go back to the late 19th century. In 1889 the International Boundary 
Commission was created to handle specifically border and water issues (it was changed to 
International Boundary and Water Commission in 1944). Given the predominantly arid 
environment of the border region, allocation issues have dominated bilateral water relations 
since the outset. The first agreement on the subject was adopted as early as in 1906, setting the 
precise amount of water the US must deliver to Mexico. This was replaced in 1944 by a more 
comprehensive agreement covering both the Rio Grande and the Colorado rivers163.  
 
Despite various efforts to create comprehensive Inter-American water cooperation mechanisms 
since the 1930s the institutionalisation of transboundary water governance in Latin America is 
still at an early phase of development164. Exceptions include the La Plata, Amazon or the 
Titicaca basins165. In the La Plata watershed formalised basin-wide cooperation goes back to 
the signing of the La Plata Basin Treaty in 1969 which, to a large extent, was triggered by the 
development of hydro-electric power in the region. The treaty provides a framework for the 
                                                          
161 See section II.2.2.2. below. 
162 NEIR, KLISE and CAMPANA (2009) op. cit. p. 18. 
163 Ibid p. 21. 
164 NEWTON, Joshua (2007): Hydropolitical vulnerability of South America’s international watercourses. In UNEP: 
Hydropolitical Vulnerability and Resilience along International Waters – Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Nairobi, pp. 45-78, p. 58.  
165 NEWTON (2007) op. cit. p. 66.  
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joint development of the catchment area, calls for open transport along the river and its 
tributaries, requires joint management of non-water resources (soil, forest, flora, and fauna), 
etc.166. As regards the Titicaca basin the first formal cooperation agreement – the Preliminary 
Convention for the Study of the Use of the Waters of the Lake Titicaca – was adopted in as 
early as 1957 (it however only entered into force in 1986 when Bolivia finally ratified it). The 
Convention is based on the “indivisible and exclusive joint ownership by both countries of the 
waters of the lake,” whose control is carried out by a joint management body (the Autonomous 
Binational Authority of Lake Titicaca). The purpose of the Convention is to promote 
development within the basin of Lake Titicaca in a manner that would not disrupt the flow and 
volume so as to affect the navigational uses of the body of water, an objective that is being 
fulfilled only partially even these days167. 
 
South and Southeast Asia is home to about 2 billion people and covers four major international 
river systems: the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, the Indus, the Mekong and the Salween 
basins. While all of these basins have some kind of treaty based-cooperation (except for the 
Salween river), the relevant treaties largely fail to deal with the emerging new problems and 
pressures with a comprehensive, basin-wide approach168. As regards the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna river system disputes between India and Bangladesh have been prevalent since the 
partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The most notable such event was the damming of 
the Ganges by India in 1975 so as to divert the majority of water into other rivers running into 
the Bay of Bengal. The differences between India and downstream Bangladesh were reconciled 
only in 1996 by the adoption of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty. A similarly notorious water 
allocation issue in the subcontinent concerns the Indus river system. Here, India’s unilateral 
manipulation of discharges into Pakistan after the partition in 1947 led to the adoption, in 1960, 
of the Indus Waters Treaty between two counties. While the Treaty, brokered by the World 
Bank at the time, has withstood the test of difficult times between the two countries, its 
relatively rigid structure and narrow scope has already become a core concern in the region169. 
There are, however, more promising examples of cooperation in the Southeast Asia region. This 
includes the collaboration among the riparian states of the lower Mekong, the longest river of 
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167 Ibid p. 212. 
168 KANWAR, Shalini, GUPTA, Ashim Das and NEWTON, Joshua (2009): Background on the concepts of 
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the region, which dates back to the 1950s. Such cooperation, however, remains ineffective with 
regards to many basin-wide issues as China stays outside all relevant formal arrangements. 
Today, the framework of collaboration in the lower Mekong Region is the 1995 Agreement on 
the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin signed by 
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam170. 
 
Many of the international rivers of West Asia (Middle East), such as the Tigris, Euphrates, 
Jordan, suffer not only from severe human and climatic pressures. Cooperation is also hampered 
by the general political instability prevailing in the region. Not surprisingly, the management 
of the largest water system in the region: Tigris-Euphrates/Shatt Al-Arab has been the subject 
of continuous uncertainty and disagreement171. The lack of a basin agreement is largely the 
result of upstream Turkey’s unilateral development policies that reflects the country’s 
projection of the out-dated doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty over water resources172.  
 
While inter-state disputes over water tend to reach high political intensity in the Central Asian 
region too, the countries concerned also benefit from the UNECE Water Convention and the 
various international development programmes aimed at stabilising the hydro-political situation 
through cooperation173. Unlike many other Asian regions, Central Asia does have an established 
legal framework for transboundary water cooperation174. These include, on the one hand, the 
various bilateral and multilateral agreements relating to the Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination of Central Asia175 and, on the other, the 1999 Agreement on the status of the 
International Fund for saving the Aral Sea and its organisations176. Importantly, a 
comprehensive multilateral transboundary water governance treaty was also adopted in 1998 
under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States entitled Agreement on the 
General Principles of the Rational Use and Protection of Transboundary Water Bodies of the 
State Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States177. The Agreement – which largely 
                                                          
170 KANWAR, GUPTA and NEWTON (2009) op. cit. p. 45. 
171 KLISE, Geoffrey T. et al. (2009): Hydrovulnerability of West Asia. In UNEP: Hydropolitical Vulnerability and 
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173 UNECE (2011): Strengthening Water Management and Transboundary Water Cooperation in Central Asia: 
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follows the provisions of the UNECE Water Convention – entered into force in 2002. As, 
however, only Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan ratified it, the real significance of this instrument 
has hitherto remained minimal in Central Asia178.   
 
I.3.2.5. Critical assessment: shortcomings of international water law 
 
One might reasonably assume that the prominence of transboundary watercourses in 
international relations has, thus far, brought about solid global legal and institutional solutions 
to address the issue of shared water resources. Reality, however, suggests the opposite. While 
the past two decades have usefully raised the profile of water policy considerations, legal norms 
and institutions dedicated to water at global level remain fragmented and are likely to remain 
so for the foreseeable future179. This applies particularly in the context of transboundary water 
governance which still belongs to the politically most controversial subjects of international 
law and politics.  
 
Some recent developments, however, give hope to a significant improvement of the present 
situation. These include the entry into force of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention in 2014 
and the opening of the UNECE Water Convention in 2013 to parties outside the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe. It is a legitimate expectation that these two instruments will solidify 
the legal and institutional bases of water cooperation globally180. 
 
Despite the above positive developments international water law remains the subject of sharp 
criticism by legal professionals and water managers alike, prompting one author to describe 
international water law to be still in the state of “conceptual infancy”181. Indeed, as seen above, 
universal water law remains mainly a collection of general and vague principles that “only offer 
suggestions and broad guidelines how [the conflicting interests of riparians] might be 
moderated and reconciled”182. In fact these solemn principles are formulated with such 
generality that often inhibits their ultimate application183. As a result, researchers on the subject 
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“found surprisingly little relationship between the worlds of theory and practice”184. For 
instance, the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle – jurists’ jolly joker when it comes 
to transboundary water allocation – is hardly ever referred to in treaties concerned with water 
allocation. This, as Aaron Wolf concludes, is due to the lack of guidelines for quantifying each 
country’s share of the water185. Moreover, not only is international water law ambiguous and 
contradictory, goes the verdict, it also fails to provide a mechanism to enforce agreed-on 
principles186. This, among others, is illustrated by the snail-pace of the entry into force of the 
1997 UN Watercourses Convention and the deliberate omission of institutional framework to 
oversee its implementation. In fact, several shortcomings of transboundary international water 
law have been recognised by the craftsmen of the treaty framework too. Steven McCaffrey, 
special rapporteur of the International Law Commission’s draft articles leading to the UN 
Watercourses Convention, admits that the evolution of modern water law was strongly 
influenced by the climatic conditions of humid regions where modern states initially took root, 
by the dominance of navigational issues and the poor understanding of hydrology. This 
incomprehensive basis of development has inevitably left major loopholes in the legal 
framework187.  
 
Given the consistent expansion of transboundary water treaties in the past decade, however, the 
above harsh criticism seems somewhat exaggerated. Undoubtedly, international water law and 
the supporting institutional framework have proved inadequate far too often to prevent or to 
solve major transboundary water conflicts. One should not forget, however, that it is not the 
intellectual foundations that international water law is still missing (indeed the Helsinki Rules, 
the cornerstone of contemporary water law have been around since 1966). Rather, the inherent 
deficiencies are rooted in the complacency of the international community to adopt binding 
rules that limit the sovereignty of states to freely dispose of their respective share of 
international watercourses.  
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Chapter 4 
Institutions of transboundary water governance 
 
I.4.1. Overview  
 
Most legal instruments concerned with transboundary water management, be it global, regional, 
basin-wide in scope, provide for some kind of institutional arrangements to oversee their 
implementation.  
 
The role and presence of such institutions is most prominent at basin and bilateral level. This 
is only natural in view of the fact that – as Stephen McCaffrey noted – “the management of 
international watercourse systems through joint institutions is […] almost indispensable, if 
anything approaching optimum utilisation and protection of the system of waters is to be 
attained”188. Thus, given the pivotal importance of institutional frameworks the UN 
Watercourses Convention suggests the establishment of joint mechanism and bodies among 
watercourse states189. By the same token, the UNECE Water Convention even goes as far as to 
specifically require riparian states to establish “bilateral or multilateral commissions or other 
appropriate institutional arrangements for cooperation”190.  
 
Institutional arrangements to manage shared rivers may take several shapes. The simplest of 
such mechanisms is where the parties to an interstate water agreement do not designate specific 
institutions for the implementation of the agreement, but use established bilateral channels 
instead. An important step towards institutionalisation is the appointment of permanent 
government representatives (plenipotentiaries) to manage (mainly bilateral) water issues of 
common interest. The most complex arrangements for the governance of shared water resources 
are the various river basin organisations (“RBOs”)191.  
 
In addition to basin-related or bilateral joint management bodies, there are a number of 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations that are engaged, directly or indirectly, 
in the facilitation of transboundary water management. Such facilitation may take place through 
                                                          
188 379 ILC, ‘Sixth Report on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, by Mr Stephen 
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regime-building, monitoring of implementation (UNECE), policy development (OECD), 
technical assistance (UNEP), financing institution-building (World Bank), etc. 
 
I.4.2. River basin organisations  
 
I.4.2.1. The evolution of river basin organisations 
 
The world’s numerous river basin organisations constitute the institutional backbone of 
transboundary water cooperation. These organisations have evolved in number and in focus 
parallel to the expansion of the regional and sub-regional treaty framework described above192.  
 
River basin organisations first appeared in the European continent following the Napoleonic 
wars. The emergence of the new political order as a result of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
coincided with the rapid expansion of navigation in the major rivers of the continent193. Thus, 
the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna already envisaged the cooperation of riparian states 
with a view to jointly regulating navigation. River commissions were established for several 
major shared European rivers by 1920194. These early river commissions subsequently inspired 
the creation of and served as a model for basin organisations all over the world195.  
 
Against their narrow original mandate (navigation only), basin organisations gradually 
obtained additional responsibilities such as cooperation over fisheries, irrigation, hydro-electric 
plants, environmental protection, joint regulation, etc. While the form and structure of each 
RBO is highly contextual, there appears to be a recent trend of harmonization of core functions 
towards integrated water resources management196. This development has been largely 
triggered by the expansion of international water law at global, regional and basin level197.  
 
                                                          
192 Ibid. Also see section I.3.2.4. above. 
193 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (2013a) op. cit. p. 14. 
194 Importantly, these commissions came into being not only as a result of the cooperative spirit of the riparian 
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Today, most RBOs focus on water quantity, water quality or the general protection of the 
environment. Other typical functions of RBOs include basin management planning and 
monitoring, data sharing, technical assistance and capacity building, investment facilitation, 
etc. In certain developing regions, RBOs are also charged with the promotion of socio-
economic development through the river’s water resources198. Some RBOs also carry out or 
facilitate joint activities for their members, especially in developing regions where riparian 
states themselves may lack the necessary capacities to do so199. In a few cases RBOs have 
functions that are not directly related to the river, such as economic integration or the promotion 
of peace and security200. Given their basic function as a platform of dialogue, conciliation is 
also a recognised core function of RBOs even where dispute settlement powers are not 
explicitly provided for in the founding instrument of the actual basin organisation201. The 
expansion of RBO functions is also reflected in general water law is so far as the UNECE Water 
Convention provides a list of 10 major groups of tasks that basin organisations must be 
entrusted with as a minimum202.  
 
I.4.2.2. Distribution of river basin organisations  
 
A recent mapping of basin organisations by Suzanne Schmeier identified 119 RBOs worldwide, 
covering 116 shared river basins203. The vast majority of international watercourses with an 
RBO are shared by two riparian countries only (49 out of 116)204. 47 of the total 119 RBOs do 
not provide full geographical coverage, i.e. one or more riparian states with a share of more 
than 1% of the catchment area are excluded from institutionalised cooperation. Such non-
inclusive RBOs can be found all over the world, from the Aral Sea through the Ganges, 
Incomati to the Mekong basins205. 
 
River basin organisations are distributed unevenly across the world. Europe not only has the 
highest number of international river basins, it also boasts the highest number of basin 
                                                          
198 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 83. 
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international river (e.g. the International Joint Commission between the US and Canada).   
204 This is due to the fact that most transboundary rivers are shared only by two countries. See section I.1.3. above. 
205 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 83. 
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organisations (20), that accounts for 40% of all transboundary basins subject to an RBO. At the 
other end of the spectrum lie Asia and Latin America, both with around 28% of RBO 
coverage206.  
 
Africa has 36 RBOs that cover some 35% of all river basins. The most comprehensive network 
of RBOs in the continent has been set up in the South African Development Community under 
the auspices of the 2000 SADC Revised Protocol that foresees the adoption of basin agreements 
and commissions207. Today, the 15 transboundary watercourses of the SADC are governed by 
12 basin commissions or authorities, all at different stages of development and capacity208. The 
Senegal, the Niger or the Chad basins are also well-known examples of institutionalised 
transboundary management. Yet, important gaps remain in Africa, in particular in the Nile basin 
where the fundamental tensions among upstream and downstream riparian states hinder the 
establishment of a comprehensive RBO. Also, a recent analysis of the subject show that the 
impressive presence of RBOs in the continent is not matched with efficient delivery capacities, 
especially where the establishment of river commission is the result of donor pressure, rather 
than the cooperative spirit of riparian states209.  
 
North America only has two major RBOs but they practically cover all (95%) transboundary 
waters. The US-Canada International Joint Commission (IJC) was established by the 1909 
Boundary Waters Treaty. Despite its relatively soft mandate, the operation of the IJC is largely 
regarded as a success210. The predecessor of today’s US-Mexico International and Boundary 
Water Commission (IBWC) was established in 1889. The statutory status of the IBWC is 
stronger than that of the IJC in so far as it adopts decisions that are binding on their respective 
governments. The successful operation of the IBWC is considered as a token of the commitment 
of the two countries to stable cooperative transboundary water management in a predominantly 
arid area suffering from severe water problems211.  
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In Latin America transboundary cooperation is ensured through RBOs, if such cooperation 
exists at all. Many basins however have no (e.g. the Orinoco basin) or relatively basic joint 
governance schemes in place. Where joint management regimes do exist, their scope, however, 
tend to be limited, with some exceptions such as the La Plata, Amazon or the Titicaca basins212. 
 
RBOs in Asia show vast variations in terms of mandate, coverage and effectiveness. While most 
of the largest international water systems (Amur, Aral, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, Indus, 
Jordan, Mekong) are covered by some kind of formal cooperation body, many of these suffer 
from insufficient political mandate, geographical coverage, resources, etc. The most notable 
exception is the Mekong River Commission, a robust intergovernmental entity of the riparian 
states of the lower section of the Mekong river, which is seen as one of the most successful 
examples of institutionalised multilateral water cooperation outside Europe213. 
 
I.4.2.3. Effectiveness of river basin organisations 
 
Institutionalist scholars consider the presence of an RBO as an important indicator of 
hydropolitical stability214. Empirical research, however, suggests that institutionalisation on its 
own does not necessarily deliver effective basin governance. RBOs can act as effective players 
only if their activity is based on strong legal foundations, broad political mandate, solid 
financing and extensive cooperation with all involved stakeholders. These conditions, however, 
do not assume the existence of supersized and omnipotent RBOs. Experience shows that the 
growing level of institutionalisation (or the size of an institution) does not always yield in 
additional or proportional governance gains. Overgrown, bureaucratic RBOs with very 
extensive mandates are likely to fail on some of the core river basin governance functions and 
tend to display a declining problem-solving impact. On the other hand, basin commissions with 
a limited, but clear mandate, lean administration and sufficient budget can be important drivers 
of an improved cooperation and joint basin development215.  
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These empirical findings have, recently, received political endorsement in the context of the 
UNECE Water Convention: in 2015 the Meeting of the Parties adopted a decision promoting 
the efficiency of joint bodies of transboundary water cooperation216. The decision lays down a 
number of principles that “aim to synthesize valuable lessons from the collective experience of 
joint bodies for transboundary water cooperation” with a view to “generally increas[ing] the 
efficiency of joint bodies for transboundary water cooperation and contribut[ing] to reaching a 
higher level of cooperation between riparian States”217. To that end, the document sets out a 
number of basic characteristics that underpin RBO efficiency regarding establishment, structure 
and functions, operation from a procedural, technical and financial and human resource 
management perspective, etc.  
 
I.4.3. Beyond the river basin: institutions of transboundary water 
governance at global and regional level 
 
I.4.3.1.  Global institutions 
 
Water – unlike similarly important policy areas – does not have a dedicated specialised agency, 
fund or programme within the United Nations system. Nor is it supported by a robust 
comprehensive treaty and a well-resourced convention secretariat (as in the case of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) that could steer decision-making, 
institution building and mobilise resources at global scale. Paradoxically, however, this does 
not imply that water is not looked after within the UN. Conversely, there are 31(!) various UN 
bodies that are engaged significantly in water policy issues. This institutional cacophony results 
in considerable overlaps and rivalry among the various actors, despite the existence of an 
internal coordination platform called UN-Water218. Given, however, its weak mandate and the 
lack of political leadership the influence of UN-Water is limited and is unlikely to evolve into 
a global water governance platform219. This gap was partly filled in the past two decades by the 
establishment of other international organisations dedicated to water issues as the Global Water 
Partnership (GWP), the proliferation of water-related activities by international development 
banks or the significant engagement in water issues by the Organisation of Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the activities of the World Water Council, an 
international umbrella organisation of governments, international organisations, companies, 
universities and other non-governmental bodies220. Notwithstanding some successful initiatives 
in and outside the UN system, the global framework of water governance can therefore be best 
described as a “fragmented, Mobius-web arrangement”221. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that transboundary water governance – a sublet of global water 
governance – has no dedicated institutional structure within the UN system either. Nor have the 
major UN environmental/sustainable development conferences addressed the institutional 
aspects of transboundary water governance to any significant extent. Indeed, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the inflammatory potential of the issue is such that any substantial 
mention of the matter in multilateral political documents can impede the discussion of all other 
(water-related) subjects222. Against this backdrop the fact that Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) No. 6 on water, adopted by the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Summit, makes a 
specific reference to the transboundary cooperation constitutes a welcome, but a rather limited 
development223. 
 
Yet, some organisations scattered within broader UN framework do address the legal, 
institutional and political aspects of transboundary water cooperation in a significant way. E.g. 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) commissioned, in the early 2000s, a 
seminal in-depth analysis of the risks of transboundary water cooperation, entitled Hydro-
political vulnerability and resilience in international river basins, for Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin 
America and North America224. The World Bank too, has engaged actively in solving cross-
border water issues both at political and policy level, the most notable example of which is the 
decade long pressure on India and Pakistan over the conclusion of the Indus Waters Treaty in 
1960225.  
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Mention also must be made of other international or non-governmental organisations that play 
a significant role in advancing transboundary water governance. First, the OECD plays a 
leading role in the elaboration and implementation of the principles of water governance, 
including transboundary cooperation226. The World Water Council through its flagship events, 
the World Water Forum series, also aims to advance river basin cooperation, although its efforts 
tend to be hampered by the same political complacency that elevates the subject into the most 
problematic area of international water governance227.  
 
I.4.3.2.  Regional frameworks 
 
Institutionalisation has been more successful at regional level. The true beacon of 
transboundary water collaboration is probably the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE), the UN’s regional cooperation body for North America, Europe and the countries of 
the former Soviet Union. Based on the UNECE Water Convention and its protocols, the 
Convention’s decision-making bodies and secretariat have become a real laboratory of 
progressive cross-border water cooperation228. Importantly, the Convention also benefits 
greatly from the broader environmental legal architecture of the UNECE229. The success of the 
institutional set-up of the UNECE Water Convention also gave rise to significant discussions 
so that its secretariat should also act for the UN Watercourses Convention230.  
 
Besides the UNECE, Africa has also created an intergovernmental body dedicated to 
international water management issues: the African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW) 
established in 2002. AMCOW provides a continent-wide cooperation platform to address, 
among others, transboundary water management issues. AMCOW’s 2011 Governance and 
Management Action Plan specifically calls for the development and implementation of basin 
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level principles231. Such ambition seems justified by the success of the world’s second largest 
regional water governance arrangement developed under the SADC Revised Protocol on 
Shared Watercourses232.  
 
In the Americas the Organisation of American States (OAS) have been active in drawing up 
programmes and implementing projects dealing with transboundary watercourses, but its 
limited mandate, financial means and technical capabilities do not allow the organisation to 
grow into a true supranational centre of water governance. North America, for the obvious 
reasons mentioned above, does not have a regional intergovernmental transboundary water 
cooperation body233. Nor does Latin America, despite repeated efforts to create comprehensive 
Inter-American water cooperation mechanisms since the 1930s. While the various integration 
bodies of the region, such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Community of 
Andean States (CAN) or the Union of South-American Nations (UNASUR) are, to a limited 
extent, also concerned with the sustainable use of natural resources, none of them have created 
any substantive regional institutional arrangement to address issues of transboundary water 
governance234. 
 
Similarly, the Asian continent has no formalised regional transboundary water cooperation 
body. Nevertheless, there are important sub-regional bodies concerned with cross-border water 
management. The most notable example is Central Asia’s complex framework for 
transboundary water cooperation, whose key institutional platform is the Interstate Commission 
for Water Coordination of Central Asia established in 1992235. Since 1999 the relevant states 
also participate in the work of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea. While both bodies 
have had partial successes at technical level, none of them have been able to bridge the 
fundamental political differences surrounding divergent water uses236.  
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Chapter 5 
Emerging challenges to transboundary water governance 
 
I.5.1. Overview 
 
The theories, laws and institutions of today’s transboundary water governance regimes have 
evolved in relatively stable hydro-climatic conditions over the past century or so. These regimes 
therefore reflect a high degree of stationarity, an assumption that the physical design parameters 
of the management of international rivers are sufficiently well-known and are largely 
predictable.  
 
The past few decades have, however, brought about such fundamental changes into the key 
factors of water management, i.e. natural hydrology and human uses that may render established 
frameworks of transboundary water governance unsuitable in the future. Order-of-magnitude 
increases in human population, atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions or agricultural water use 
– just to name a few – have triggered an unfolding global water crisis that is likely to have 
significant repercussions on co-riparian relations even in historically water-abundant, 
cooperative and wealthy regions of the world. Evidently, the security and political implications 
of the water crisis multiply in areas characterised by arid conditions, high anthropogenic water 
stress or political instability237.  
 
As a consequence, the stability of political relations among states sharing freshwater resources 
has recently become a major subject of interest for governments, international organisations 
and academia alike. Findings of empirical research on the issue in the past two decades suggest 
that the key determinants of transboundary water cooperation are not one (or a handful) 
powerful hydrological or political driver(s), such as water scarcity or unilaterism. Instead, the 
stability of transboundary water relations depends on the capacity of the governance regime in 
place to absorb changes that go beyond the ranges of previously observed events. Such capacity 
can be measured through the presence of a number of formal components of treaty design (e.g. 
allocation formula, dispute settlement mechanism, etc.) and a series of qualitative criteria (e.g. 
history of regional conflicts, relative wealth discrepancies among riparian states, etc.). 
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Recent academic, policy and political assessments reveal that all regions of the world face 
significant water security challenges both internally and in a transboundary context. The risk 
of serious political conflict is likely to arise or intensify in a growing number of international 
river basins in the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent or South 
East Asia. These regions are not only at high risk because of rapid changes in hydrology and 
the scale of human interventions, but – even more prominently – because their transboundary 
governance regimes are not sufficiently robust and flexible to absorb multiple and simultaneous 
changes. Other regions of the world are not immune from these challenges either. Changing 
hydroclimatic conditions are likely to force political decision-makers to revisit the 
fundamentals of transboundary basin management even in such politically balanced and well-
watered regions as the joint watersheds between Canada and the United States or the European 
Union. 
 
I.5.2. The Anthropocene and the global water crisis 
 
I.5.2.1. The concept of the Anthropocene  
 
“Anthropocene” (the “Age of Man”) is a term widely used to describe the present time interval 
in which many geologically significant conditions and processes are fundamentally altered by 
human activities238. While not yet formally recognised as a unit of the international Geological 
Time Scale, the term usefully informs scientists and policy-makers about the overwhelming 
power and scale of man’s impact on Earth generated by the sky-rocketing increase in industrial 
and agricultural production in the past 150 years.  
 
The most visible of such changes is the unprecedented increase in human population: since the 
19th century the global population has risen from one billion to over 7 billion by 2015. Currently, 
80 million new fellow human beings are born annually, with the global population likely to 
reach 9 billion by 2050. The population boom went hand-in-hand with a massive acceleration 
of urbanisation (6 billion people are projected to be city-dwellers by 2050) that has produced a 
                                                          
238 ZALASIEWICZ, Jan et al. (2017): The Working Group on the Anthropocene: Summary of evidence and interim 
recommendations, Anthropocene 19, pp. 55-60, p. 55. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2019.003
65 
 
25-fold increase in megacities (urban areas with more than 10 million inhabitants) between 
1950 and 2005239.  
 
The Anthropocene has, however, brought about a wide range of negative environmental 
consequences. These include an order-of-magnitude increase in the long-term rate of soil 
erosion and sedimentation, unprecedented loss of biodiversity, growth in atmospheric CO2 
concentration over a third above preindustrial level, etc. The ensuing rise in temperature has 
important repercussions on the state of the polar ice-sheet, glaciers and snow-packs as well as 
sea levels and river flows. The rate of change seems to exceed the adaptive capacities of the 
biosphere. Species will migrate (if they can) to trace their optimal climatic conditions, resulting 
in cascade-like changes in entire ecosystems both in land and sea. Coupled with other human 
stressors (habitat fragmentation, invasive species, etc.) accelerating climate change may trigger 
the sixth great extinction event on planet Earth240.  
 
I.5.2.2.  The impacts of the Anthropocene on freshwater resources: the global water crisis 
 
Water is one of the key environmental media through which the above negative changes are 
manifested. As Rockström et al. conclude in their flagship publication on planetary boundaries:  
 
„[t]he global freshwater cycle has entered the Anthropocene  because humans are now 
the dominant driving force altering global scale river flow and the spatial patterns and 
seasonal timing of vapour flows”241. 
 
The UN’s regular publications on water security, the World Water Development Reports, 
identify the ever increasing global demand as the main stressor on the availability and quality 
of freshwater resources. Expanding economies have been demanding more water for more food 
production, fibre and energy. The emergence of the global middle class has prompted an 
unsustainable increase in water use, especially in regions already characterised by water stress. 
Over the past decades the rate of demand for water has doubled the rate of population growth. 
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Demand for water is expected to further increase in all sectors of production. By 2030, the 
world is projected to face a 40% global water deficit (i.e. demand for freshwater will outreach 
supply by 40%), if current trajectories remain unchanged242. The ensuing urbanisation gives 
rise to special water challenges. Already, more than 50% of the world’s population lives in 
cities where 30% of all city-dwellers reside in slums without proper access to water and 
sanitation. 40% of all urban expansion in developing countries is made up by slums243.  
 
Broken down by sector, the impacts of energy production and agriculture on water clearly stand 
out. Fossil, nuclear, hydro-power generation and mining are major users of water. Energy 
production accounts for 15% of water consumption today, but it is expected to rise to 20% by 
2035. Globally, however, it is agriculture that is already the biggest water consumer, 
singlehandedly responsible for 70% of all freshwater withdrawals. Unless major improvements 
take place in water use efficiency, the water footprint of agriculture is likely to increase due to 
population pressure and the extension of irrigation necessitated by declining river runoffs244. 
The regional and global water of impact of agriculture is also strongly influenced by the import 
or export of water in raw or processed foods. While such “virtual water” usually fails to feature 
in the water balance of either the exporting or the importing country, it does have a significant 
overall effect on national water supply and demand245.  
 
Given the increased competition for water among human and economic needs water quality 
and ecosystem integrity is often overlooked. In most parts of the developing world population 
and economic growth leads to uncontrolled surface and groundwater pollution. Groundwater, 
the most widely used source of drinking water all over the world, is not only threated by such 
unabated pollution, but also by over-abstraction246.  
 
Out of the various drivers and impacts of the Anthropocene climate change bears special 
relevance as its impacts are mainly expressed through changes to hydrology. The 5th 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change summarises the major 
freshwater-related risks of climate change as follows: 
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- dramatic decrease of renewable water resources in large areas of the world that will 
intensify competition for water among agriculture, ecosystems, settlements, industry, 
and energy production, affecting regional water, energy, and food security, 
- increased exposure to 20th-century 100-year river floods, 
- likely increase in the frequency of meteorological droughts (i.e. less rainfall) and 
agricultural droughts (i.e. less soil moisture) in presently dry regions, which is likely to 
result in less surface water and groundwater, 
- negative impacts on freshwater ecosystems by changing stream flow and water quality,  
- projected reduction of raw water quality, posing risks to drinking water quality even 
with conventional treatment as a result of increased temperature, increases in sediment, 
nutrient and pollutant loadings due to heavy rainfall, reduced dilution of pollutants 
during droughts, and disruption of treatment facilities during floods, etc.,  
- increasing alterations of stream flow in regions with snowfall,  
- decrease in total meltwater yields in the long run in glacierfed rivers. Continued loss of 
glacier ice resulting in a shift of peak discharge from summer to spring247. 
 
In summary: all major indicators point to the conclusion that humanity has already entered the 
era of a water crisis as “[g]lobal manipulations of the freshwater cycle already affect 
biodiversity, food, and health security and ecological functioning, carbon sequestration, and 
climate regulation, undermining the resilience of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems”248. 
According to the above-mentioned “planetary boundaries” metrics while annual planetary 
freshwater use has not yet reached its upper physical threshold, the unused theoretically 
available amount may be seen as largely committed already to cover necessary human needs in 
the future249.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
247 JIMÉNEZ CISNEROS, Blanca E. et al. (2014): Freshwater resources. In FIELD, C.B. et al. (Eds.): Climate Change: 
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 229-269, p. 232-234. 
248 ROCKSTRÖM et al. (2009) op. cit. p. 15. 
249 Ibid. p. 16. 
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I.5.3. Political implications of the global water crisis 
 
I.5.3.1. Concepts of water security 
 
The human-induced global water crisis is not only manifested in terms of hydrology, but gives 
rise to a set of complicated social, political and economic implications. These complex 
phenomena are encapsulated by the various concepts of water security. 
 
Water security is a relatively new notion that has gradually evolved from its purely military 
roots into a more comprehensive concept encompassing all water-related aspects of human 
security250. In view of the concept’s inclusive nature the World Economic Forum describes it 
as the “gossamer that links together the web of food, energy, climate, economic growth, and 
human security challenges the world economy faces over the next two decades”251. Some 
sources underline the original (national) security aspects of the term252. Others, on the other 
hand, focus on the economic aspects of water security253. The most commonly used formulation 
of water security, however, remains the one developed by UN-Water that reads as follows: 
 
“[Water security is t]he capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to 
adequate quantities of acceptable quality of water for sustaining livelihoods, human 
well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-
borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate 
of peace and stability”254. 
 
I.5.3.2.  Assessments of global water security 
 
When it comes to the assessment of water security, the starting point is the water endowment 
of a country (basin, region, etc.). This comprises the absolute level of its freshwater availability, 
the fragility and strength of its freshwater ecosystems and the variability of its hydrology255. 
                                                          
250 NEWTON (2014) op. cit. p. 180. 
251 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2011): Water Security: The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus, Washington D.C., 
Island Press, p. 1.  
252 NEWTON (2014) op. cit. p. 182. 
253 SADOFF et al. (2015) op. cit. p. 16. 
254 UN-WATER (2013): Water Security and the Global Water Agenda: A UN-Water Analytical Brief, Hamilton, 
Ontario, UNU, p. 1. 
255 UN-WATER (2013) op. cit. p. 39-40. 
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Large natural hydrological variations (droughts, floods, inter-annual and intra-annual rainfall) 
– that characterise e.g. monsoonal river basins – require major investments in physical 
infrastructure and complex governance regimes and mechanisms. On the other hand, a more 
“simple” hydrology – i.e. lower rainfall/river flow variability typical of temperate river basins 
– usually requires proportionately less efforts to secure the management of water domestically 
and internationally256. Besides natural hydrological conditions the actual availability of water 
is influenced by human interventions in equal measure. These interventions include not only 
water use and pollution in a given basin, but the export and import of water as a commodity or 
in contained other commodities (virtual water)257. In fact, the empirics of water management 
worldwide show that far too often water insecurity is caused not by the lack of water, but the 
political or economic capacity of a country to sustainably use its available resources258. 
 
Despite the vagueness of the concept and ensuing methodological challenges water security 
assessments are regularly carried out by international organisations, policy institutions, 
governments etc. at various scales. A comprehensive global picture is provided by the World 
Water Development Reports, the annual publications of the UN World Water Assessment 
Programme administered by UNESCO. Such reports paint a picture of growing water insecurity 
worldwide. The 2012 report describes in great detail the growing uncertainties with regards to 
the natural hydrological cycle and the concomitant management difficulties259. These findings 
are reinstated in subsequent thematic reports in the context of water and energy (2014)260, water 
and sustainable development (2015)261, water and employment (2016)262 etc.  
 
An assessment published by the researchers of the International Institute of Advanced Systems 
Analysis in 2015 provides a numerical water security scoreboard for each country. Based on 
their institutional coping capacities (economic power) and hydrological complexities countries 
have been clustered into four large water security chapters (Figure 5 below). 
 
                                                          
256 See section I.1.4. above. 
257 SZILÁGYI (2018) op. cit. p. 72-73. 
258 FISCHER, Günther et al. (2015): Towards indicators for water security – A global hydro-economic classification 
of water challenges, IIASA Interim Report, Laxenburg, International Institute of Applied Systems Analyis, p. 2. 
259 WWAP (United Nations World Water Assessment Programme) (2012): The United Nations World Water 
Development Report 4: Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk, Paris, UNESCO, Volume 1, p. 77-215. 
260 WWAP (United Nations World Water Assessment Programme) (2014): The United Nations World Water 
Development Report 2014: Water and Energy, Paris, UNESCO. 
261 WWAP (2015) op. cit. 
262 WWAP (United Nations World Water Assessment Programme) (2016): The United Nations World Water 
Development Report 2016: Water and Jobs, Paris, UNESCO. 
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Figure 5: water security classification of countries (by region) 
 
Legend: NAM: North America, EUR: Europe, CAM: Central America, LAM: Latin America, OCE: 
Oceania, AFR: Africa, NAF-MEA: North Africa – Middle East, ASIA: Asia. 
Source: FISCHER et al. (2015) op. cit. p. 14. 
 
Countries that are characterised both with complex hydrology and low institutional coping 
capacity display the highest degree of water insecurity. These include several states in northern 
Africa (Egypt, Algeria), the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Jordan), Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Niger, Somalia, Sudan) and Asia (India, Pakistan). These countries account for 27% of the 
world’s population (HE4). The largest group of countries, hosting over half of the global 
population, is made up by states with relatively low capacity to address water challenges. At 
the same time, however, the hydrological challenges they face appear less complicated too. This 
group of states comprises large and populous countries from all over the world including China, 
Indonesia, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey, Thailand or Vietnam (HE1). A small 
number of countries are characterised with high water complexities but also with considerable 
economic and institutional coping capacities to address even massive water security challenges. 
These include South Korea, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United Arab Emirates, 
accounting for less 2% of the world’s population (HE3). Finally, most countries of the global 
west, such the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Canada display relatively low exposure 
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to water-related risks in view of their modest hydrological complexities and high coping 
capacities (HE2)263. 
 
Other dedicated assessments on water security arrive at similar conclusions. The GWP/OECD 
Task Force on Water Security and Sustainable Growth – measuring water insecurity with 
reference to droughts and scarcity, floods, inadequate water supply and sanitation, ecosystem 
degradation and pollution – concluded in 2015 that aggregate water security risks (including 
access to water and sanitation) were highest in China, India and Pakistan. In terms of economic 
impact the African continent is likely to be hit hardest, with Central and Eastern Africa 
displaying the highest degree of water insecurity264. The risks of real water scarcity are the most 
severe in south Asia and northern China. India and Pakistan are particularly exposed in view of 
their ever-growing demand for irrigation water. Hydroclimatic variability will have a 
particularly high impact on the stability of crop production in Africa, South America, central 
Asia and some parts of Europe will also be severely affected265.  
 
Figure 6: Environmental water scarcity index by basin 
 
Source: US NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (2012b): Global Water Security, Intelligence 
Community Assessment, Washington D.C., p. 69 
As regards ecosystem degradation and pollution most indicators show high risks in all 
populated areas of the world. For aggregated pollution hazards the eastern United States, the 
whole of Europe, the Indian sub-continent, China and the Mekong basin are at the highest risk 
                                                          
263 FISCHER et al. (2015) op. cit. p. 14, 16. 
264 SADOFF at al. (2015) op. cit. p. 105-107, Figures 35-36, Tables 4-5. 
265 Ibid p. 77. 
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category. As regards environmental flow requirements the hotspots are slightly different. All 
arid and semiarid regions of the world are experiencing serious violations of environmental 
flow requirements, including the western United States, the Iberian Peninsula, central Asia, 
South Africa, the Tigris-Euphrates basin, much of the Indian subcontinent, China’s main river 
basins or eastern Australia266 (Figure 6).  
 
I.5.3.3.  Political implications of the global water crisis and the growing water insecurity 
 
The potential gravity of the effects of the global water crisis on global political security is such 
that it has prompted some commentators to describe the present situation as a “hydro-climatic 
time bomb”267. A 2012 publication of the US National Intelligence Council identifies four 
megatrends that will critically shape our world by 2030. Three of these megatrends are social-
political in nature (individual empowerment, diffusion of power, demographic patterns), only 
one relates to the physical environment: the growing food, water and energy nexus268. In view 
of the projected 40% increase in demand for water and the intensification of severe weather 
patterns described above, many countries probably will not be able to avoid water and food 
shortages without massive external help. The fact that nearly half of the world’s population will 
live in areas experiencing severe water stress (Figure 5) will affect not only already fragile 
states in Africa and the Middle East, but China and India will also turn vulnerable. As a result, 
concludes the study, “water may become a more significant source of contention than energy 
or minerals out to 2030 at both the intrastate and interstate levels”. The fact that the highest 
degree of water stress is expected to emerge in shared river basins raises the potential of 
interstate conflict, despite the fact that historically water tensions have led to more water-
sharing agreements than violent conflicts269.  
 
While water-related state-to-state conflicts are unlikely to erupt in the next decade, water will 
be increasingly used as leverage and to obtain/increase regional influence by states in regions 
of difficult hydrology270. This can take several shapes, but constructing or halting major water 
                                                          
266 VÖRÖSMARTY, Charles et al. (2000): Global Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and 
Population Growth, Science 289, pp. 284-288, p. 285. 
267 BIGAS, Harriet (Ed.) (2012): The Global Water Crisis: Addressing an Urgent Security Issue, Papers for the 
InterAction Council, 2011-2012, Hamilton, Ontario, UNU, p. 15.  
268 US NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (2012a): Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, Washington D.C., p. 
iv-v. 
269 Ibid p. 66-67. 
270 US NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (2012b): Global Water Security, Intelligence Community Assessment, 
Washington D.C., p. 3. 
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infrastructure projects that manipulate transboundary water flows are expected to continue as a 
major tool of intra-basin politics271. In terms of domestic politics water can be a powerful 
precursor to national instability. Water problems, when combined with poverty, social tensions, 
environmental degradation, weak political institutions, etc. contribute to social disruptions that 
can result in state failure. Consequently, growing water insecurity will be a destabilising factor 
in many countries that, in turn, is likely to spill over to inter-state relations272.   
 
In view of the above it is not surprising that the 2015 Global Risks Report of the World 
Economic Forum ranked water crisis as the number one global risk in terms of impact and 
number eight in terms of likelihood273, highlighting its potential to trigger major interstate 
challenges such as large scale involuntary migrations. Similarly, in the 2016, 2016 and 2018 
reports water crisis featured top ten in terms of likelihood together with the failure to mitigate 
and adapt to climate change274.  
 
I.5.4. The global water crisis in a transboundary context: hydropolitical 
resilience or vulnerability?  
 
I.5.4.1. Concepts of hydropolitical resilience and vulnerability 
 
Transboundary water governance is one of the most complicated and delicate challenges of 
interstate relations even at best of times. However, the scientific findings cited above suggest 
that altered precipitation patterns and other human interventions will render future river flow 
variability outside the bounds of previously observed events. This may seriously test the balance 
of co-riparian relations all over the world as most of the world’s technical and political 
instruments to govern/manage shared basins have been based on the historic experience that 
river runoffs fluctuate within predictable ranges of variability. With hydro-climatic stationarity 
declared dead, the question arises whether and how countries will be able to cope with the new 
dynamics that the various impacts of the Antrophocene inject into transboundary water 
relations275.  
                                                          
271 Ibid p. 4. 
272 Ibid p. 3. 
273 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2015): Global Risks 2015, 10th Edition, Geneva, Table 1. 
274 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2016): Global Risks 2016, 11th Edition, Geneva, Figure 1, WORLD ECONOMIC 
FORUM (2017): Global Risks 2017, 12th Edition, Geneva, Figure 1, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2018): Global 
Risks 2018, 13th Edition, Geneva, Figure 1. 
275 MILLY, Paul C. D. et al. (2008): Stationarity is Dead: Whiter Water Management? Science 319 pp. 573-579, p. 
573.   
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The ability of a basin or a region to cope with emerging water-related political challenges has 
been expressed through the notion of hydropolitical resilience and vulnerability, a concept 
developed by scholars of hydropolitics276. The point of departure of the hydopolitical resilience 
thinking – formulated most clearly by the Oregon School under the leadership of Aaron Wolf 
– is the contention that a basin’s capacity to absorb stress can be best expressed in terms of its 
institutional capacity277. Where the rate of change within the basin exceeds the institutional 
capacity to absorb that change the likelihood of conflict rises. Importantly, such changes can be 
linked to a wide range of physical or political stress indicators: environmental change, 
asymmetric economic growth, unilateral implementation of major projects or decline of 
political relations. In other words, while certain phenomena are more likely to trigger conflict 
than others (almost 90% of all conflicts on record relate to water quantity and infrastructure), 
there is no single precursor (e.g. scarcity) that mechanically creates disputes among riparian 
states. Instead, it is “very rapid changes, either on the institutional side or in the physical system, 
that outpace the institutional capacity to absorb those changes [that] are at the root of most water 
conflict”278.  
 
Thus, hydropolitical vulnerability can be defined as the risk of political disputes over shared 
water resources. Hydropolitical resilience, conversely, denotes the ability of the same basin’s 
human-environmental system to adapt to changes within that system279. In other words, a 
capacity to withstand and recover from stresses so as to continue its function to prevent or 
resolve political disputes in a given shared basin280. 
 
I.5.4.2. Building blocks of hydropolitical resilience and vulnerability  
 
If we accept that institutions or “regimes” (i.e. the collection of norms, formal institutions and 
mechanisms) constitute the backbone of the resilience of co-riparian relations, the question 
arises whether such resilience can be measured and, if so, through which indicators.  
 
                                                          
276 See section I.2.2.3. b) above.  
277 TURTON (2008) op. cit. p. 24. 
278 WOLF (2009) op. cit. p. 12. 
279 Ibid p. 4. 
280 See section III.1.2.1. below. 
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The various hydropolitical schools use diverse assessment matrixes composed of certain 
formal/normative elements that, based on empirical evidence, are supposed to point to the 
presence or the lack of basin-wide political resilience.  
 
Ken Conca from the so-called Maryland School identifies the following core normative 
elements for the empirical analysis of transboundary governance regimes: 
- the equitable use principle, 
- the no-harm principle, 
- sovereign equality and territorial integrity, 
- information exchange, 
- consultation with other riparian states, 
- prior notification, 
- environmental protection, 
- peaceful resolution of disputes281.  
 
The Mumbai-based Strategic Foresight Group, an international think-tank, carries out a 
systematic global assessment of river basin cooperation, using the following indicators: 
- formal agreement, 
- river basin commission, 
- ministerial meetings, 
- technical projects,  
- joint monitoring of water flows, 
- floods, dams and reservoirs, 
- high political commitment,  
- integration into economic cooperation, 
- actual functioning282.  
Others also include various political aspects (political stability, transparency and accountability, 
diplomatic relations), sociological factors (epistemic communities) or geo-physical parameters 
(external water dependency, ratio of external to total renewable water)283.  
 
                                                          
281 CONCA (2006) op. cit. p. 110-111. 
282 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT GROUP (2015) op. cit. p. 12-14.  
283 MILMAN, Anita et al. (2012): Adaptive Capacity of Transboundary Basins in the Mediterranean, the Middle 
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The Oregon School uses similar indicators to map the potential political vulnerability of 
transboundary river basins. De Stefano et al. identified the following minimum core normative 
elements of multi- or bilateral water cooperation mechanisms that seem necessary to provide 
sufficient flexibility for riparians to manage changing hydro-political conditions284: 
- presence of a water treaty: any formal agreement among sovereign states that 
substantively covers water management issues. These may be basin treaties, frontier 
water treaties, bilateral cooperation treaties that cover substantial water issues, etc.285, 
- mechanisms for water allocation: treaty stipulations on methods and/or processes for 
the allocation of river flow quantities between riparians. These can be direct allocation 
rules (i.e. an amount of water fixed) as well as indirect allocation methods (principles 
of water sharing, prioritisation of uses) and procedures286, 
- mechanisms for variability management: mechanisms designed to deal with climatic 
extremes, such as droughts, floods or other specific variations. Variability management 
can include substantive obligations and procedures alike. The former includes water 
allocation adjustments, stricter irrigation procedures, specific reservoir releases, etc. 
The related procedures include immediate consultations, data sharing, transboundary 
warning systems, risk management planning, etc.287, 
- conflict resolution mechanisms: mechanisms to address disagreements among 
signatories, including consultations, engagement of third parties, compliance 
mechanisms, arbitration or the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice, etc.288, 
- presence of a river basin organisation: these include joint commissions, governing 
councils, directorates, joint basin authorities, etc., i.e. any bilateral or multilateral body 
comprised by the representatives of riparian governments with a competence over basin 
issues289.  
 
Thus, according to this matrix, institutional resilience is determined in a significant way by 
treaty design. If a given treaty framework is sufficiently robust, yet flexible enough to 
                                                          
284 DE STEFANO et al. (2012) op. cit. p. 199, Table I. 
285 Under the system of SDG 6 (see section I.4.3.1. above) these are summarised as “an arrangement for water 
cooperation [in the form of] a bilateral or multilateral treaty, convention, agreement or other formal arrangement 
between riparian countries that provides a framework for cooperation”. Source: 
http://www.sdg6monitoring.org/indicators/target-65/indicators652/ (accessed 12 February 2019).  
286 See section III.2.1.1. below. 
287 See section III.2.4.1. below. 
288 See section III.2.5.1. below. 
289 See section I.4.2. above. 
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accommodate changing hydro-climatic realities, it is likely to ensure resilience even in the face 
of increased water variability290. Naturally, no assessment based exclusively on such normative 
indicators can provide a nuanced picture of the resilience of a particular cooperation regime 
without an in-depth analysis of its actual operation291. Recent mathematical analyses carried 
out by Shlomi Dinar and colleagues found that, for example, that the lack of an allocation 
mechanism does not automatically bode lower hydropolitical resilience as it may also reflect 
the fact that the basin is sufficiently and evenly watered (i.e. the need for allocation mechanisms 
does not even arise). In contrast, allocation mechanisms that are either too rigid or too vague 
may actually increase vulnerability as they fail to adequately respond to the very challenge they 
were designed to solve292. Consequently, in order to draw robust conclusions on hydropolitical 
resilience and vulnerability based on the raw indicators of treaty design the initial findings must 
always be embedded in the concrete hydrological and geo-political context of the international 
river basin at issue. 
 
Yet, the high degree of convergence among the findings of the various hydropolitical 
assessments summarised below suggests that irrespective of these limitations the use of formal 
indicators is a suitable instrument to map out fundamental vulnerabilities in co-riparian 
relations.  
 
I.5.4.3.  Mapping hydropolitical resilience and vulnerability  
 
The most comprehensive and detailed global mapping of hydropolitical vulnerability thus far 
has been carried out by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) that, together 
with the Oregon State University and the University of Dundee, undertook, between 2005 and 
2009, an extensive analysis of the hydro-political risks in Africa, Latin America, North 
America, the Caribbean, Asia and Europe293. Similarly, a comprehensive analysis of the risks 
of transboundary water governance has also been commissioned by the World Bank. The study, 
published in 2010, aimed at drawing a global picture of hydropolitical risks294. In the years to 
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follow the findings of these studies have been further refined by a series of publications on 
global hydropolitical resilience295.  
 
A thorough multiannual assessment of global hydro-political stability has also been carried out 
by the Mumbai-based Strategic Foresight Group using a slightly different methodology. Their 
results are broken down to individual river basins and countries and can be easily accessed 
through an interactive global water cooperation map296. In addition, numerous assessments 
have been made with regard to specific regions and individual basins that already are or may 
turn into political hotspots (European Union297, Middle East, Sahel298, the Himalayas299, etc.).  
 
The main findings of the above hydropolitical surveys can be broken down to two fundamental 
conclusions: 
- cooperation, rather than conflict, is the dominant feature of co-riparian relations, 
- risks to transboundary water cooperation are growing in most parts of the world. 
 
First, statistical evidence confirms that differences over transboundary waters are more likely 
to result in cooperation than conflict300. On record, the number of acute conflicts over water has 
been significantly lower than instances of cooperation. The extensive qualitative research by 
Aaron Wolf and colleagues reveals that the period between 1960 and 2010 saw only 37 acute 
disputes (involving violence); of those 30 were between Israel and one or another of its 
neighbours and the violence ended in 1970. Non-Middle East cases accounted for five acute 
events only. Almost 90% of all conflicts on record relate to water quantity and infrastructure. 
The 507 conflict-related events identified are grossly outnumbered by the nearly 1300 
cooperative events (treaties, projects, institutions, joint initiatives, etc.) accounted for during 
the same period301. The high rate of cooperation is also eloquently illustrated by the constantly 
growing number of bilateral or basin treaties and basin institutions. As outlined above, the past 
50 years shows that about 30 new water agreements are signed every decade that results in a 
                                                          
295 E.g. DE STEFANO et al. (2012) op.cit.; DINAR et al. (2014) op.cit. 
296 STRATEGIC FORESIGHT GROUP (2015) op. cit. For the visual illustration see: http://strategicforesight.com/water-
cooperation-map/ (accessed 12 February 2019). 
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high treaty coverage todays (70% of the world’s transboundary areas, 80% of the people living 
in those regions)302. A similar token of the cooperative behaviour of riparian states is the steady 
increase in the number of river basin organisations worldwide303.  
 
Yet, the application of the various resilience indicators to emerging hydro-climatic challenges 
also shows that hydropolitical vulnerabilities exist in all regions of the world and they are likely 
to increase. Based on the five above-mentioned vulnerability indicators De Stefano et al. 
identified 24 transboundary basins with high potential risk for interstate tensions associated 
with water variability. These are mainly concentrated in northern and sub-Saharan Africa. The 
basins displaying the lowest levels of risks are primarily found in western and central Europe, 
along the USA–Canada border and in Southeast Asia (Figure 7). Yet, even the (supposedly) 
more resilient regions of the world face significant challenges today. E.g. one third of European 
population lives in basins that are covered only by very basic treaties whose ability to handle 
complex changes in the watershed remains limited304. 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of treaties and river basin organisation components by continent (%) 
Individual treaty and 
RBO components 
Continent 
Africa Asia Europe N. America S. America 
At least one water 
treaty 
50 40 69 64 32 
Allocation 25 25 33 42 14 
Variability mgmt. 20 18 34 15 6 
Conflict resolution 35 25 49 44 15 
At least one RBO 40 19 32 56 22 
Source: DE STEFANO et al. (2012) op. cit. p. 200, Table II. 
 
By 2050 high risks of conflict will be spatially more dispersed, extending to 61 international 
basins (instead of 24 today). Importantly, many future high impact areas will be outside today’s 
hydropolitical hotspots. Thus, in 2050 only half of high risk basins will be in Africa, the rest 
being distributed between Latin America, Europe and Western Asia. In fact, seven European 
basins, mostly in the central and eastern part of the continent, will also be characterised by the 
highest level of political risk by 2050305. 
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The findings of the above assessment concur with those of other global surveys on the subject. 
E.g. a research paper issued in 2012 by the US National Intelligence Council singles out the 
following international basins that are likely to post the greatest transboundary security 
challenges up to 2040: the Indus, the Jordan, the Mekong, the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, the 
Amu Darya and the Brahmaputra306. All of these basins are expected to witness degraded food 
security, reduced resilience to floods and droughts and continuing regional tensions. 
Importantly, the institutional capacity of these basins can be judged as moderate at best, but 
mainly limited or inadequate307. A 2014 study by Adelphi, a consultancy, commissioned by the 
German Federal Foreign Office also identified the same hotspots of potential transboundary 
conflicts308. The Strategic Foresight Group goes further in its analysis in so far as it tries to 
predict the risk and the direction of armed conflict over shared water resources around the 
world. Based on their assessment the following countries may be inclined to engage in combat 
for water: (Middle East) Turkey→Syria, Iraq; Syria→Israel, Turkey, Jordan; Israel→Palestine, 
Lebanon, Syria; Jordan→Syria; Palestine→Israel; Iraq→Turkey; (Asia) 
Afghanistan→Pakistan; Pakistan→Afghanistan, India; India→Pakistan, China; China→India, 
Vietnam; Vietnam→China; North Korea→South Korea; South Korea→North Korea; (Africa) 
Algeria→Morocco; Morocco→Algeria; Sudan→South Sudan; South Sudan→Sudan; 
Eritrea→Ethiopia, Djibouti; Ethiopia→Eritrea, Somalia; Djibouti→Ereitrea, Somalia; 
Somalia→Ethiopia309. 
 
  
                                                          
306 US NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL (2012a) op. cit. p. v. 
307 Ibid. 
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PART II 
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER GOVERNANCE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: AN OVERVIEW 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Transboundary river basins in the European Union and the impacts of the 
Anthropocene 
 
II.1.1. Transboundary river basins in the European Union 
 
Despite its relatively small size, the European continent has the highest number of international 
river basins among all UN regions in the world. The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database accounts for 69 transboundary basins310, while a 2012 study commissioned by the 
European Commission on the subject identifies 75 international river basins in Europe311.  
 
Although the European continent itself is much larger than the European Union, the 
concentration of international basins within the EU still remains very high in global comparison. 
This is due to the fact that – apart from the three large rivers of the eastern European plains 
(Volga, Dniester, Don) and four Caucasian basins (three of which are very small) – the majority 
of Europe’s international basins are in fact found (at least partly) within the boundaries of EU 
member states (Figure 8). These international basins cover around 60% of EU territory, 
expanding to about 3.3 million km2. Out of the continent’s 75 basins 24 (30%) are shared by 
EU member states only312.  
 
Naturally, these basins vary greatly in terms of size, hydrological conditions and political 
complexity. E.g. the Danube catchment area (with over 800 000 km2) alone makes up 25% of 
the total EU international basin area, while another five rivers (Rhine, Vistula, Elbe, Oder, 
Nemunas) cover another 25%313. The Danube basin has 19 riparian states, with 14 countries 
actually having more than 2000 km2 of the entire catchment area. The Danube is followed by 
                                                          
310 See section I.I.3. above. 
311 WRC (2012) op. cit. p. 155. Importantly, this study was not conceived as a complete register of international 
river basins, but as a compilation of “representative set of international European river basins” for the analysis of 
international coordination mechanisms in Europe (Ibid p. 148). Consequently, international river basins where the 
relative share of the smaller riparian was considered insignificant, were omitted altogether, except the Swedish-
Norwegian basins that all pertain to a comprehensive bilateral governance regime. 
312 Ibid p. 154. 
313 Ibid p. 173. 
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the Rhine (9 riparian states), the Meuse (5 riparian states), the Ems, the Daugava, the Nemunas 
and the Struma (each shared by 4 countries). The remainder of the (partly) EU river basins are 
shared by two or three countries only314.  
 
Figure 8: International river basins of the European continent 
 
Source: Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database315 
 
The hydro-geological diversity of the continent results in a very high transboundary exposure 
in most parts of the EU. Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal receive 40% of their 
surface waters from abroad, the Netherlands and Slovakia 80% while Hungary 95%! In 16 EU 
member states more than 90% of the territory is located in an international river basin316.  
 
II.1.2. The state of freshwaters in the European Union: a snapshot 
 
Thanks to the EU’s extensive monitoring mechanisms the European Commission and the 
European Environment Agency (“EEA”) produce detailed regular analyses on the state of 
freshwater resources in the Union. Below is a brief summary of the main recent reports, broken 
down by water availability and water use, water quality and hydro-morphological status.  
                                                          
314 Ibid p. 158. 
315 Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, College of Earth, Ocean, and Atmospheric 
Sciences, Oregon State University. Additional information about the TFDD can be found 
at: http://transboundarywaters.science.oregonstate.edu. 
316 RIEU-CLARKE, Alistair (2009): Challenges to Europe’s Water Resources. In UNEP: Hydropolitical 
Vulnerability and Resilience along International Waters – Europe, Nairobi, pp. 17-28, p. 17-19, p. 18. 
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II.1.2.1. Water availability and water use  
 
The European continent is generally considered a water abundant region, with 3,200 m3 of water 
available annually for every European citizen317. However, as any other average figure of its 
kind, this number hides large differences between regions, basins and users. How much water 
is actually available in the EU’s various regions is defined by the combined effect of 
precipitation, river flow and storage.  
 
Precipitation varies widely in the EU, ranging from less than 400 mm/year in parts of the 
Mediterranean region and the central plains of Europe to more than 1 000 mm/year along the 
Atlantic shores from Spain to Norway, the Alps and their eastern extension. Precipitation in 
Europe has generally increased during the 20th century, rising by 6-8 % on average between 
1901 and 2005. During the same period, however, some areas – notably the Mediterranean and 
eastern Europe – have witnessed a loss of rain and snowfall318.  
 
Variations in river flow – i.e. the quantity of freshwater resources within a basin – are 
determined mainly by precipitation and temperature, as well as by catchment characteristics 
such as geology, soils and land cover. Average river flow across Europe is about 450 mm/year 
but this varies significantly, ranging from less than 50 mm/year in southern Spain to more than 
1500 mm/year in parts of the Atlantic coast and the Alps. Annual flows have risen in the 
northern parts of Europe, with increases mainly in winter, but have shown a decreasing trend 
in the southern regions of Europe. In most parts of the EU river basins have been subject to 
significant human alterations with a lasting impact on flows319. The natural water storage or 
retention capacity of the various regions of the EU is changing considerably too. E.g. the Alps, 
that singlehandedly provides 40% of Europe’s fresh surface water, have experienced 
temperature increases twice the global average (1.48 °C) in the last hundred years. Glaciers are 
melting, the snowline is rising and the mountain range is gradually changing the way it collects 
and stores water in winter and distributes it in the summer months320. 
 
                                                          
317 RIEU-CLARKE (2009) op. cit. p. 19. 
318 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (2009): Water resources across Europe – confronting water scarcity and 
drought, EEA Report No. 2/2009, Copenhagen, p. 11. 
319 Ibid p. 13. 
320 Ibid p. 14. 
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The largest share – 44% – of the water abstracted in the EU is used for energy production and 
is mostly returned to the original water body. The second biggest water consuming sector is 
agriculture responsible for 24% of the water (here, the water is mostly consumed). 21% is used 
for public water supply and 11% is used by industry. Naturally, these general figures obscure 
gross geographical disparities. In central and western Europe energy production is the largest 
user of water (over 50%), followed by public water supply and industry. In southern Europe, 
however, agriculture is by far the biggest consumer, responsible for over 60% of all 
abstractions. The EU’s main source of water is surface water, accounting for 80% of the total 
amount used. Energy production relies on surface water almost exclusively. More than 75% of 
the water used in industry and agriculture comes from surface sources too. On the other hand, 
groundwater remains the predominant source of public water supply (55%)321.  
 
Figure 9: Annual total water abstraction as a percentage of available long-term freshwater 
resources around 1990 (WEI-90) compared to latest year available (1998–2007) (WEI-Latest 
Year) 
 
Source: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/water-exploitation-index-wei-3 (accessed 2 May 
2018) 
 
In view of the above figures the question arises whether Europe actually faces a water crisis.  
This can, among others, be assessed through the so-called water exploitation index (“WEI”), a 
commonly used measure of pressures on freshwater resources, calculated as the ratio of total 
                                                          
321 Ibid. 
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freshwater abstraction to the total renewable resource. WEI figures above 20% indicate water 
stress while values above 40% show severe water stress. The EEA’s relevant summary shows 
that Cyprus has the highest WEI (over 60%), followed by Belgium, Spain and Italy (Figure 9). 
Importantly, WEIs have been developed for individual river basins too. According to the 2007 
data of the EEA all major southern European basins have a WEI over 40% (some reaching a 
staggering 160%!), and several western European basins, including the Rhine, Meuse, Rhone, 
Elbe, Seine, Oder are above the warning threshold of 20%322.  
 
II.1.2.2. Water quality 
 
Tackling Europe’s persistent water pollutions problems has been in the forefront of the EU’s 
water policy in the past four decades. Pollutants arise from a wide range of sources, including 
agriculture, industry, households and the transport sector. During the last 25 years, however, 
significant progress has been made in reducing the pollution of numerous European water 
bodies. This progress is due to improved wastewater treatment, reduced volumes of industrial 
effluents, decrease in the use of fertilisers, reduced or banned phosphate content in detergents, 
as well as declining atmospheric emissions323. The successful implementation of the EU’s water 
legislation, especially the Urban Waste Water Directive324, has resulted in reduced point 
discharges of nutrients and organic pollution into freshwaters325. Nevertheless, discharges from 
wastewater treatment plants and industries and the overflow of wastewater from sewage 
systems still cause significant pollution: 22% of water bodies are still exposed to high point 
sources pollution. Despite some progress in reducing agricultural inputs of pollutants, diffuse 
pollution from agriculture is a major pressure in more than 40% of the EU’s rivers and coastal 
waters as well as in 30% of in lakes and transitional waters326. 
 
This means that more than half of the EU’s surface water bodies are reported to be below good 
ecological status or good ecological potential (for heavily modified or artificial water bodies) 
under the Water Framework Directive, the EU’s comprehensive water legislation327. Rivers are 
generally in a worse ecological status than lakes. The most polluted water bodies can be found 
                                                          
322 Ibid p. 18. 
323 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (2012a): European waters – assessment of status and pressures, EEA 
Report No. 8/2012, Copenhagen, p. 8. 
324 See section II.2.3.3. below. 
325 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (2012a) op. cit. p. 8. 
326 Ibid p. 8-9. 
327 See section II.2.3.3. below. 
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in central and north-western Europe, corresponding to high population densities and intensive 
agricultural practices with high fertiliser input and nitrate concentration328. As for groundwater, 
despite important improvements with regards to some major sources of pollution, around 25% 
of Europe’s groundwater bodies are still of poor chemical status according to the Water 
Framework Directive. Excessive levels of nitrates are the most frequent cause of poor 
groundwater status across much of the European Union329. 
 
II.1.2.3. Hydromorphology 
 
European water bodies have been modified for centuries for a variety of objectives such as 
irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood protection or urban development. Such modifications 
can take a multitude of forms such as straightening and canalisation, disconnection of 
floodplains, land reclamation, dams, reservoirs, bank reinforcement, etc. All of them, however, 
result in some sort of damage to the natural morphology and hydrology of the water bodies 
concerned. The extent of such damage has been such that today hydromorphological changes 
and altered habitats constitute the most commonly occurring pressures in EU surface waters, 
affecting around 40% of rivers and 30% of lakes330.  
 
Particularly significant are the interventions that regulate water flow or water level. The 
seasonal or daily flow regimes of a large number of European rivers have been altered in a major 
way. Most common modifications have taken place through impoundments (there are several 
hundreds of thousands of barriers and transverse structures in European rivers), abstractions, 
drainage return flows, etc.331 The various artificial morphological changes in natural surface 
water bodies result in altered sediment movements that, again, affect their ecological status as 
well as impair critical human uses (e.g. siltation of reservoirs and navigable waterways)332. 
Given the expanse of morphological interventions a high number of EU freshwater bodies have 
been classified as heavily modified or artificial under the Water Framework Directive (Figure 
10). 
 
 
 
                                                          
328 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (2012a) op. cit. p. 9 
329 Ibid. 
330 Ibid p. 15. 
331 Ibid p. 34. 
332 Ibid p. 35. 
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Figure 10: Heavily modified and artificial water bodies in Europe 
 
Source: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/percentage-of-natural-heavily-modified-1/proportion-
of-heavily-modified-and/image_large (accessed 12 February 2019) 
 
II.1.3. European water future: the impacts of the Anthropocene  
 
The freshwater resources of the European Union are – just as elsewhere – one of the prime 
victims of the Anthropocene. In a 2012 report the European Environmental Agency identified 
the most important drivers of water vulnerability as follows: the variation of the hydrological 
cycle, land use and land use change, water abstraction and climate change333. While other 
pressures – most notably pollution – also remain of critical importance, the former factors 
nonetheless stand out in view of their capacity to irreversibly change the prevailing hydrological 
conditions.  
 
In the context of climate the EEA concluded that the most important effect will be changes in 
the availability of freshwater, i.e. higher variability of river flows334. For northern Europe 
projections suggest less snow, lake and river ice cover, increased winter and spring river flows 
in some parts (e.g. Norway) and decreases in other parts (e.g. Finland) as well as greater damage 
by winter storms. For north-western Europe higher winter precipitation is expected to increase 
the intensity and frequency of winter and spring river flooding. The most severe effects will be 
felt in central and eastern Europe where river flow droughts are already widespread and 
                                                          
333 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (2012b): Water resources in Europe in the context of vulnerability, EEA 
Report No. 11/2012, Copenhagen, p. 5. 
334 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (2012c): Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2012 – An 
indicator-based report, EEA Report No. 12/2012, Copenhagen. 
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projected to further increase with prolonged and more extreme dry periods. Decreasing water 
availability is projected to exacerbate water stress, especially in southern Europe. Moreover, 
climate change has already increased water temperatures of rivers and lakes, and has decreased 
ice cover (changes in stream flow and water temperature have important impacts on water 
quality and on freshwater ecosystems)335.  
 
Figure 11: Impacts of climate change on freshwater quantity and quality in Europe 
Variable What is already happening What could happen 
River flow River flows during winter and lower river 
flows during summer have been recorded 
since the 1960s in large parts of Europe 
Climate change is projected to result in 
strong changes in the seasonality of river 
flows across Europe. Summer flows are 
projected to decrease in most of Europe, 
including in regions where annual flows 
are projected to increase. 
River floods More than 325 major river floods have 
been reported for Europe since 1980, of 
which more than 200 have been reported 
since 2000.  
Global warming is projected to increase 
the occurrence and frequency of flood 
events in large parts of Europe. Pluvial 
floods and in particular flash floods, which 
are triggered by local intense precipitation 
events, are also likely to become more 
frequent throughout Europe. In regions 
where snow accumulation during winter is 
projected to decrease (e.g. north-eastern 
Europe), the risk of early spring flooding 
could decrease.  
Droughts Europe has been affected by several major 
droughts in recent decades, such as the 
catastrophic drought associated with the 
2003 summer heat wave in central parts of 
the continent and the 2005 drought in the 
Iberian Peninsula. Severity and frequency 
of droughts appear to have increased in 
certain areas, in particular in southern 
Europe. 
Regions most prone to an increase in 
drought hazard are southern and south-
eastern Europe, but minimum river flows 
are also projected to decrease significantly 
in many other parts of the continent, 
especially in summer. 
Water 
temperature 
Water temperature in major European 
rivers and lakes has increased by 1-3 °C 
over the last century. 
Lake and river surface water temperatures 
are projected to increase following further 
increases in air temperature. 
Lake and river ice 
cover 
The duration of ice cover on European 
lakes and rivers has shortened at a mean 
rate of 12 days per century over the last 
150-200 years. 
A further decrease in the duration of lake 
ice cover is projected. 
Freshwater 
ecosystems and 
water quality 
Cold-water species have been observed to 
move northwards or to higher altitudes. 
Changes in life cycle events have been 
observed. Phytoplankton and zooplankton 
blooms in several European lakes are now 
occurring one month earlier than 30–40 
years ago. Biological invasions of species 
(including toxic species) that originate in 
warmer regions have been observed. 
The observed changes are projected to 
continue with the progress of climate 
change. Increases in nutrient and dissolved 
organic carbon concentrations in lakes and 
rivers may occur, but management changes 
can have much larger effects than climate 
change. 
Source: EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (2012c): Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2012 
– An indicator-based report, EEA Report No. 12/2012, Copenhagen, on the basis of p. 112-127 and 213-216. 
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In summary: water stress will emerge as a widespread phenomenon and, where it already exists, 
is projected to worsen. Importantly, while such negative effects can partly be reduced by water 
use efficiency gains (e.g. in the field of irrigation, industry, etc.) or trade (e.g. import of 
agricultural produce), these measures will not be sufficient to compensate for climate-induced 
increases in water stress336. At the same time, floods and the concomitant economic loss are 
projected to significantly increase in large parts of Europe in the future (Figure 11). In other 
words, while the EU as a whole is not threatened by an immediate water crisis, the risk of severe 
water shortages and other crisis phenomena is increasing even in those parts of the Union that 
are generally characterised by balanced hydrology. 
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Chapter 2 
Transboundary water governance in the European Union 
 
 
II.2.1. A distinct European model of transboundary water governance 
 
II.2.1.1. Drivers of water cooperation 
 
The normative and institutional features of transboundary water governance in the EU are 
determined by a number of specific hydrological and political conditions that result in a sui 
generis governance model. First of all, as shown in the previous section, the natural hydro-
geographical circumstances prevailing in the EU render most of its members heavily exposed 
to the challenges of transboundary water management337. Such high political complexity is, 
however, compensated by relatively low hydrological complexity, i.e. most of Europe’s 
international rivers – apart from the largely arid transboundary basins of the Iberian Peninsula 
– are relatively well-watered. Moreover, co-riparian relations within the EU have lately been 
largely spared from the dominant drivers of water conflicts elsewhere, such as dramatic increase 
in national water use, excessive manipulation of river flow, sky-rocketing urbanisation, large-
scale unilateral infrastructure development or runaway climate change.  
 
The strong intra-basin interdependencies and the relatively benign nature of the collective 
action problems have created a positive political constellation that supports bilateral and basin-
wide cooperation. As a result, the European Union has become the cradle and the global 
laboratory of institutionalised cross-border water management. On top, the EU is the most 
elaborate supranational political-economic association in the world. Member states’ 
sovereignty is significantly constrained by the EU’s founding treaties and the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice. Consequently, member states cooperate routinely on a multitude 
of issues through established multilateral channels. Such close and highly institutionalised 
horizontal collaboration creates complex interlinkages among issues and countries that act as 
a natural break against the emergence of exceedingly conflictual interstate disputes in general. 
Finally, EU member states are highly industrialised, high income countries, with no apparent 
political or economic hegemon in the bloc. The outstanding level of economic development, 
                                                          
337 See section II.1.1. above. 
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environmental consciousness as well as the relative abundance of aquatic resources in the bloc 
therefore limits the potential pool of transboundary water problems.  
 
II.2.1.2. Normative features of transboundary water governance in the European Union 
 
The distinctive normative characteristics of EU transboundary water governance stem from the 
unique constitutional construction of the European Union. Under its founding treaties, notably 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), the EU disposes of autonomous supranational legal system that – in case of a 
conflict – supersedes national law338.  
 
In most policy fields – such as water – the EU and its member states share responsibilities. In 
such shared competence areas, the EU (typically the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament) adopts legislation that is binding on member states. Moreover, the EU also 
concludes international agreements that apply automatically to EU institutions and member 
states alike (irrespective of national ratification)339. While the existence of EU legislation does 
not automatically pre-empt national measures in areas of shared competences, member state 
autonomy is, nonetheless, seriously constrained by three layers of EU law:  
- the founding treaties and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(primary law), 
- international treaties ratified by the EU, as well as 
- legislation adopted by EU institutions (secondary law)340. 
 
Importantly, through the prism of the EU legal system, any other legal norm, such as intra-
member state treaties, are basically considered as national law and remain subject to the 
supremacy of EU law. In other words, EU law limits member states legislative powers not only 
internally, but also in the international arena341.  
 
                                                          
338 CRAIG, Paul and DE BÚRCA, Gráinne (2003): EU Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, p. 275. 
339 Article 216.1., TFEU 
340 KUIJPER, Peter Jan (2013): “It Shall Contribute to … the Strict Observance and Development of International 
Law…” In COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2013): The Court of Justice and the Construction of 
Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law, The Hague, TCM Asser Press, pp. 589-612, p.  
597-601. 
341 KUIJPER (2013) op. cit. p. 591. 
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From this follows the fact that transboundary water governance in the EU is regulated by no 
less than four (!) levels of supranational law: 
- EU primary law defines the distribution of powers in the field of water policy between 
the EU and its member states. It also establishes horizontal institutional requirements – 
on e.g. enforcement and dispute settlement – that apply to water issues regardless of the 
provisions of multi- or bilateral treaties; 
- international water treaties ratified by the EU: the EU is an active player in the 
international water policy arena. Any treaty to which the EU accedes becomes 
automatically binding on EU institutions and member states, even if some member 
states choose not to become a party on their own right; 
- EU secondary law: the bulk of EU water law is adopted as so-called secondary 
legislation, mostly in the form of directives. Any such legislation has to conform to 
primary EU law as well as to international treaties approved by the EU; 
- bilateral, regional, basin, etc. treaties concluded by EU member states: the daily 
practice of cross-border water management takes place through bilateral water treaties 
and basin agreements. These treaties not only have to comply with all three layers of 
EU law, but – under the “doctrine of harmonious interpretation” – member states also 
have to interpret them in light of the letter and spirit of the relevant EU norms342. It 
means that two (or more) member states cannot make agreements to deviate from 
general EU or specific water law.  
 
The above legal structure is mirrored by the unique institutional set-up of the EU that has 
considerable implications for transboundary water governance inside the bloc343. 
 
II.2.2. International water law in the European Union 
 
II.2.2.1. Evolution of international water law in the European continent  
 
The evolution of modern international water law predates the establishment of the European 
Union and its predecessors. In fact, the EU as a supranational political body has played a very 
limited role in the development of international water law. On other hand, some member states 
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343 See section II.2.3.4. below. 
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of the EU have been the unquestionable driving force behind many of the achievements the of 
today’s transboundary water governance.  
 
The evolution of today’s vast body of water treaties in Europe was neither linear, nor free of 
controversies. In fact, as Götz Reichert, a monographer of EU water law, underlines early water 
treaties grew out of conflict-driven partial approaches344. Collaboration after World War II was 
not only impeded by strong sovereignty concepts, but also by the stark political division of the 
European continent. The mid1980s, however, brought about major improvements. In 1985 eight 
Danube riparian states – overcoming the east-west political divide – signed the Bucharest 
Declaration on the Cooperation of the Danube Countries on Problems of the Danube Water 
Management. The Declaration acknowledged the pressing environmental problems in the 
Danube basin and committed the countries to integrated water resources management345. A 
similarly important trigger was the 1986 Sandoz accident in Switzerland on the Rhine whose 
devastating ecological impacts led to a paradigm shift towards ecosystem-oriented, holistic 
governance approaches all over Europe346.  
 
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989-1990 injected fresh impetus into the institutionalisation of 
transboundary cooperation. The first example of the ensuing treaty-making was the adoption of 
Elbe Convention347 by Germany, Czech Republic and the European Economic Community as 
early as in 1990. The year 1992 marked the adoption of the UNECE Water Convention348 that 
not only provided a solid and durable legal framework for transboundary cooperation for the 
European continent and beyond, but also required the conclusion of specific basin agreements 
by parties. This resulted in a new wave of regional treaty-making since the mid1990s. The most 
notable examples include the Danube Convention (1994)349, the Scheldt Agreement350, the 
Meuse Agreement351 and the Oder Convention352 (1996), the Spanish-Portuguese Basins 
                                                          
344 REICHERT, Götz (2016): Transboundary Water Cooperation in Europe: A Successful Multidimensional 
Regime? Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, p. 8-14. 
345 MOYNIHAN, Ruby (2015): The Contribution of the UNECE Water Regime to Transboundary Cooperation in 
the Danube River Basin. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation, 
Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 296-307, p.302. 
346 REICHERT (2016) op. cit. p. 12. 
347 Convention on the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe, Magdeburg, 8 October 1990.  
348 See section II.2.2.2. below.  
349 Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube, Sofia, 29 June 1994.  
350 Agreement on the Protection of the River Scheldt, Charleville Mezieres, 26 April 1994. 
351 Agreement on the Protection of the River Meuse, Charleville Mezieres, 26 April 1994. 
352 Convention on the International Commission for the Protection of the Oder, Wroclaw, 11 April 1996. 
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Convention353 (Albufeira Convention, 1998), the new Rhine Convention354 (1999), the Sava 
Framework Agreement355 (2002) or the Lake Ohrid Agreement356 (2004). Most recently, treaty-
making (or revision) at basin level has been influenced by the EU’s Water Framework Directive 
whose planning and monitoring requirements have been incorporated into the text or work 
programme of the relevant international agreements and basin organisations357. This 
evolutionary curve, largely determined by the persistent pollution problems of the 1970s and 
1980s, has left a lasting impact on water law within the European Union, resulting in a strong 
ecological/qualitative focus with water quantity-related or economic issues playing only a 
marginal role. 
 
Naturally, below basin or sub-basin level riparian states had engaged in formal transboundary 
water cooperation well before the emergence of the above major basin treaties or the UNECE 
Water Convention. Bilateral instruments comprise of (comprehensive or partial) water frontier 
treaties , joint water infrastructure and development treaties, agreements on special water uses, 
etc.358  Remarkably, such treaties were concluded in large numbers by parties on opposite sides 
of the Iron Curtain. 
 
Today, EU countries and their neighbours are interconnected by an extensive web of multi- and 
bilateral treaties. On top of European system of international water law sits the UNECE Water 
Convention. This is supplemented by basin treaties, sub-basin treaties, comprehensive bilateral 
water treaties, as well as bilateral treaties covering single transboundary water bodies or 
particular issues. As Figure 12 show this adds up to an almost seamless treaty coverage of all 
international river basins situated within or shared by the EU.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
353 Convention on the Co-operation for the Protection and the Sustainable Use of the Waters of the Luso-Spanish 
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Figure 12: Map of EU river basin districts indicating transboundary cooperation 
 
  Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/facts_figures/pdf/Transboundary-cooperation-
%202012.pdf (accessed 12 February 2019) 
 
II.2.2.2. The UNECE Water Convention 
 
a) History  
 
The overarching institutional framework for pan-European transboundary water cooperation 
has been created by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the UN’s 
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regional body. Importantly, the UNECE region is not limited to the European continent as it 
also includes countries that emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union as well as the 
United States and Canada. Today, the UNECE has 56 member states359.  
 
The UNECE has been active in the field of environmental policy since the 1960s. The current 
overarching political framework, the Environment for Europe process was launched in 1991 
following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. This process paved the 
way for the adoption of a range of landmark environmental conventions throughout the 1990s, 
such the 1991 (Espoo) Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, the 1992 (Helsinki) Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, 
the 1998 (Aarhus) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice on Environmental Matters or, indeed, the UNECE Water 
Convention itself360.  
 
UNECE started to address selected water related problems as early as in the 1950s. Throughout 
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s it has adopted a large number of recommendations, declarations 
and decisions addressing a range of water-related questions such as drinking water abstraction, 
water pollution, economic instruments of water governance, etc. As Alistair Rieu-Clarke, a 
monographer of UNECE water law, concludes this early body of non-binding instruments 
reflects “an evolution and consolidation of shared understanding […] on transboundary water 
challenges” that laid the foundations for the eventual adoption of the Water Convention itself361.  
 
The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes (“Water Convention”) was adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1996. 
It has two protocols – the 1999 Protocol on Water and Health and the 2003 Protocol on Civil 
Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents on Transboundary Waters – of which the latter is not yet in force. The Convention 
was amended in 2003 (effective as of 2013) to allow the accession thereto by any member states 
of the United Nations outside the UNECE region362. 
                                                          
359 https://www.unece.org/oes/nutshell/member_states_representatives.html (accessed 12 February 2019). 
360 Also see section I.4.3.2. above. 
361 RIEU-CLARKE, Alistair (2015): Remarks on the Drafting History of the Convention. In TANZI, Attila et al. 
(Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation, Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 3-15, p. 5. 
362 Amendment to Articles 25 and 26 of the Convention, ECE/MP.WAT/14. 
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b) Objectives  
 
The Convention is based on a holistic approach towards transboundary waters. Thus, it requires 
parties to consider the broader implications of transboundary waters on human health, the 
environment and their economic and development policies in an integrated fashion363. Its main 
objectives comprise:  
- the protection of transboundary waters (both surface and groundwater) by preventing, 
controlling and reducing transboundary impacts, including impacts on human health 
and safety, flora, fauna, soil, climate, landscape and historical monuments or other 
physical structures as well as impacts on the cultural heritage or socio-economic 
conditions;   
- the ecologically sound and rational management of transboundary waters;   
- the reasonable and equitable use of transboundary waters and therefore prevention of 
conflicts;  
- conservation and restoration of ecosystems364.  
 
In the pursuit of these objectives the Convention explicitly recognises the legal relevance of a 
number of basic environmental law principles such as the precautionary principle, the polluter-
pays-principle and the principle of sustainable management of water resources365.  
 
c) Core obligations 
 
The Convention contains two major categories of obligations: 
- general obligations: the first, more general, group of obligations apply to all parties and 
include such requirements as the authorisation and monitoring of wastewater 
discharges366; setting emission limits for discharges from point sources based on the 
best available technology367; the application of best environmental practices to reduce 
inputs of nutrients and hazardous substances from agriculture and other diffuse 
                                                          
363 Article, 1.2, UNECE Water Convention; BERNARDINI, Francesca (2015): The Normative and Institutional 
Evolution of the Convention. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation, 
Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 32-48, p. 32. 
364 Articles 2, 3, UNECE Water Convention. 
365 Article 2.5, ibid. 
366 Article 3.1.b), Article 4, ibid. 
367 Article 3.1.c), f), ibid. 
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sources368; environmental impact assessment369; development of contingency plans370; 
setting of water-quality objectives371, and minimization of the risk of accidental water 
pollution372,  
- obligations of riparian states: the second category of obligations is more specific and 
must be implemented by parties sharing transboundary waters. Thus, riparian states are 
obliged to conclude specific bilateral or multilateral agreements that create joint 
bodies373, to hold consultations concerning the shared watercourse374, to exchange 
information on the state of water bodies375, to provide mutual assistance in critical 
situations376, etc. 
 
d) Operation and institutions  
 
The framework nature and the flexible institutional set-up of the Convention permitted the 
parties to adopt comprehensive work programmes and a wide range of supporting instruments 
and mechanisms over the years. This has greatly contributed to the further development of the 
original principles and requirements of the Convention377. Thus, today, the Convention’s 
activities extend to such novel issues of water management as climate change or payment for 
ecosystem services, etc. To facilitate implementation strategic and technical guidelines have 
been developed under the Convention on specific issues such as monitoring, flood control or 
groundwater378. The UNECE Water Convention is supported by a robust institutional 
framework, including the regular meetings of the parties, an implementation (compliance) 
mechanism, various working and expert groups and a highly active secretariat379.  
e) Evaluation 
 
Following its entry into force, the Convention has quickly evolved into a full-fledged model 
platform for transboundary water cooperation that has pioneered on such critical areas as 
                                                          
368 Article 3.1.g), ibid. 
369 Article 3.1.h), ibid. 
370 Article 3.1.j), ibid. 
371 Article 3.2, ibid. 
372 Article 3.1. l), ibid. 
373 Article 9.1-2, ibid. 
374 Article 10, ibid. 
375 Article 13, ibid. 
376 Article 15, ibid. 
377 BERNARDINI (2015) op. cit. p. 33. 
378 Ibid. 
379 MCCAFFREY (2016) op. cit. p. 35-36. 
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transboundary groundwater management, climate adaptation or monitoring, water allocation, 
etc., receiving critical acclaim worldwide380. It is also widely recognised for its substantial 
contribution to the development of international water law381. Due to its compatible and 
complementary character vis-à-vis the UN Watercourses Convention the Convention today 
represents one of the fundamental building blocks of water governance not only within the 
European Union, but also on a global scale382. 
 
II.2.2.3. Basin treaties within the European Union 
 
Most river basins in the EU are subject to formalised governance schemes. A 2012 survey, 
commissioned by the European Commission383, identified only three international basins with 
no formal cooperation agreement in place: the Marica-Evros/Meric between Greece, Bulgaria 
and Turkey, the Axios/Vardar between Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and the Adige/Etsch basin 
between Italy and Switzerland. All other transboundary watercourses and lakes are subject to 
at least one dedicated treaty (Figure 12). The majority of such treaties also established river 
basin organisations or some kind of formal cooperation bodies (in the case of basins shared by 
two states only typically the frontier water commission).  
 
As mentioned above, the most important European basin treaties include the Danube 
Convention, the Rhine Convention, the Sava Framework Agreement, the Conventions for the 
Elbe and the Oder rivers, the Meuse Agreement and the Spanish-Portuguese Basins Convention 
(Albufeira Convention)384. These basin treaties cover the critical bulk of the international 
watersheds in the EU.  
 
                                                          
380 In his address to the sixth session of the Meeting of the Parties on 28 November 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon had stated: “Since its launch twenty years ago, this Convention has significantly enhanced the integrated 
norms and standard for cooperation, which makes it a best practice model at the international level.” 
http://www.unece.org/?id=32154&type=111 (accessed 12 February 2019). 
381 TANZI Attila, MCINTYRE, Owen and KOLLIOPOULOS, Alexandros (2015): The Contribution of the UNECE 
Water Convention to International Water Law. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the 
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its Contribution to International 
Water Cooperation, Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 533-540, p. 533. 
382 MCCAFFREY (2016) op. cit. p. 39. 
383 WRC (2012) op. cit. p. 279-290. 
384 See section II.2.2.1. above. 
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a) The Danube Convention385 
 
The Danube is the second largest river of the European continent: its basin area covers more 
than 800,000 square kilometres or 10% of Europe’s surface. With 19 riparian countries, out of 
which 14 has more than 2000 square kilometres of the basin, it is considered as the world’s 
most international river386.  
 
Formalised basin-wide cooperation over the Danube goes back to the mid-19th century when, 
in 1856, the European Commission of the Danube was established to oversee navigation387. 
However, substantial basin-wide cooperation on non-navigational uses started to take shape 
only in the mid1980s amidst the quick erosion of the bipolar political system that cut the basin 
into two388. Today’s framework instrument: the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection 
and Sustainable Use of the River Danube (“Danube Convention”) was signed in Sofia, Bulgaria 
in 1994 and came into force in 1998. Parties to this convention include all major riparian states, 
i.e. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and the European Union. The elaboration of the Convention 
was heavily influenced by the UNECE Water Convention, even though the latter was not yet in 
force at the time389.  
 
Given that water pollution was the dominant problem in the basin at the time of its drafting, the 
Convention itself has a predominantly ecological focus390. The main objectives of the 
Convention are thus sustainable and equitable water management, including the conservation, 
improvement and rational use of surface and groundwater in the Danube river basin as well as 
the reduction of the pollution of the Black Sea. Water quantity issues come under the remit of 
the Convention “only incidentally” as was interpreted by the European Court of Justice391. To 
achieve the above objectives, parties pledged to cooperate so as to maintain and/or improve the 
                                                          
385 Although the Convention is commonly called as the Danube Protection or the Danube River Protection 
Convention (to distinguish it from the Convention regarding the regime of navigation on the Danube, Belgrade, 
18 August 1948), for sake of brevity this study will refer to all basin treaties by the name of the respective river 
only.  
386 http://www.icpdr.org/main/danube-basin (accessed 12 February 2018). 
387 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (2013a) op. cit. p. 177. 
388 KITTINGER, Wilhelm (1997): The Danube River Protection Convention. In LYONS MURHY, Irene (Ed.): 
Protecting Danube Basin Resources, NATO ASI series (Series 2: Environment) Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 43-47, 
p. 44.  
389 MOYNIHAN (2015) op. cit. p. 304. 
390 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 175. 
391 C-36/98, Spain v. Council, ECR 2001, I-00779, para 63. 
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environmental and water quality conditions of the basin. For all such measures the 
precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle constitute a common starting point392. 
 
The implementation of the Convention is supported and coordinated by the International 
Commission for the Protection of the River Danube (ICPDR). The ICPDR operates the 
decision-making system of the Convention, carries out projects specifying measures to be taken 
to achieve the objectives of the convention, etc. Importantly, the ICPDR has been chosen by 
the relevant basin states to coordinate the implementation of the EU’s Water Framework 
Directive which non-EU riparian states also undertook to implement on a voluntary basis. The 
ICPDR is considered as one the highly effective model RBO in wider international 
comparison393. 
 
b) The Rhine Convention  
 
The River Rhine flows from its source in Switzerland through Germany, France and the 
Netherlands to the North Sea. The Rhine basin also includes Austria, Liechtenstein, Italy and 
Belgium. It is the third largest river of Europe, with a total length of 1,320 km and a catchment 
area of 185 000 square kilometres394.  
 
The Rhine was the first international river to be made subject to a formal governance 
arrangement: the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine in 1815395. The current 
institutional setting for cooperation – the International Commission for the Protection of the 
Rhine (“ICPR”) – was established in 1963. Today’s regulatory framework, the Convention on 
the Protection of the Rhine (“Rhine Convention”), signed in 1999, replaced two earlier 
international instruments396 that, according to critics, proved to be a “regulatory failure”397.  
 
The Rhine Convention has been ratified by Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
(EU member states), Switzerland (a non-Member State) and the European Union. Its main 
objectives include the sustainable development of the Rhine ecosystem, the production of 
                                                          
392 Article 2. 
393 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 183. 
394 https://www.iksr.org/en/rhine/ (accessed 12 February 2019). 
395 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (2013a) op. cit. p. 177. 
396 Agreement concerning the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine against Pollution, Bern, 
29 April 1963; Convention for the protection of the Rhine against chemical pollution, Bonn, 3 December 1976. 
397 REICHERT (2016) op. cit. p. 11. 
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drinking water from the waters of the Rhine, the improvement of the sediment quality and 
general flood prevention and protection398. The Convention is based on a number of 
international water law and environmental law principles, such as the “no harm” rule, the 
precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle, etc.399 Given its broad ecological focus, the 
Convention hardly makes mention of any other aspects of water management than quality 
improvement.  
 
Implementation of the Convention is coordinated by the ICPR. The ICPR is endowed with 
broad powers to prepare and propose programmes, measures, studies, etc. with a view to 
improving or evaluating the effectiveness of implementation. In particular, the ICPR is tasked 
to carry out studies and programmes on the Rhine ecosystem, to make proposals for actions, to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the actions carried out, to coordinate warnings and alerts, to inform 
the public of the state of the Rhine and the results of its activities400. The impact of the ICPR is 
generally evaluated as highly positive (e.g. the return of the salmon to the river is often cited as 
an emblematic achievement) so it has served as a model for the development of other basin 
commissions401. 
 
c) The Elbe Convention 
 
The River Elbe has a total length of 1091 km and a catchment area of 148 268 square kilometres 
(almost the size of the Rhine!). The Elbe basin is shared by four countries, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Austria and Germany, although 99% of the draining area belongs to the Czech Republic 
and Germany only402.  
 
While formalised water cooperation in the basin goes back to 1811, during the Cold War, the 
Elbe symbolised the separation between the two German states as well as the entire European 
continent403. By the end of the 1980s the Elbe has become one of the most polluted rivers in 
Europe, causing considerable tension between West Germany and the upstream communist 
                                                          
398 Article 3. 
399 Article 4. 
400 Article 8. 
401 MOELLENKAMP (2007) op. cit. p. 1413. 
402 http://www.ikse-mkol.org/en/themen/die-elbe/ (accessed 12 February 2019). 
403 DOMBROWSKY, Ines (2008): Institutional design and regime effectiveness in transboundary river management? 
The Elbe water quality regime, Hydrology and Earth System Sciences Discussions, European Geosciences Union 
12(1), pp. 223-238, p. 226; MOELLENKAMP (2007) op. cit. p. 1412.  
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neighbours (then Czechoslovakia and East Germany). Consequently, following the fall of the 
Iron Curtain cooperation in the Elbe basin become a high political priority not only for 
Germany, but also for the (then) European Communities. Thus a new legal framework was 
agreed upon as early as 1990 in the form of a basin agreement entitled Convention on the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe. Parties to the original Convention 
were Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republic and the European Communities404.  
 
The objectives of the Elbe cooperation relate predominantly to pollution prevention and control. 
Cooperation among the riparian countries takes place through the International Commission of 
the Protection of the Elbe (“ICPE”) whose main goals include:  
- to facilitate water usage, primarily to provide drinking water from riverbank infiltration 
and water and sediments for agricultural usage,  
- to restore the ecosystem to a healthy abundance of species, and 
- to incrementally decrease pollution of the North Sea from the Elbe basin area405.  
 
To that end the focus of the activities of ICPE is the improvement of the status of the Elbe and 
its tributaries from the physical, chemical and biological point of view with respect to water, 
suspended matter, sediments and organisms and the enhancement of the ecological value of the 
Elbe river valley. Despite the rather sketchy regulatory framework, the Elbe cooperation is 
perceived as generally effective which is illustrated by a relatively high achievement of the 
goals established by the ICPE in its various action programmes406.  
 
d) The Oder Convention 
 
The Oder (Odra) River is 840 km long and has a catchment area of 124 000 square kilometres, 
shared by the Czech Republic, Poland and the Germany. The river constitutes the border 
between Germany and Poland over a 170 km long stretch. Its geopolitical function as well as 
its hydro-geographical conditions qualify the Oder as one of the principal transboundary rivers 
in Europe407.  
 
                                                          
404 When the Czech Republic became member of the European Union, the EU formally withdrew from the Elbe 
Convention. 
405 Article 2, Elbe Convention. 
406 DOMBROWSKY (2008) op. cit. p. 235. 
407 http://www.mkoo.pl/index.php?mid=2&lang=EN (accessed 12 February 2019). 
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The existing basin-wide cooperation framework is based the 1996 Convention on the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Oder which is modelled very closely on the 
Elbe Convention. As in the case of the Elbe, the objectives and main measures of the 
Convention are formulated with reference to the responsibilities of the implementing basin 
organisation: the International Commission for the Protection of the Oder (“ICPO”). The 
principal objectives of the ICPO’s work are: 
- to prevent and reduce the pollution of the Oder, 
- to restore water and riparian ecosystems to a near-natural condition with a characteristic 
diversity of species, 
- to facilitate the primary use of the Oder as a source of drinking water by bank filtration, 
for fishing and tourism, 
- to implement the EU Water Framework Directive, 
- to co-ordinate integrated flood protection, 
- to collect and provide Oder-related information (studies, projects, maps, reports, 
literature) for information exchange408. 
 
e) The Sava Framework Agreement 
 
The Sava River is about 950 km long with a basin area of 97,700 square kilometres covering 
significant parts of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and a small 
part of Albania. It is the third longest tributary of the Danube and the largest by discharge409.  
 
The Sava River represents a unique case in the recent history of international water governance. 
The river became international only in the early 1990s following the disintegration of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Sava – as a major tributary of the Danube – is 
already covered by the cooperation framework of the Danube Protection Convention and the 
work of the ICPDR. Yet, following the establishment in 1999 the Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe strong international pressure and the recognised mutual interest of the riparian 
states – Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and (then) the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia – led to the relatively quick elaboration and adoption of the Framework Agreement 
                                                          
408 Article 2, Oder Convention. 
409 http://www.savacommission.org/basin_about (accessed 2 May 2018) 
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on the Sava River Basin in 2002410. (In fact, it was the first international treaty the successor 
states adopted in the wake of the demise of Yugoslavia).  
 
The Agreement has been strongly influenced by the UN Watercourses Convention411. It 
represents a new generation of water agreements in Europe in so far as it goes beyond the 
limited environmental focus of its counterparts for it aims to integrate all aspects of water 
resources management in the basin. The objectives of the Agreement are threefold: navigation, 
sustainable water management, water-related hazard prevention and mitigation412. These 
objectives must be achieved in accordance with the three core principles of the UN 
Watercourses Convention: equitable and reasonable utilisation, the prevention of significant 
harm and the cooperation on any significant transboundary matter413. Importantly, the 
Agreement is based on the notion of “water regime”, i.e. the unity of the qualitative and 
quantitative conditions of the river414. Sustainable water management thus implies the 
integrated management of all surface and groundwater bodies with a view to ensuring sufficient 
water quantity and quality for all ecological functions and major human uses415. The Agreement 
also calls for the adoption of an integrated Sava River Basin Management Plan, to be developed 
in coordination with the ICPRD and in line with the EU Water Framework Directive416.  
 
The Agreement also established a dedicated river basin organisation: the International Sava 
River Basin Commission, operational since 2005. The Commission follows the integrated 
approach of the Agreement and, as such, it has the broadest formal mandate among all European 
basin organisations. Its responsibilities go beyond the traditional RBO activities (navigation, 
pollution prevention and control, monitoring) to encompass such activities as the coordination 
of the preparation and implementation of joint plans for the basin, the preparation of 
                                                          
410 MATIC, Jasnica Klara (2011): The Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin (FASRB). In MONTINI, 
Massimiliano and BOGDANOVIC, Slavko (Eds.): Environmental Security in South-Eastern Europe, NATO 
Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 229 -241, p. 229.  
411 RIEU-CLARKE, Alistair (2007): The Role and Relevance of the UN Convention of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses to the EU and its Member States, British Yearbook of International Law 78(1) pp. 
389-428, p. 389.  
412 Article 1, Sava Framework Agreement. 
413 Articles 3, 4, 7-9, ibid. 
414 Article 1.3, ibid. 
415 Article 11, ibid. 
416 Articles 3.2 and 12, ibid. 
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development programmes, even, the harmonisation of national legislation with relevant EU 
law417.  
 
f) The Meuse Agreement 
 
The River Meuse (Maas) rises in France and flows through Belgium and the Netherlands for 
900 kilometres. Its catchment area covers approximately 36,000 square kilometres that also 
includes Germany and Luxembourg. While it is commonly treated as a distinct river basin, in 
hydro-geographical terms it forms part of the larger Rhine river system for its connection to the 
same estuary system418. 
 
The main instrument governing basin-wide cooperation of riparian states is the 2002 
International Agreement on the River Meuse (Accord international sur la Meuse), replacing a 
1994 agreement on the same subject. Contracting parties to the Agreement are France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium and the three affected Belgian regions 
(Wallonia, Flanders, Brussels Capital).  
 
The Agreement is conceived as a regional implementation tool for the UNECE Water 
Convention, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic and, first and foremost, the EU Water Framework Directive419. While the Agreement 
aims to achieve sustainable water management based on an integrated approach, its focus and 
provisions are largely concerned with environmental quality and, to a lesser extent, with flood 
protection and drought management420. It establishes a governance mechanism for the joint 
implementation of the WFD in the Meuse basin through the development and execution of a 
single river basin management plan421.  
 
The institutional framework of the Agreement is provided by the International Meuse 
Commission. The Commission can adopt opinions and recommendations, but cannot take 
                                                          
417 KOMATINA, Dejan and GROŠELJ, Samo (2014): Transboundary Water Cooperation for Sustainable 
Development of the Sava River Basin. In MILAČIČ, Radmila, SCANCAR, Janez and PAUNOVIĆ, Momir (Eds.): The 
Sava River, Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer, pp. 1-25, p. 11.  
418 See section I.1.2. above. 
419 Preamble, Accord international sur la Meuse, Gent, 3 December 2002. 
420 Article 2, ibid. 
421 Article 1, ibid. 
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decisions binding on the parties422. According to some commentators the Commission has not 
proved as successful as the ICPR for the Rhine, mainly because of the lack of competence to 
establish decisive programmes of measures423.  
 
II.2.2.4. Bilateral cooperation agreements 
 
a) Typology and distribution 
 
Bilateral water treaties provide the most important operational framework for daily cross-border 
water cooperation, complementing and adjusting the (occasionally) somewhat vague principles 
and requirements of general international water law and basin treaties424.  
 
Most cooperation agreements under basin or sub-basin level have been adopted in the form of 
so-called frontier or boundary water treaties regulating transboundary issues between two 
particular basin states. These treaties have no uniform content, format, structure, etc. Even, they 
often do not even constitute stand-along legal instruments as they are embedded into general 
frontier treaties. Early examples of post Word Water II frontier water treaties – such as the 1956 
Austria-Hungary frontier water treaty425 or the 1964 Soviet Union-Poland agreement426 – 
applied only to the actual border-creating river or lake, and to water bodies situated in a narrow 
stretch beyond the borders. Typically, these agreements constrained riparians’ rights to 
unilateral interventions (mainly hydraulic structures) in the relevant zones, often establishing a 
co-authorisation procedure. Usually, frontier water treaties call for cooperation on flood 
protection, joint monitoring, exchange of information and establish formalised cooperation 
bodies (frontier water committees). They do not, however, address transboundary water 
management in a comprehensive matter.  
 
                                                          
422 Articles 4-5, ibid. 
423 VAN RIJSWICK, Marleen, GILISSEN, Herman K.  and  VAN KEMPEN, Jasper (2010): The need for international 
and regional transboundary cooperation in European river basin management as a result of new approaches in EC 
water law, ERA Forum 11, pp. 129–157, p. 144.  
424 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (2013a) op. cit. p. 53. 
425 Treaty between the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Republic of Austria Concerning the Regulation of 
Water Economy Questions in the Frontier Region, Vienna, 9 April 1956. 
426 Agreement between the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and the Government of the Union of the 
Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Use of the Water Resources in Frontier Waters, Warsaw, 17 July 1964. 
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Beyond the agreements covering all (or most) joint water bodies, there exist a number of 
bilateral treaties covering just a single water body427 or a particular water issue428 or 
development project429. Several bilateral treaties involve (or sometimes exclusively concluded 
between) the constituent units of federal countries or regions430. In line with the UNECE Water 
Convention’s call for the revision of frontier water treaties and the new requirements of the 
Water Framework Directive the trend, however, is clearly moving towards comprehensive, all-
inclusive bilateral water treaties and replacing fragmented, historic, single issue agreements.  
 
b) Examples of major bilateral water agreements 
 
The body of contemporary EU bilateral water treaties is thoroughly documented. As a part of 
the above-mentioned survey of transboundary water governance in the European Union and its 
immediate neighbourhood, the European Commission compiled a comprehensive catalogue of 
bilateral water treaties431. From this compilation it appears that most EU members and their 
riparian neighbours have concluded bilateral water cooperation agreements (there are 20 such 
agreements just among the Danube riparian states)432.  
 
Some of these agreements have gained a reputation beyond their own constituencies for their 
success in managing co-riparian relations in complicated hydrological or political 
circumstances. One notable example is the 1964 Finnish-Soviet frontier water agreement433 
that created a model for transboundary water cooperation in the darkest era of the Cold War 
with lasting positive impacts not only on bilateral relations, but also on the development of 
UNECE water law434. Another European bilateral arrangement whose development and 
implementation was followed beyond the immediate basin is the 1970 Agreement between the 
                                                          
427 E.g. the Convention between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the French Republic on the 
Protection of Geneva Lake Against Pollution, 16 November 1962. 
428 E.g. the Agreement between France and Switzerland concerning the Intervention of Bodies in charge Fighting 
against Accidental Water Pollution by Hydrocarbons or Other Substances Capable of Altering the Water, Geneva, 
17 December 1977. 
429 Treaty between Czechoslovakia and Hungary concerning the construction and operation of the Gabčíkovo- 
Nagymaros System of Locks, Budapest, 16 September 1977. 
430 Arrangement between the State Council of the Republic and Canton of Geneva and the Prefect of Haute-Savoie 
on the Protection and Recharge of the Franco-Swiss Genevois Aquifers, Geneva, 9 June 1978. 
431 WRC (2012) op. cit. 
432 WRC (2012) op. cit. p. 11-12. 
433 Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Frontier 
Watercourses, Helsinki, 24 April 1964. 
434 BELINSKIJ, Antti (2015): Cooperation between Finland and the Russian Federation. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): 
The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its 
Contribution to International Water Cooperation, Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 310-318, p. 310. 
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Government of the French Republic and the Spanish Government relating to Lake Lanoux that 
finally settled decades of water allocation disputes between France and Spain concerning the 
Lake Lanoux and Carol river435. 
 
The best-known bilateral water agreement between two EU member states, however, is 
undoubtedly the 1998 Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the 
Waters of Luso-Spanish River Basins436 (the Albufeira Convention) between Spain and 
Portugal. While there exist a number of other bilateral treaties that established effective 
governance mechanisms for transboundary watercourses, the Albufeira Convention deserves 
special attention for the novelty of its approach as well as its propensity to become a European 
model for water management in semi-arid climatic conditions437.  
 
The Albufeira Convention follows the basic building blocks of international and EU water law, 
such equitable and reasonable utilisation, the no-harm rule, sustainable water use or the river-
basin approach. The Convention covers all five joint basins and, in a comprehensive and 
progressive manner, all major water-related issues such as water quality and associated 
ecosystems, river flows (quantity), physical interventions, data collection, monitoring and 
dissemination of information, emergency communication, etc. Importantly, the Convention 
specifically addresses extreme hydrological situations both in terms of substance and 
procedure438. The Convention establishes a two-tier system of decision-making: the conference 
of the parties as the main political forum and the International Rivers Commission, a technical 
regulatory body. An additional Protocol to the Convention prescribes a precise water flow 
regime for individual river basins, including minimum flow requirements that can only be 
ignored in the case of extreme droughts439.  
 
                                                          
435 Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Spanish Government relating to Lake 
Lanoux, Madrid, 12 July 1958.  
436 Convention on the Co-operation for the Protection and the Sustainable Use of the Waters of the Luso-Spanish 
River Basins, Albufeira, 30 November 1998. 
437 CANELAS DE CASTRO, Paulo (2009): Luso-Spanish Cooperation on the Management of the Waters of the Shared 
Rivers - A Model within the European Model? Conference Paper, 
http://umir.umac.mo/jspui/bitstream/123456789/15128/1/4446_0_MEDITERRANEAN%20CONF%20-
%20Luso-Spanish%20wATERManagement%20-MODEL%20within%20the%20Model-%2002022009.doc 
(accessed 12 February 2018), p. 1.  
438 CANELAS DE CASTRO (2009) op. cit. p. 14. 
439 Protocol amending the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Waters of 
Luso-Spanish River Basins signed 30 November 1998, 4 April 2008. 
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The Convention is generally regarded as one of the most complex and progressive (multi-) basin 
agreement in the world. In particular, the river-flow and variability management clauses stand 
out not only in European comparison, but in the broader international context440. Critics note, 
however, that the implementation of the Convention has lately lacked political impetus and the 
operation of the International Rivers Commission – that has no international legal status and an 
autonomous budget – fails to meet expectations of efficiency and competence441. Practical 
experience also suggests that the dominant supply-management logic of the Convention – 
tailored to the operation of large hydropower and irrigation structures in both countries – leads 
to poor resource conservation442. 
 
II.2.3. The water law and policy of the European Union 
 
II.2.3.1. The broader context: EU environmental law and policy  
 
Water issues in the European Union fall into the broader category of environmental policy under 
one of the EU’s founding treaties, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). This fact has fundamental repercussions on the nature and extent of EU water law and 
policy. First, EU water policy remains subject to the general objectives and principles of 
environmental law443 that creates an evident imbalance between the ecological and non-
ecological aspects of water management. Second, environmental policy is one of those shared 
areas of competence where both the EU and its member states exercise legislative power. Thus, 
as noted above, the more the EU legislate on water issues, the less powers do member states 
retain to do the same444. The TFEU also defines the decision-making and enforcement structure 
of environmental policy that can constitute important political hurdles in the future development 
of transboundary water governance within the bloc. 
 
 
 
                                                          
440 SERENO, Amparo (2014): Climate Change in Albufeira Convention, 
http://www.academia.edu/9031808/CC_in_Albufeira_Convention (accessed 12 February 2019), p. 8. 
441 Ibid p. 6. 
442 COSTA, Leonardo, VERGÉS, Josep and BARRAQUÉ, Bernard (2008): Shaping a new Luso-Spanish Convention, 
Economics Working Papers 082008, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa. 
443 BÁNDI, Gyula (2011): Környezetjog [Environmental Law], Budapest, Szent István Társulat, p. 115. 
444 See section II.2.1.2. above.  
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a) Objectives and principles of EU environmental policy 
 
The objectives of EU environmental policy are defined by the TFEU as follows: the 
preservation, protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment, the protection 
of human health, the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, and the promotion of 
measures at international level dealing with regional or worldwide environmental problems445. 
The objectives of EU environmental policy must be pursued in accordance with a number of 
statutory principles, notably the principle of high level of protection, the precautionary 
principle, the principle of preventive action, the principle that environmental problems as a 
priority should be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay446. The “classic” objectives 
of water management, such as security of water supply, protection against water-related hazards 
(floods, droughts, etc.) do not feature in EU primary law. 
 
b) Institutional constrains  
 
As in the case of other shared competences, the EU adopts its own environmental legislation 
through the so-called ordinary legislative procedure, i.e. by the joint legislative act of the 
Council of ministers (voting by qualified majority) and the European Parliament (voting by 
simple majority)447. In the context of water policy, however, there is one major exception to 
this rule: “measures affecting the quantitative management of water resources or affecting, 
directly or indirectly, the availability of those resources” can only be adopted through a special 
legislative procedure, where the Council acts with unanimity and the European Parliament is 
only consulted (i.e. cannot block or amend the legislation as under the ordinary legislative 
procedure)448.  Arguably, this exception is designed to safeguard member states’ sovereignty to 
regulate the flow of water by way of granting veto power to each of them and by excluding the 
European Parliament, generally seen as an activist, green force in the joint decision-making 
process449. 
 
                                                          
445 Article 191.1, TFEU. Also see BÁNDI (2011) op. cit. p. 115-117. 
446 Article 191.2, ibid. 
447 Article 192.1, ibid. 
448 Article 192.2, ibid. (emphasis added). 
449 BARANYAI, Gábor (2015): The Water Convention and the European Union: The Benefits of the Convention for 
EU Member States. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation, 
Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 88-100, p. 90. 
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To achieve its environmental policy objectives the EU and its member states cooperate with 
third countries and international organisations and may conclude international agreements450. 
Importantly, agreements that are ratified by the EU itself form an integral part of the EU’s legal 
system and, as such, are binding on the EU institutions and its member states451.  
 
II.2.3.2. The evolution of EU water law and policy 
 
The European Economic Community (EEC) – the predecessor of today’s European Union – 
started to regulate water-related matters in the 1970s. The first wave of legislation took place 
between 1975 and 1980. This period that has resulted in a large number of EEC directives and 
decisions which laid down selected environmental quality standards for specific types of water 
bodies (e.g. fish water, surface water, bathing water, drinking water) or established emission 
control and discharge limit values for specific water uses (e.g. various industrial activities using 
hazardous substances)452. The 1980s and 1990s saw the adoption of some highly costly water 
infrastructure-related legislation, such as the directives concerning nitrates pollution from 
agricultural sources or the collection and treatment of urban waste water. By the mid1990s EU 
water law accumulated over 20 legislative acts covering not only specific water uses, quality 
objectives and discharge limits, but also product standards and procedural requirements453.  
 
This extensive, yet patchy legislative arrangement did not, however, prove capable of reversing 
the continuous deterioration of water quality in Europe. Such relative failure can be attributed 
to several overlapping causes. First, the incomprehensive nature of EU water law created major 
lacunas, leaving significant water issues unattended. Thus, the benefits of relative progress with 
regards to one area (e.g. phasing out the discharge of certain hazardous substances) could have 
easily been cancelled out by the lack of progression in other fields (e.g. diffuse pollution). 
Second, implementation by member states was less than satisfactory. As Reichert 
euphemistically notes: “member states treated EU water directives more as recommendations 
rather than legally binding obligations”454. Finally, it must also be mentioned that many of the 
                                                          
450 Article 191.4, TFEU. 
451 Article 216.2, ibid. 
452 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL BUREAU (2005): EU Environmental Policy Handbook, Brussels, 
http://www.wecf.eu/cms/download/2004-2005/EEB_Book.pdf (accessed 12 February 2019), p. 129.  
453 MACRORY, Richard (1993): European Community Water Law, Ecology L.Q. 20, pp. 119-139, p. 119.  
454 REICHERT (2016) op. cit. p. 48. 
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politically motivated early water legislation simply failed the minimum tests of scientific 
robustness or regulatory clarity455.  
 
Following lengthy technical and political preparations a new policy framework was agreed in 
the form of the so-called Water Framework Directive (“WFD”) in 2000456. The bulk of EU 
legislation adopted ever since has focused on the implementation of the WFD.  
 
Mention also must be made of the general or specific policy documents of the EU that address 
water in a significant manner. The most important such instruments are the EU’s regular 
environmental action programmes, developed by the European Commission and endorsed by 
the European Parliament and the Council. The current such action programme – the 7th since 
the first one in 1973 – was adopted in 2013 under the title of “Living well, within the limits of 
our planet”457. Recently, and thus far uniquely in the history of EU environmental policy, the 
European Commission also issued a stand-alone water policy document entitled “A Blueprint 
to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources”458 that sets topical water-related objectives and 
measures so as to complement the Water Framework Directive and fill its implementation 
gaps459.  
 
 
 
                                                          
455 For example, the first bathing water directive (Directive 76/160/EEC) – adopted in 1976 – required compliance 
with 19 (!) quality parameters, ranging from microbiological pollutants to heavy metals. No wonder that by the 
time the proposal for a new directive was tabled by the Commission in 2003 practically all member states were 
condemned by the European Court of Justice for non-compliance. Subsequent research on the health impacts of 
bathing waters revealed that most of the original parameters were indeed irrelevant for bathers’ health. As a result, 
the current bathing water directive (2006/7/EC) calls for the observance of only two microbiological parameters.  
456 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy. 
457 Decision No. 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on a General 
Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 “Living well, within the limits of our planet”.  
458 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources, COM 
(2012) 0673 final.  
459 While these documents do not have the legal force to overrule the WFD or other EU directives, they define the 
broader context and provide additional policy directions as to their implementation. E.g. the Environmental Action 
Programme lays down important resource efficiency goals such as to ensure, by 2020, that water abstraction 
respects available renewable water resource limits (para 41). Similarly, the Blueprint cautiously introduces the 
notion of “ecological flows” into EU water policy that is supposed to fill the gap created by the almost complete 
ignorance of river flow quantity management questions by the system of the WFD, underlying that “there is a need 
in many EU river basins to put quantitative water management on a much more solid foundation” (section 2.1). 
Also see section: III.2.2.3. a) below. 
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II.2.3.3. Overview of contemporary EU water law and policy  
 
The centrepiece of today’s EU water law and policy is Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a 
framework for Community action in the field of water policy, i.e. the Water Framework 
Directive. The WFD represents a broad overhaul of the previous water policy and regulatory 
philosophy: it has either replaced or called for the gradual repeal of 25 years of previous EU 
water legislation, leaving only a handful of pre-WFD legislation in effect460. As mentioned 
above, the broad framework of the WFD is complemented by two policy documents: the EU’s 
7th Environment Action Programme and the Blueprint461.  
 
The WFD lays down a comprehensive framework for the protection and the improvement of 
the aquatic environment in the Union. Nonetheless, it does not amount to an exhaustive “water 
code”. In fact, the regulatory character of the various provisions of the WFD varies greatly. 
Some clauses are extremely detailed, while some are programmatic in nature. Moreover, the 
WFD also points out to other EU legislation in the field of water management and 
environmental protection. 
 
The WFD has a universal scope covering all inland freshwater (surface and groundwater) 
bodies within the territory of the EU as well as coastal waters. It also covers wetlands and other 
terrestrial ecosystems directly dependent on water462. Its regulatory approach is based on the 
integrated consideration of all impacts on the aquatic environment, extending the focus from 
purely chemical to biological, ecosystem, economic and morphological aspects. It establishes 
environmental objectives for surface waters, groundwater and so-called protected areas (areas 
designated under other EU legislation for their particular sensitivity for water – e.g. nature 
conservation areas, drinking water resources, etc.)463. These objectives are summarised as 
“good water status”, described in the Annexes to the Directive by precise ecological and 
chemical parameters for surface waters, on the one hand, and chemical and quantitative 
parameters for groundwater, on the other hand464.  
                                                          
460 BARANYAI (2015) op. cit. p. 90. 
461 See section II.2.3.2. above. 
462 Article 1, WFD. 
463 Article 4, ibid. 
464 ”Good status” for surface waters is described as a “slight deviation” from the aquatic biodiversity found or 
estimated to exist under conditions where there has been only very minor human impact. For groundwater, “good 
status” means that groundwater quality and quantity does not negatively impact surface water status or the ecology 
of terrestrial ecosystems which depend on groundwater (Annex V, WFD). 
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Importantly, the WFD considers quantitative issues as “ancillary” to water quality, 
conspicuously leaving surface water quantity to a regulatory grey zone465. Member states are 
obliged to carry out extensive monitoring of the quality of the aquatic environment along EU-
wide coordinated methodologies466.  
 
The planning and implementation framework of the WFD is the river basin. Member states are 
obliged to identify river basins in their territory and assign them to river basin districts (formal 
administrative management units comprising one or more basins). If a river basin is shared by 
more than one member state, it has to be assigned to an international river basin district467.  
 
The environmental objectives of the WFD have to be achieved through a complex planning and 
regulatory process that, in the case of international river basin districts, requires the active 
cooperation of member states468. The main administrative tools of member state action are the 
river basin management plans and the programmes of measures to be drawn up for each river 
basin district (or the national segment of an international river basin district). The WFD lays 
down strict deadlines for the preparation of the management plans and for compliance with the 
environmental objectives. As a general rule, all water bodies in the EU had to reach good status 
by the end of 2015. If, objectively, that was not possible and was clearly justified under any of 
the several statutory exemptions specified under the Directive469, good water status will have 
to be ensured by the end of the following planning cycle of 2021, or ultimately, by the final 
compliance deadline specified by the WFD, that is 2027. It must be underlined that these 
deadlines are not merely “management-planning objectives”, but as the European Court of 
Justice underlined in a landmark judgement in 2015, legally binding obligations for which 
member states hold full responsibility under EU law470.    
 
The WFD, as its name suggests, provides only a framework for water policy. There exists a 
range of additional EU legal acts addressing various specific water-related issues.  
 
                                                          
465 In detail see section III.2.1.3. a) below. 
466 Article 8, Annex V, WFD. 
467 Article 3, ibid. 
468 Articles 3, 13, ibid. 
469 Articles 4.4-4.7, ibid. 
470 C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:433. 
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The first group of such measures is concerned with various sources of pollution or the chemical 
status of water. The most important such measure is the urban waste water directive471, the 
single most costly piece of environmental legislation ever to be implemented in EU history472. 
It obliges EU member states to collect and subject to appropriate (i.e. at least biological) 
treatment all urban waste water above 2000 population equivalent and the waste water of certain 
industrial sectors. Another important source of nutrient input, that is nitrates pollution from 
agricultural sources, is regulated by the so-called nitrates directive473. It aims to prevent the 
nitrates pollution of ground and surface waters from agricultural sources through the promotion 
of good farming practices. Discharges into surface waters of the most prominent hazardous 
substances is governed by the environmental quality standards directive (or priority substances 
directive) that sets limit values for 33 priority hazardous substances and 8 other pollutants with 
a view to their progressive elimination474. The groundwater directive establishes a regime 
which defines groundwater quality standards and introduces measures to prevent or limit inputs 
of pollutants into groundwater475.  
 
The EU’s general industrial pollution legislation, the so-called industrial emissions directive 
lays down an integrated permitting system for the most important industrial installations, with 
strict conditions relating to surface water, groundwater and soil protection476. It subjects all 
existing and future permits to a periodic review in light of the developments in the best available 
technique, a set of complex and evolving industry-specific technological and management 
benchmarks. While less relevant in this context, mention must nevertheless be made of the 
drinking water directive477, the bathing water directive478, the flood risk management 
directive479 or the marine strategy directive480, all contributing to the objectives of the WFD. 
                                                          
471 Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment. 
472 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-urbanwaste/implementation/factsfigures_en.htm (accessed 12 
February 2019). 
473 Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution 
caused by nitrates from agricultural sources. 
474 Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental 
quality standards in the field of water policy. 
475 Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection 
of groundwater against pollution and deterioration. 
476 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial 
emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control). 
477 Council Directive 98/83/EC of 3 November 1998 on the quality of water intended for human consumption. 
478 Directive 2006/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 concerning the 
management of bathing water quality. 
479 Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment 
and management of flood risks. 
480 Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework 
for community action in the field of marine environmental policy. 
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Significantly, other EU environmental measures have important effects on water management. 
These include horizontal legislation such as the environmental impact assessment and the 
strategic environmental impact assessment directives481, the directive on the access to 
environmental information482, the environmental liability directive483, EU nature conservation 
measures, especially the habitats directive484.  
 
II.2.3.4. Transboundary cooperation under EU water law and policy 
 
As mentioned above, the WFD follows a basin approach. Consequently, the directive foresees 
close cooperation among member states sharing international river basins, projecting such 
cooperation as the quintessential element of the European model of water governance485. The 
basin approach is, however, manifested mainly through certain procedural and planning 
requirements and mechanisms member states must follow, rather than hard and fast substantive 
rules.  
 
First of all, member states are required to coordinate their efforts aimed at meeting the 
environmental objectives of the Directive for the entire river basin or river basin district486. This 
implies that where a river basin is covered by the territory of more than one member state, it 
must be assigned to a so-called international river basin. When no agreement is reached on the 
designation of such international basin by the riparians concerned, any member state may 
request the European Commission to facilitate the process487. Shared river basins must be 
subjected to the same administrative and institutional regimes as purely national basins, 
irrespective of their international character488.  
 
                                                          
481 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment 
of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment; Directive 2001/42/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes 
on the environment. 
482 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to 
environmental information. 
483 Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage. 
484 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild flora and 
fauna. 
485 Recital (14), Preamble, WFD. 
486 Recital (35), ibid. 
487 Article 3.3, ibid. 
488 Ibid. 
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Second, member states must coordinate the management of their sections of the international 
river basin from the start of the planning phase all the way through the implementation process, 
in particular in the preparation and execution of river basin management plans and programmes 
of measures489. As a priority, the member states concerned are called upon to produce a single 
management plan for the entire river basin. This is, however, not an obligation of result. Should 
the coordinative efforts of member states fail to produce a comprehensive international river 
basin management plan, riparian governments are merely required to adopt uncoordinated 
national plans and measures for their respective parts of the international basin490. To settle the 
differences that may emerge in this process among member states the Commission may, again, 
be invited to facilitate491.  
 
Third, where an international river basin districts falls partly outside the territory of the EU, the 
member states concerned are called upon to establish “appropriate coordination” with the non-
EU riparian countries with a view to achieving the environmental objectives of the WFD for 
the entire basin492. This implies the rather soft requirement to “endeavour” to produce a single 
river basin management plan in cooperation with the relevant non-EU riparians493.  
 
Member states can fulfil the above coordination requirements through existing international 
mechanisms, basin organisations, bilateral water committees, etc.494. As shown above, most 
European basin commissions have indeed been mandated by their members to ensure the 
coordination of the implementation of the WFD in their respective basins. In some cases, like 
the Meuse, a new basin commission has even been set up with the specific objective to create 
a framework for WFD implementation495. The expansion foreseen by the Directive beyond the 
territory of the EU also proved successful as all non-EU riparian states in the Rhine, Danube 
and Sava agreed to implement the WFD in their respective shares of the basin496.  
 
Finally, the WFD introduces a modest quasi dispute resolution mechanism to facilitate inter-
state differences in the above processes. As already mentioned, any member state whose water 
                                                          
489 Article 3.4, WFD. 
490 Article 13.2, ibid. 
491 Article 3.4, ibid. 
492 Article 3.5, ibid. 
493 Article 13.3, ibid. 
494 Article 3.4, ibid. 
495 See section II.2.2.3. above. 
496 Ibid. 
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management has been impacted by another member state may “report” the problem to the 
affected riparian and/or the European Commission, together with its own recommendations to 
solve the problem. All the Commission is required to do, however, is to “respond” to the 
recommendation of the concerned party within a period of six months497.  
 
Other pieces of water-related EU legislation also impose certain interstate cooperation 
obligations. The most notable is the Floods Directive that requires riparian states to assess and 
map flood risks as well as to develop flood risk management plans498. It foresees the same type 
of (rather weak) coordination mechanism as the WFD, urging member state to exchange data 
and produce a single risk management plan for international river basins499. This directive, 
however, also contains an important substantive obligation – a rare, but explicit transposition 
of the “no-harm” rule into EU law – that prohibits member states to adopt such flood 
management measures in international river basins that may significantly increase flood risks 
downstream or upstream500.  
 
In addition, some of the pollution-related water directives also regulate certain aspects of co-
riparian relations. E.g. the priority substances directive addresses the issue of cross-border 
pollution in so far as it exempts downstream member states from their responsibility to meet 
EU environmental quality standards to the extent non-compliance is caused by upstream 
member states501. In a less explicit way, the urban waste water directive, too, recognises 
upstream-downstream interdependence. Under a rarely applied clause, if a member state is 
affected by sewage pollution from another member state, it may notify its problem to the 
relevant upstream state and the Commission. In such cases the parties are required to hold 
consultations so as to “ensure conformity with the directive”502.  
 
General EU environmental law also creates important obligations for Member States in their 
cross-border water relations, most notably the directives relating to environmental impact 
assessment, industrial emissions and environmental liability503. They all establish specific 
notification and consultation procedures with a view to assessing, preventing or mitigating 
                                                          
497 Article 12, WFD. 
498 Directive 2007/60/EC. 
499 Articles 4.3, 8.2, ibid. 
500 Article 7.4, ibid. 
501 Article 6, Directive 2008/105/EC. 
502 Article 9, Directive 91/271/EEC. 
503 See section II.2.2.3. above. 
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transboundary freshwater impacts. These procedures – that are largely modelled on the 
applicable UNECE conventions504 – constitute the framework for the implementation of the 
“prior notification of planned measures” principle of international water law within the EU505. 
 
II.2.3.5. Institutional background  
 
a) European Commission 
 
The European Union does not have specific administrative bodies (agencies) dedicated solely 
to the questions of water management. Nevertheless, as in the case of most EU policy areas, the 
European Commission exercises multiple powers with in the field of water too.  
 
In its role as the “guardian of the treaties” the Commission has universal competence to 
supervise the compliance of member states with EU water law506. The Commission receives 
and checks implementation reports submitted by member states regularly in accordance with 
the various EU directives. The Commission also accepts complaints by natural or legal persons 
that have information on any infringement of EU law. Once the Commission detects any 
instance of non-compliance, it may investigate the case through the so-called infringement 
procedure and may eventually refer the case to the European Court of Justice507. Indeed, the 
Commission has an impressive record in relation to water-related infractions: in 2017 a quarter 
of all investigations undertaken in the field of environment were connected to water508.   
 
The Commission does not only check the implementation of adopted water legislation, but also 
very much determines the priorities and measures of water policy on its own right. Most 
importantly, under the TFEU the Commission has the exclusive right of initiative, i.e. tabling 
legislative proposals to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament509. The latter have 
no formal powers to call for the initiation of draft legislation or other policy documents 
(although they may exert a degree of political pressure on the Commission to do so), they can 
                                                          
504 See section II.2.2.2. a) above. 
505 See section III.2.3.3. below.  
506 CRAIG and DE BÚRCA (2003) op. cit. p. 61. 
507 On the infringement procedure see section III.2.5.3. below. 
508 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/statistics.htm (accessed 12 February 2018). 
509 CRAIG and DE BÚRCA (2003) op. cit. p. 60. 
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only amend what the Commission had already proposed. Thus, the development of European 
water law and policy very much depends on the political agenda of the Commission.  
The Commission also plays an important coordinative, facilitating role when it comes to the 
implementation of EU water law. In response to the complexity and demanding timetable of 
the WFD it has set up an informal coordination forum of high-ranking civil servants (“water 
directors”) from member states’ (plus Norway’s) national water administrations. By today, EU 
water directors’ meetings have grown into a key operative platform to discuss EU-wide water 
issues. This platform adopts the non-binding implementation programmes and guidance 
materials of EU water law such as the Common Implementation Strategy, work programmes, 
various guidance documents and other resource materials510.  
 
Finally, as mentioned above, the European Commission has been allocated a somewhat unusual 
mediation role under the Water Framework Directive. However, as it will be discussed below, 
this mediatory position is truly alien to the Commission’s usual working methods and, thus far, 
has served very little practical purpose in the reconciliation of co-riparian differences511.  
 
b) European Court of Justice 
 
The EU’s highest court of law, the Court of Justice of the European Union or as commonly 
called: the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) is a crucial player in the enforcement of the 
Union’s water policy. Under the TFEU it has the exclusive competence, in the framework of 
the infringement procedure initiated by the Commission, to establish weather a member state 
has complied with its legal obligations or not512. If non-compliance is established, yet the 
member state concerned fails to live up to the judgement, the Commission may initiate a second 
court procedure as a result of which the ECJ may impose a significant financial penalty on the 
erring state513. Under a separate mechanism – the so-called preliminary ruling procedure – 
national courts may also seize the ECJ, asking it to provide binding interpretations on abstract 
questions of EU law514. Finally, the European Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to 
                                                          
510 The Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) is essentially the combination of a guidance toolbox, a 
continuously updated work programme and an information exchange platform, maintained by the Commission 
together with the network of member states’ water directors. The main products of the CIS process have been more 
than thirty guidance documents and almost two dozen thematic and technical reports. The CIS is supported by a 
specific electronic water information database (Water Information System for Europe – WISE).  
511 See section III.2.5.3. below. 
512 Article 258, TFEU. 
513 Article 260, TFEU. Also see section III.2.5.3. below.  
514 Article 267.2, TFEU. 
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adjudicate bilateral disputes among member states concerning the application of EU law515. As 
it will be discussed in detail later, actions before the ECJ initiated by member states against 
each other are extremely rare and it is unlikely that this avenue will ever become an effective 
mechanism for the settlement of co-riparian conflicts516.  
 
Given the prominence of water issues in EU law and the complexity and costs of European 
water law, the ECJ hears a relatively large number of water-related cases. Since the elapse of 
the transposition deadline of the WFD in 2002, it has adjudicated over 20 cases that were 
connected to this single directive517. Official statistics show that most of such procedures 
concern pollution issues only (typically due to the lack of adequate waste water treatment or 
diffuse nitrates pollution). These judgements hardly go beyond the establishment of the facts 
and the condemnation of the erring member state518. Far less is the number of the cases launched 
by national courts seeking the interpretation of actual regulatory provisions (e.g. out of the 20+ 
judgements relating to WFD only 7 were preliminary rulings)519. There have been, however, a 
small number of cases where the ECJ did make a critical impact on water policy. Examples 
include the interpretation of the EU’s powers to regulate water quantity issues in the context of 
the Danube Convention520 or the legal force of the environmental objectives of the Water 
Framework Directive521.  
 
c) European Environment Agency 
 
While not formally engaged in policy supervision and enforcement, the European Environment 
Agency (“EEA”) – a sublet of the European Commission headquartered in Copenhagen, 
Denmark – nonetheless plays an important role shaping EU water policy by way of providing 
a robust monitoring data and analyses. The EEA collects and evaluates information on a very 
wide range of water-related subjects, such water quality, water quantity, water stress indicators, 
etc. not only for EU member states, but also for neighbouring and candidate countries522. 
                                                          
515 Article 259, TFEU. 
516 See section III.2.5.3. below. 
517 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060 (accessed 12 February 2019). 
518 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/pdf/statistics_sector.pdf (accessed 12 February 2019). 
519 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060 ( accessed 12 February 2019). 
520 C-36/98, Spain v. Council, ECR 2001, I-00779. Also see section III.2.1.3. a) above. 
521 C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:433. Also see section II.2.3.3. above.  
522http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/dm#c1=Data&c1=Graph&c1=Indicator&c1=Interactive+data&c1=Int
eractive+map&c1=Map&c0=10&b_start=0 (accessed 12 February 2019). 
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II.2.3.6. Evaluation 
 
The European model of transboundary water governance, especially the Water Framework 
Directive, has been universally praised as the most sophisticated and progressive transnational 
water regime. For its courageous innovations with respect to river basin planning, holistic 
coverage of all waters and uses, internalisation of economic considerations, public participation, 
etc. the WFD unquestionably represents a very high level of political and policy ambition that 
can serve as a model for the rest of the world523.  
 
Yet, a closer look at some of the constituent features of the EU’s water transboundary 
cooperation regime reveals a number of important shortcomings. First, most of the relevant 
requirements are purely procedural in nature. This reflects a widely shared regulatory 
philosophy in EU bureaucracy that assumes that the right procedures lead to good decisions524. 
Yet, the procedures that are supposed to provide the backbone of basin cooperation cover only 
a small segment of possible interactions among riparian states. E.g. while EU countries are 
required to develop joint river basin management plans and programmes of measures, this 
obligation does not extend to the joint implementation of the plans. Where, exceptionally, EU 
water law imposes substantive obligations on fellow basin states these do not go beyond a 
context-specific adaptation of the “no-harm” rule laid down by the UNECE Water Convention 
and the UN Watercourses Convention525. 
 
Besides, not only is cooperation reduced mainly to procedures, compliance with such 
cooperation procedures is not supported by robust sanctions. In fact, as described above, if 
member states fail to come to terms in the preparation of joint international river basin or flood 
risk management plans, their failure to cooperate triggers no legal consequences whatsoever526. 
Similarly, the basic cooperation procedures are not broken down to distinct procedural steps 
(timetables, milestones), nor are they supported by established platforms for consultation 
(although the European Commission may be invited to help). While basin organisations play 
an important role in coordinating the planning processes of riparian states, they have neither the 
                                                          
523 DELLAPENNA, Joseph. W. and GUPTA, Joyeeta (2008): The Evolution of Global Water Law. In DELLAPENNA, 
Joseph. W. and GUPTA, Joyeeta (Eds): The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 
3-20, p. 10. 
524 KRÄMER, Ludwig (2002): Thirty Years of EC Environmental Law: Perspectives and Prospectives, Yearbook of 
European Environmental Law 2, pp. 155-182. 
525 See section II.2.3.4.  above.  
526 Ibid. 
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powers, nor the ambition to vigorously coordinate or to compel countries to participate in the 
process. Not surprisingly, in view of the lack of common procedural guidelines and the absence 
of sanctions the coordination of transboundary river basin management plans shows a very 
mixed picture527.  
 
Besides reducing cooperation to certain weak procedures, an additional shortcoming of EU 
transboundary water law is the fact that it has long been dominated by quality (pollution) and 
ecological considerations. At the outset, this one-sided focus could have been justified by the 
abundance of freshwater in north-western European countries – the core states of European 
integration – as well as by the dominance of cross-border pollution issues in the first decades 
of EU water policy. The fact, however, that this approach was subsequently ossified in the EU’s 
founding treaty seems to create the single biggest drag on adaptation to changing hydrological 
conditions in Europe, which will likely to be dominated by sharp fluctuations in river flow 
rather than intense point source pollution528. Some critics also underline that even where the 
EU fixes ecological objectives, these are not as progressive as they appear to outside observers 
as their implementation can be deferred almost ad infinitum529.  
 
II.2.4. The interplay among the various layers of European transboundary 
water governance: cross-fertilisation or cannibalisation? 
 
The remarkable intensity of actual transboundary water cooperation, colourfully illustrated in 
Figure 12, as well as the recent lack of noisy inter-state water disputes indeed suggest that the 
European Union and its member states have managed to develop a stable legal and institutional 
framework to manage cross-border hydrological issues. This conclusion has, indeed, been 
repeatedly confirmed by various comparative studies that place Europe among the best 
performing regions when it comes to hydropolitical resilience worldwide530. This – as Reichert 
rightly concludes – “is itself a major achievement not to be underestimated in a conflict-ridden 
world”531. Some even argue that the common planning requirements imposed collectively on 
basin states may help balance the fundamental upstream-downstream dichotomy as the WFD 
                                                          
527 BARANYAI, Gábor (2016): Managing Upstream-Downstream Dichotomy in European Rivers: A Critical 
Analysis of the Law and Politics of Transboundary Water Cooperation in the European Union. In EDSI: The Water 
Footprint in Decision Sciences, Proceedings of the 7th EDSI Conference, Helsinki, Finland, pp. 318-330, p. 326. 
528 In detail see section III.2.1.4. below. 
529 VAN RIJSWICK et al. (2010) op. cit. p. 134. 
530 See section I.5.4.3. above. 
531 REICHERT (2016) op. cit. p. 102. 
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lifts downstream states onto the same level as other basin states532. Such shift of positions is 
expected to materialise not only out of the community spirit of riparian states envisaged by the 
Directive, but also by upstream dependence on the benefits of downstream action, such as 
improved fish migration or flood prevention533. 
 
While such jubilation is certainly not without foundations, one should not forget about some 
important shortcomings, especially when it comes to EU’s sui generis water law and the 
interaction of the three regimes534.  
 
The evolution of transboundary water governance in the EU – viewed from a historic 
perspective – shows at least three distinct phases of development. The first (post-World War 
II) phase was characterised by bilateral issues and regimes that did not aim to cover large and 
complex international river basins in a comprehensive manner. The second phase, triggered by 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall, witnessed the emergence of complex multilateral basin treaties 
and organisations as well as the birth of the UNECE Water Convention. Since the entry into 
force of the EU’s Water Framework Directive in 2000, the focus of political attention and 
member state action has shifted towards the implementation of the gargantuan ecological 
improvement project envisaged by the WFD.  
 
Against this background the question of the efficiency of EU transboundary water governance 
characterised by multiple and overlapping layers naturally arises. Do these regimes compete, 
cooperate or helpfully complement one another? Is there a dominant regime with hegemonic 
ambitions? In other words: does the nature of the interplay among the various layers of 
transboundary water governance display signs of positive cross-fertilisation or deadly 
cannibalisation by the dominant regime? 
 
The question whether or not one particular regime plays dominates transboundary water 
governance among EU member states seems relatively easy to answer. Yes, the EU’s relevant 
legal instruments, in particular the Water Framework Directive, clearly dominate contemporary 
co-riparian relations in the Union. Indeed, the regulatory philosophy of the WFD and the close 
practical cooperation its implementation requires created a new cohesion and dynamics among 
                                                          
532 MOELLENKAMP (2007) op. cit. p. 1414. 
533 Ibid p. 1419. 
534 See section II.2.3.6. above. 
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EU member states that is probably unique in its kind all over the world535. This shift of trend 
and focus is eloquently illustrated by the WFD’s growing influence on international water 
agreements and river basin organisations within the EU. As shown above, by now all basin 
commissions in Europe placed the basin-wide planning, coordination and monitoring tasks 
flowing from the WFD at the core of their work programme536. In the case of the river Meuse 
even a new basin treaty was adopted for the implementation of the Water Framework Directive, 
practically side-lining all other transboundary issues537. In a probably less conspicuous fashion 
the UNECE Water Convention has also extensively drawn on the WFD. As Francesca 
Bernardini notes: “many of the soft-law instruments, guidelines and recommendations 
developed under the Convention were inspired by the Directive and based on the experience of 
the EU parties with its implementation”538.  
 
More difficult is to answer the question whether the dominance of EU directives in the 
European transboundary governance scene leads to a mutually beneficial reinforcement of all 
affected regimes or to the gradual erosion of the weaker ones. Indeed, in the context of bilateral 
water treaties the WFD did bring new focus and impetus. As noted above, many such bilateral 
treaties have been revised as a result of the new obligations introduced by the WFD. Even, the 
WFD was often used as a pretext to revisit old and outdated water agreements whose long 
overdue revision was systematically blocked by a complacent (typically: upstream) riparian 
state539.  
 
Less positive is the picture when it comes to the relationship between the EU’s own regime and 
the UNECE Water Convention despite the fact that the constitutional hierarchy between the two 
regimes is crystal clear. Not only does the Water Convention sit higher on the EU’s legal order 
that the directive, the preamble to the WFD explicitly defines the Directive as one of the 
implementing measures of the Convention540. The approach of the European Commission, 
however, suggests that it largely ignores or downplays the importance of the UNECE Water 
Convention as an instrument whose practical value has, supposedly, been superseded by the 
Water Framework Directive. This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that EU member 
                                                          
535 MOELLENKAMP (2007), p. 1414. 
536 See section II.2.2.3. above. 
537 See section II.2.2.3.f) above. 
538 BERNARDINI (2015) op. cit. p. 36. 
539 See section II.2.2.4. above. 
540 Recitals (23) and (35), Preamble, WFD. 
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states can greatly benefit from the Convention, regardless of the extensive, environmentally 
progressive and technically detailed internal water legislation of the EU541.  
 
As, however, the Convention was opened for accession by countries outside the UNECE region 
in 2013, global interest has risen steadily, not least because of the dedicated campaigning by 
UN leaders and institutions542. Given that the EU is the single biggest bloc of parties in the 
Convention’s system, a more active presence of the European Commission in the Convention’s 
activities and bodies could multiply the global impact of the EU’s own internal water policy. If 
nothing else, the potential of global political benefits is likely to trigger a more substantial 
engagement of EU institutions in the implementation of the UNECE Water Convention. 
 
  
                                                          
541 BARANYAI (2015) op. cit. p. 100.  
542 See e.g. opening remarks of Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General at the 2013 Budapest Water Summit, urging 
non-UNECE countries to join the Convention. https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-10-
08/secretary-generals-opening-remarks-budapest-water-summit-prepared (accessed 12 February 2019). 
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PART III 
THE RESILIENCE OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
Chapter 1 
Why, what, how? – The assessment framework 
 
III.1.1.  The need for an assessment of the stability of co-riparian relations 
in the European Union 
 
The need for a critical review of the legal, institutional and political stability of co-riparian 
relations within the European Union is underpinned by a series of overlapping factors. 
 
Given the historic dependence of water governance on the reliability of historic data and rigid 
sovereignty concepts, changing hydrological conditions should warrant for a regular review 
even at the best of times543. It is true that the European Union boasts one of the most elaborate 
and extensive transboundary water governance regimes in the world544. At the same, however, 
it also suffers from a series of structural deficiencies such as the uneven interaction among the 
various layers of governance (UNECE, EU, basin, bilateral), the purely procedural nature of 
the cooperation requirements under EU law, the dominance of water pollution and ecological 
questions, etc.545 Consequently, the European model of transboundary water governance well 
deserves a comprehensive fitness check, regardless of its relative success vis-à-vis other 
regional regimes in the world.  
 
The necessity of review becomes even more compelling, if the above problem-setting is put 
into a historic context. It is common knowledge that the creation of new water cooperation 
treaties and institutions usually takes very long periods of time546. As a result, it often happens 
that by the time a new (or modified) water governance schemes is finally put in place it no 
longer caters for newly emerging hydrological realities547. The evolution of the contemporary 
                                                          
543 COSENS, Barbara (2010): Transboundary River Governance in the Face of Uncertainty: Resilience Theory and 
the Columbia River Treaty, Journal of Land, Resources & Environmental Law 30 pp. 229-265, p. 230. 
544 See section II.2.3. above. 
545 See section II.2.3.6. and II.2.4. above. 
546 WOLF (2009) op. cit. p. 8.  
547 See section I.3.2.4. above. 
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European transboundary cooperation framework is a case in point. Today’s basin treaties have 
evolved in response to the unfettered pollution and morphological alteration of transboundary 
freshwaters on either side of the Iron Curtain until the late 1980s. The backbone of the EU’s 
internal regime, the Water Framework Directive, also reflects the water quality challenges core 
EU member states were facing in the final decades of the past millennium. In other words, even 
the most recent transboundary water governance innovations in Europe are almost two decades 
old. Yet, the unfolding new hydrological phenomena – such as the growing variability of flow 
volumes and the continuous degradation of the aquatic environment – raise serious questions 
about the adequacy of existing transboundary arrangements within the European Union already 
today. As these negatives tendencies are only likely to intensify, they will further accentuate 
the mismatch between the original design parameters of the contemporary governance system 
and the unfolding hydropolitical future that will be characterised by competing water interests 
and a greater need to cooperate across the borders548.  
 
III.1.2. The subject of assessment: hydropolitical resilience and 
vulnerability in the European Union 
  
III.1.2.1. Hydropolitical resilience and vulnerability revisited 
 
The ultimate objective of this study is to map out the potential political risks and challenges 
affecting the joint management of shared surface waters within the European Union. Such risks 
and challenges will be assessed against the ability of the EU’s transboundary water governance 
system “to absorb disturbance and reorganise so as to retain essentially the same function, 
structure and identity”549. Such capacity “to withstand and recover from stresses”, – drawing 
on the terminology of general resilience science – will be referred to resilience550.  
 
Challenges to the resilience of transboundary water governance may emerge not only as a result 
of the actual misfit between the regime in place and the hydrological phenomena they are 
supposed to handle. They may also develop as a result of the inability of the governance system 
to adapt to new circumstances. These represent two interconnected, yet autonomous aspects of 
the resilience that can be formulated along the following questions: 
                                                          
548 COSENS (2010) op. cit. p. 229.  
549 Ibid p. 231. 
550 Ibid p. 237. 
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- is the existing regime fit to handle current and emerging hydrological and political 
challenges in a transboundary context? 
- is the existing regime capable to dynamically adapt to new hydrological and the ensuing 
political challenges or its evolution is blocked by systemic legal, institutional or political 
obstacles? 
 
The first question represents the static dimension of the issue. In this narrower sense the 
resilience of transboundary water governance is understood as the presence (or the lack) of risks 
of political dispute over shared water systems within the European Union. This condition can 
be best analysed through the various indicators developed by various scholars of 
hydropolitics551. The second question relates to the dynamic dimension of resilience that can be 
evaluated through various indicators relating to the adaptive capacity of socio-economic 
systems552.  
 
In order to expand the existing research base that mainly focuses on the first dimension of 
resilience, this study carries out both a formal (static) hydropolitical assessment as well as an 
evaluation of adaptive capacity of transboundary water governance in the EU. 
 
III.1.2.2. The indicators applied 
 
As outlined in Part I, the various schools of hydropolitics have developed a range of indicators 
to measure the stability of co-riparian relations in particular river basins. These indicators are 
based on the assumption that the resilience of transboundary governance can be best assessed 
with reference to a number of formal institutional constituents. The most commonly used 
indicators comprise 
a) the presence of a water treaty,  
b) mechanisms for water allocation,  
c) water quality protection,  
d) variability management,  
e) the presence of formal cooperation institutions553.  
                                                          
551 DELLI PRISCOLI and WOLF (2009) op. cit. p. 22-23. 
552 GARMESTANI, Ahjond S. and BENSON, Melinda H. (2013): A framework for resilience-based governance of 
social-ecological systems, Ecology and Society 18(1), pp. 9-20, p. 12. 
553 See section I.5.4.2. below. 
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Admittedly, these indicators provide only a raw picture of hydropolitical resilience as they 
largely omit the political-economic circumstances prevailing among riparian states or the 
hydrological conditions of the basin. Another limitation is that such indicators offer only a 
snapshot in a given moment in time, irrespective of the potential of the given system for 
evolution. Thus, an important factor of resilience: the capacity to adapt and learn remains 
completely outside their scope. Notwithstanding all these constraints, however, the simple and 
unambiguous nature of the formal hydropolitical indicator set makes it possible to apply them 
across a very wide range governance schemes and to arrive at easily comparable results. 
 
In order to overcome the above shortcomings, the usual set of hydropolitical indicators have 
been refined and expanded so as to encapsulate not only the actual resilience of transboundary 
water governance in the EU, but also the ability of the system to adapt to changing hydrological 
and political conditions. As a result, the following indicators will be used for the purposes of 
the subsequent analysis: 
a) water quantity management and water allocation; 
b) water quality protection; 
c) cooperation over planned measures; 
d) management of hydrological variability; 
e) conflict resolution mechanisms; 
f) adaptive capacity of the institutions of transboundary water governance within the EU 
expressed through the following issues: 
fa) coordination among the different levels and actors; 
fb) transfer of information and feedback; and 
fc) authority and flexibility in decision-making and problem-solving  
 
The above list of indicators differs on three instances from the raw hydropolitical matrix 
described in Part I.  
 
First, no further inquiry will be carried out concerning the presence of a legal framework to 
govern co-riparian relations in the European Union as this issue has been comprehensively 
exhausted in Part II. While this regulatory framework may suffer from significant shortcomings, 
it nonetheless amounts to a robust legal structure that – through substantive obligations, 
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procedures and institutions – serves as an undisputed basis for the interaction of basin states 
within the EU554.  
 
Second, an additional indicator is included on the cooperation between riparian states over 
planned interventions into shared waters. This indicator informs about the implementation of 
the legal principle of “notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse effects” 
outlined in detail by the UN Watercourses Convention555.  
 
Finally, the existence and the contemporary operation of formal water cooperation institutions 
within the EU has already been discussed in Part II extensively, so there is no need for further 
elaboration on that subject556. Such static description will, however, be supplemented by a 
qualitative analysis of the dynamic aspect of resilience, notably the adaptive capacity of these 
institutions to adjust to new hydrological and political challenges along three sub-indicators: 
- coordination among the different levels and actors; 
- transfer of information and feedback; and 
- authority and flexibility in decision-making and problem-solving. 
Given the distinct character of the analysis of institutional adaptive capacity, its findings will 
be summarised in a chapter separate from the formal legal-institutional assessment of EU 
transboundary water governance557. 
  
                                                          
554 See sections II.2.2.2. and II.2.2.3. above. 
555 See section I.3.2.3. above. 
556 See section II.2.3.5. above. 
557 See chapter III.2. below. 
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Chapter 2 
The resilience of transboundary water governance within the European 
Union: a legal and institutional analysis 
 
III.2.1. Water quantity management and water allocation 
 
III.2.1.1. The role of water quantity management and water allocation in the context of hydro-
political resilience 
 
Water quantity management in a transboundary context has several dimensions. The most 
apparent facet is the distribution of flow volumes among riparian states in regular conditions, 
including natural variations. Another dimension is the control of stream flow in extreme 
situations, i.e. where volumes exceed the regular ranges of fluctuation for reasons of natural 
character (floods, droughts) or of human origin (accidental releases). Finally, water quantity 
management includes deliberate human interventions to control river flow (volumes, timing) 
by way of water infrastructure (e.g. reservoirs) and other management measures (e.g. the 
reduction of upstream water abstraction in times of drought). A critical, albeit not quintessential 
element of quantity management is the deliberate partition of volumes of water among riparian 
states: water allocation. (Although much of the relevant literature refers to “quantity 
management” and “allocation” as interchangeable terms, this study refers to allocation as a 
subset of the broader category of water quantity management).  
 
Mechanisms to allocate water between riparian states can take several shapes. In their 
comprehensive analysis of the subject Drieschova et al. classify the patterns of water allocation 
as follows558: 
- direct allocation mechanisms: these clearly stipulate how water is to be divided between 
the parties. Direct allocation mechanisms can be flexible that distribute the resource by 
percentages or set quantities according to water availability. On the other hand, direct 
fixed mechanisms divide water by absolute volumes,  
- indirect allocation mechanisms: indirect allocation mechanisms establish processes 
through which actual allocations are to be determined, but without codifying the specific 
quantities or proportions to be shared. These include: 
                                                          
558 DRIESCHOVA, Alena, GIORDANO, Mark and FISCHHENDLER, Itay (2008): Governance Mechanisms to address 
flow variability in water treaties, Global Environmental Change 18 pp. 285-295. 
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- consultations between parties,  
- an obligation to notify when water need arise, 
- a requirement for co-riparians to consent to any increased water use, 
- prioritisation of uses, etc. 
- allocation principles and guidelines: these are broader ideas or concepts for determining 
how water should be allocated now or in the future. Such principles include: 
- equitable and reasonable utilisation, 
- rational use, 
- sustainable use, 
- no harm, 
- protection of existing uses559. 
 
Each mechanism has its benefits and drawbacks. Direct allocation mechanisms provide clarity, 
but it can be difficult to reach agreement on actual quantities of water. Direct fixed mechanisms 
may effectively ignore natural fluctuations in water quantity, let alone out-of-range variations 
triggered by climate change. If the allocation mechanism is rigid and inflexible, the parties are 
less able to honour their commitments once water availability changes560. Indirect mechanisms 
are flexible, but at the same time they are open-ended which may turn problematic when clearer 
direction is needed. Such ambiguity may allow parties to reach an agreement relatively easily, 
but may also lead to controversy later, especially when the availability of water does not satisfy 
all parties’ needs561. This applies particularly to the broad legal principles of water sharing that 
– as Meredith Giordano and Aaron Wolf have demonstrated – have very little practical impact 
on the actual practice of water allocation562.  
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the allocation of water among riparian states is one of the 
most frequent and powerful driver of water-related inter-state disputes563. In other words, the 
relative importance of allocation questions in co-riparian relation correlates with the 
hydropolitical complexity of a given basin. In fact, as Aaron Wolf contends, it is the “question 
of equitable allocations” that lies “at the heart of most international water conflicts”564. It is 
                                                          
559 Ibid p. 286. 
560 DINAR et al. (2014) op. cit. p. 5. 
561 Ibid. p. 5-6. 
562 GIORDANO (2002) op. cit. p. 24-25. 
563 See Figure 3 above. 
564 WOLF, Aaron T. (1999): Criteria for equitable allocations: The heart of international water conflict, Natural 
Resources Forum 23 pp. 3-30, p. 3. 
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therefore not surprising that much of the world’s water-related legal apparatus is primarily 
concerned with water sharing, since the presence of allocation mechanisms may confer 
resilience to any given transboundary governance scheme565.  
 
Recently, the impact of water allocation mechanisms on the stability of co-riparian relations 
was tested through quantitative mathematical modelling by Dinar et al. The research aimed to 
measure, on the basis of a large number of institutional and economic-political variables, the 
degree to which given allocation mechanisms influence hydro-political resilience. The 
conclusions of the study contributed significantly to the refinement of one of the established 
premises of hydropolitics, notably, that allocation mechanisms are the institutional cornerstones 
of hydropeace. In fact, it was found that water allocation per se is no panacea. There are several 
transboundary basins (even regions) of the world that display a high degree of hydropolitical 
stability despite the absence of allocation mechanisms in their governance arrangements. This 
– conclude the authors – flows from an endogeneity issue: in basins where no hard allocation 
problems are likely to arise riparian states tend not to negotiate and institutionalise water sharing 
mechanisms. Equally, certain allocation mechanisms do more harm than good to hydro-political 
stability. As mentioned, rigid and inflexible water sharing arrangements that ignore actual or 
future hydrological variations are more likely to contribute to the rise of co-riparian tensions 
rather than to alleviate them. In a similar fashion, ambiguity and vagueness in water allocation 
may negatively affect hydro-political relations among states. In conclusion: the mere presence 
of an allocation mechanism does not necessarily increase resilience. On the other hand, 
allocation mechanisms that are both flexible and specific tend to increase the likelihood of 
cooperative behaviour among riparian states566.  
 
In summary, sufficiently precise and flexible allocation arrangements contribute positively to 
hydro-political stability. Too rigid or too vague water sharing mechanism may actually 
exacerbate political tensions, depending on the gravity of the underlying allocation problem. 
The absence of allocation mechanism only bodes for hydro-political vulnerability, if there is 
acute competition over the use of shared water resources or such competition is likely to arise 
in the future in view of changing hydrological conditions.  
III.2.1.2. Water allocation mechanisms in international water law 
 
                                                          
565 DINAR et al. (2014) op. cit. p. 2. 
566 Ibid p. 19-20. 
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Historically, water allocation has been a dominant feature of international water treaties. Water 
sharing schemes have been the primary focus of almost 40% of all transboundary water 
agreements concluded during the 20th century, only to be surpassed slightly by 
hydroelectricity567. Allocation schemes feature equally high in contemporary water treaties. On 
the basis of the detailed comparative analysis of international basin specific agreements 
concluded between 1980 and 2002 Dreischova et al. found that 60% of such agreements 
included one of the three allocation mechanism referred to above, while 26% included one or 
more direct allocation mechanisms. Indirect allocation is used in about half of the treaties, often 
complimenting a direct mechanism. Principles of allocation are rarely employed 
independently568.  
 
Yet, the most authentic codification of contemporary international water law, the UN 
Watercourses Convention, does not define water allocation mechanisms, it merely lays down 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation that is meant to provide key guidance for 
all allocation questions569. Importantly, however, no hard and fast rules can be derived from the 
equitable and reasonable utilisation imperative, nor is it supported by robust international 
judicial practice570. In fact, the weak guidance given by the principle does not even amount to 
a common frame for reference571. Therefore, its success largely depends on the effectiveness of 
their administration and enforcement572. As a result, the equity concept has very little practical 
impact on actual water sharing mechanisms573.  
 
At regional and basin level, however, a significant number of agreements actually do address 
allocation in a more elaborate fashion. E.g. the SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses 
specifically covers certain critical uses riparian states may rightfully pursue (agricultural, 
domestic, environmental and industrial use) and the relevant flow regulation measures574. 
Importantly, the southern African region has a large number of international rivers that are 
subject to specific basin agreements and commissions that lay down precise allocation rules or 
                                                          
567 RIEU-CLARK et al. (2012) op.cit. p. 93. 
568 DRIESCHOVA et al (2008) op.cit. p. 289. 
569 RIEU-CLARK et al. (2012) op.cit. p. 100. Also see section I.3.2.3. above. 
570 BARANYAI and BARTUS (2016) op. cit. p. 45.  
571 WOLF (1999) op. cit. p. 10. 
572 RAI, Subash P., SHARMA, Nayan and LOHANI A.K. (2016): Transboundary Water Sharing: Issues Involved, 
Environmental Policy and Law 46/1 pp. 62-68, p. 65. 
573 GIORDANO (2002) op. cit. p. 24-25. 
574 Article 3.2 and 1.1, SADC Revised Protocol. Also see section I.3.2.4. above. 
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define mechanisms for water allocation on the basis of the Revised Protocol (e.g. the 2002 
Incomaputo Agreement concerning the Incomati and Maputo rivers575).  
 
Several multilateral basin treaties also contain some kind of allocation mechanisms. For 
example the 1995 Agreement on the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin sets 
minimum and maximum flow requirements for the mainstream for the dry season, the wet 
season as well as defines acceptable minimum monthly natural flows576. It also lays down 
mechanisms and institutions for the determination of actual flow quantities in the lower Mekong 
basin577. Similarly, the 2002 Charter of Waters of the Senegal River lays down a list of 
principles and priorities as to how to apportion water among different uses and sectors in the 
entire basin. Actual transboundary allocations are to be determined by the Permanent Water 
Commission according to the principles and the modalities set out in the Annexes to the 
Charter578. Another well-known water sharing mechanism has been instituted among the 
central-Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan579. In this case, the water resources of the Aral Sea basin are allocated among the 
riparian states by the Interstate Commission on an annual basis in accordance with a series of 
agreements.  
 
Even more prominent is the presence of allocation principles, rules and mechanisms in general 
or issue-specific bilateral water treaties. Examples include the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty 
between the US and Canada580, the 1944 treaty between the US and Mexico on the Colorado, 
Tijuana and Rio Grande rivers581, the 1996 Indian-Bangladeshi Ganges treaty582, the 1960 Indus 
                                                          
575 Article 7 and Annex I, Tripartite Interim Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of 
South Africa and the Kingdom of Swaziland for Co-Operation on the Protection and Sustainable Utilisation of the 
Water Resources of the Incomati and Maputo Watercourses, Johannesburg, 29 August 2002. 
576 Articles 5 and 6, Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 
Chieng Rai, 5 April 1995. 
577 Article 26, ibid. 
578 Article 19, Charte des eaux du fleuve Sénégal, 28 May 2002. 
579 Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on Cooperation in the Field of Joint Management on Utilization and 
Protection of Water Resources from Interstate Sources, Statute of the Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination of Central Asia, Alma-Ata, 18 February 1992. 
580 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising between 
the United States and Canada, Washington, 11 January 1909. 
581 Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico relating to the utilization of the Waters of the Colorado 
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Washington, 2 March 1944. 
582 Treaty between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh on sharing of the Ganga/Ganges water at Fakarra, New Delhi, 12 December 1996.  
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Waters Treaty between Pakistan and India583, etc. These agreements contain a large variety of 
allocation mechanisms referred to above584. 
 
III.2.1.3. Water allocation in the European Union 
 
As outlined in Part II, the evolution European water governance has been mainly driven by 
water quality and ecological considerations585. This is not at all surprising in view of the fact 
that these instruments were originally conceived by economically developed, environmentally 
conscious countries with abundant water resources586. In other words: the collective action 
problems behind transboundary water cooperation in Europe were relatively benign, with the 
major international basins displaying relatively low hydro-political complexity587. As a result, 
the three multilateral layers of the body European water law: EU law, the UNECE framework 
and the major basin treaties almost comprehensively ignore water quantity issues, let alone 
allocation. Importantly, a number of bilateral treaties do contain certain allocation mechanisms. 
These individual arrangements, however, – apart from the Albufeira Convention – usually do 
not amount to comprehensive and sophisticated water sharing regimes. 
 
a) EU law 
 
The point of departure as regards water quantity management under EU law is Article 192.2, 
point (b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which subjects the 
adoption of “measures affecting the quantitative management of water resources or affecting, 
directly or indirectly, the availability of those resources” to the so-called consultation 
procedure. As outlined above this, on the one hand, implies an unfettered veto-power by any 
member state and, on the other, excludes any meaningful participation of the European 
Parliament from the legislative process. Although the said article of the TFEU permits member 
states to deviate from the unanimity rule so that they adopt legal acts on water quantity 
                                                          
583 Indus Waters Treaty, Karachi, 19 September 1960. 
584 For a comprehensive list of multi- and bilateral agreements concerning water sharing see WOLF (1999) op. cit. 
p. 16-29 and Appendix A.  
585 See section II.2.1.1. above. 
586 MCINTYRE, Owen (2015): The Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilisation. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): 
The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes – Its 
Contribution to International Water Cooperation, Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 146-159, p. 146. 
587 See Figure 3 above.  
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management by qualified majority (the so-called “passerelle”), but arriving at such a decision 
requires unanimity among member states in the first place too588.  
 
Importantly, the current formulation of the quantity management clause is relatively new as it 
was incorporated into the predecessor of the TFEU in reflection to a judgement of the European 
Court of Justice in a case launched by Spain against the Council of the European Community 
for the ratification of the 1994 Danube Convention by the EU589. The legal substance of the 
case concerned the limits of the EU’s powers to adopt legislation on water management 
questions, rather than cooperation in the Danube basin (that lies thousands of kilometres away 
from Spain). While the judgement usefully clarified the EU’s powers to regulate water 
protection through the ordinary legislative procedure, it nonetheless introduced and ossified a 
sharp and rather artificial distinction between water quality and water quantity management 
that pervades EU water law ever since590. As a result, today both the current treaty language 
and the explicit jurisprudence of the Court refers water quantity measures squarely to the 
unanimity box, which practically amounts to a natural political break on any significant 
consideration of transboundary water quantity issues at EU level591.  
 
Consequently, the quantitative aspects of water management appear in EU water law only 
sporadically. In fact, the Water Framework Directive itself begins with reinstating the 
secondary role of water quantity by way of declaring that “[t]his Directive aims at maintaining 
and improving the aquatic environment in the Community. This purpose is primarily concerned 
                                                          
588 See section II.2.3.1. b) above. 
589 C-36/98, Spain v. Council, ECR 2001, I-00779. Also see section III.2.1.3. a) above. 
590 When the EU ratified the Danube Convention by Council Decision 97/825/EC, Article 1302(2) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (predecessor of the TFEU) called for unanimity vote for the adoption of 
any measures “concerning the management of water resources”. As the relevant Council decision had been 
approved by qualified majority Spain brought an action against the ratification before the Court alleging that it 
was adopted on an inappropriate legal basis. Spain’s plea was based on a broad interpretation of “water 
management” and of the objectives and content of the Convention. Notably: water management is to be construed 
to encompass all measures that are designed to administer and rationalise the use of water (para 10). As the 
Convention affects various aspects of water management, it could have only been ratified through unanimity in 
Council. The European Court of Justice however – in line with the arguments of the Council, the Commission, 
Portugal and France – concluded that the term “management of water resources” had to be construed narrowly, 
covering only measures “which regulate the quantitative aspects of the use of those resources […], not those 
concerning the improvement and the protection of the quality of those resources” (para 52). Thus the adequate 
procedure for the ratification of the Convention must be determined in view of the primary purpose and the content 
of the measure (para 58). When water quantity aspects appear only “incidentally” in a complex water-related 
legislation – such as in the case of the Danube Convention – the measure must be regarded as an “environmental 
protection” rather than “water management” instrument. Consequently, it can be adopted through the ordinary (co-
)decision procedure, rather than by unanimity in Council (para 74). 
591 See section II.2.3.6. above. 
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with the quality of the waters concerned. Control of quantity is an ancillary element in securing 
good water quality […]” (emphasis added)592.  
 
In a slightly contradictory manner, however, the WFD makes a modest effort to incorporate 
certain water quantity considerations with reference to “the need for action to protect 
Community waters in qualitative as well as in quantitative terms”593, the necessity of “common 
principles […] to coordinate Member States’ efforts to improve the protection of Community 
waters in terms of quantity and quality, to promote sustainable water use”594 and the “need for 
a greater integration of qualitative and quantitative aspects of both surface waters and 
groundwaters, taking into account the natural flow conditions of water within the hydrological 
cycle” (emphasis added)595. 
 
Against this restrictive and somewhat confusing background EU law nonetheless does regulate 
certain aspects of water quantity management:  
- first and foremost, for groundwater bodies the WFD defines good quantitative status as 
one of the constituent elements of the environmental objectives to be achieved (“good 
status”)596. Thus, in the context of subsurface waters the WFD treats the qualitative 
(chemical) and quantitative dimension on an equal footing. To a much lesser extent 
quantity aspects are addressed also in relation to surface waters in so far as the “quantity 
and the dynamics of water flow” must be regarded as a “factor of water quality” (sic)597;  
- the WFD covers a number of physical interventions that affect the availability and 
quantity of waters. In particular, it calls for the introduction of control measures (e.g. 
authorisation) over the abstraction of surface water and groundwater598, the 
impoundment of surface water599, artificial recharge or augmentation of 
groundwater600;  
- finally, a complete directive is dedicated to transboundary cooperation over flood 
protection, a par excellence quantitative aspect of water management601. 
                                                          
592 Recital (19), WFD. 
593 Recital (4), ibid. 
594 Recital (23), ibid. 
595 Recital (34), ibid. 
596 Article 2.26, ibid. 
597 Annex V, point 1, ibid. 
598 Article 13.3 (e), ibid. 
599 Ibid. 
600 Article 13.3 (f), ibid. 
601 Directive 2007/60/EC. This directive is analysed in the context of variability management below, see section 
III.2.4. below. 
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This ambivalence concerning water quantity management transpires through the EU’s existing 
water policy documents too. The current strategic document of the EU, the 2012 Blueprint for 
Europe’s Waters, clearly recognises the pivotal interlinkages between quality and quantity, 
considering the latter as an important factor in the achievement of good water status602. Such 
purely ecological approach to quantity management is further elaborated in a guidance 
document issued by the European Water Directors entitled “Ecological flows in the 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive”603. While the ecological flow concept may 
seem an important sign of the gradual emancipation of water quantity considerations, in reality 
its impact remains inherently limited both in terms of legal status (no formal recognition by the 
WFD) and scope (it ignores the water needs of sectors other than the natural environment). 
 
Against this backdrop it is no surprise that EU law does not in any way address the question of 
transboundary water allocation. At the same time, it creates almost insurmountable legal and 
political obstacles to address the issue in any substantial manner, let alone on equal footing with 
water quality management. As a result, all that remains in place to guide member states when 
it comes to cross-border water sharing are the principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation 
and the no-harm rule, incorporated into EU law through the backdoor of the UNECE Water 
Convention604.  
 
b) UNECE law 
  
The UNECE Water Convention does not explicitly address the transboundary allocation of 
water resources either. It does, however, contain a number of important provisions that provide 
useful guidance to riparian states when it comes to water quantity management. Also, in an 
important region of the UNECE – notably: Central Asia – the Water Convention has played a 
key role in pacifying co-riparian relations characterised by highly political allocation 
disputes605. Finally, the Convention bodies have lately started to address the quantitative aspects 
                                                          
602 Section 2.1., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water 
Resources, COM (2012) 0673 final. See section II.2.3.2. above. 
603 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2015): Ecological flows in the implementation of the Water Framework Directive, 
CIS guidance document No. 31, Luxembourg   
604 Baranyai (2015) op. cit. p. 100. Also see section III.2.1.3.b) below. 
605 See sections I.3.2.4.b) and III.2.2.2. above.  
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of transboundary water governance in an open spirit. Consequently, while both EU law and the 
Water Convention are primarily driven by quality considerations, the UNECE regime seems to 
go much further in accommodating quantitative aspects of water management, including 
transboundary allocation.  
 
First and foremost, the Convention requires riparian states to “ensure that transboundary waters 
are used in a reasonable and equitable way, taking into particular account their transboundary 
character, in the case of activities which cause or likely to cause transboundary impact”606 
(emphasis added). The Convention defines “transboundary impact” broadly, i.e. covering not 
only significant ecological impacts, but also “effects on socio-economic conditions” caused by 
alterations in river flow607. The official Guide to the Convention further specifies that “a real 
impairment of [any] significant use” must be construed to be covered by the Convention 
definition608, underlining that such impairment can relate not only to public health or the 
environment, but also to industry or property, i.e. economic uses of water609. Importantly, unlike 
its UN counterpart, the UNECE Water Convention does not specify the conditions that are 
relevant to equitable and reasonable utilisation. To bridge that gap, however, the Guide refers 
to Article 6.1. of the UN Watercourses Convention that enlists a range of relevant non-
ecological factors, such as the social and economic needs of the watercourse states concerned, 
the population dependent on the watercourse, and other existing and potential uses as well as 
establishes the relative precedence of vital human needs in case of conflict among conflicting 
uses610. In summary, the UNECE Water Convention does cover the quantitative aspects of 
transboundary water management under the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle as it 
is complemented by the “no-harm” rule611. Although the Convention does not specify direct 
allocation rules or mechanisms, it nonetheless goes beyond ordinary EU law as it recognises 
the importance water quantity management on equal footing with quality control and constraints 
basin states’ room for manoeuvre for river flow manipulation612.  
 
The UNECE’s own practice also offers important lessons that underline the significance of the 
Convention in the field of water sharing mechanisms. Most notable is the example of the Aral 
                                                          
606 Article 2.2.c), UNECE Water Convention. 
607 Article 1.2, ibid. 
608 UNECE (2013): Guide to Implementing the Water Convention, Geneva, p. 15. 
609 MCINTYRE (2015) op. cit. p. 148. 
610 UNECE (2013) op. cit. p. 24. Also see section I.3.2.3. above. 
611 Article 2.1, UNECE Water Convention. 
612 BARANYAI (2015) op. cit. p 97-98, 100.  
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Sea basin whose riparian states – Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan – were all born following the demise of the Soviet Union. The region is 
characterised by persistent water allocation disputes among riparian states that emante from the 
extreme divergence in upstream-downstream supply and demand conditions as well as 
strategically different flow timing needs. Through its principles, cooperation platforms and 
mechanism the UNECE Water Convention has contributed considerably to the relative 
hydropolitical stability of the region613. 
 
Furthermore, recently the Convention bodies have dedicated greater attention to the political 
complexities future changes in river flow are likely to give rise to in the implementation of the 
Convention614. The Convention’s Task Force on Water and Climate has even acknowledged 
the evident conflict potential of the issue as well as the necessity to consider allocation questions 
at transboundary or basin-level615. Such potential turn into a real conflict, i.e. if any riparian 
state considers that a particular water sharing scheme or practice runs counter to the relevant 
principles of the Convention, it may bring the matter to the attention of the Implementation 
Committee through a simple procedure616.  
 
 
c) Multilateral basin treaties  
 
The Danube Convention covers several aspects of water quantity management. While its main 
focus area remains water quality improvement, it is nonetheless based on a broad notion of 
sustainable water management that incorporates quantitative dimensions too. This is best 
illustrated by the collective and individual obligation of riparian states to establish basin wide 
                                                          
613 MOSELLO, Beatrice (2008): Water in Central Asia: a prospect of conflict or cooperation? Journal of Public and 
International Affairs 19 pp. 151-174, p. 161. Also see sections I.3.2.4.b) and III.2.2.2. above. 
614 https://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/conventions/water/envwatermeetings/water/workshops-water-
convention-and-protocol-on-water-and-health/2017/global-workshop-on-water-allocation/doc.html (accessed 12 
February 2019). 
615 „Most significant water allocation decisions may be best considered at the transboundary or basin-wide level 
— agriculture, energy, ecosystems, infrastructure. Indeed, sustainable water resources management may be 
claimed by upstream countries but downstream ones may have a different opinion regarding the meaning of “an 
equitable and reasonable manner,” a designation that should take into account a set of relevant factors and 
circumstances, such as the ones listed in article 5 of the UN Watercourses Convention (United Nations, 1997)”, 
Task Force on Water and Climate, Seventh meeting, Draft Collection of lessons learned and good practices on 
climate change adaptation in transboundary basins, 2014, section 7.7, p. 30,  
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2014/WAT/10Oct_13-
15_Geneva/7th_Task_Force/TFWC_2014_3_Collection_of_lessons_learned_and_good_practices_first_draft_re
v.pdf (accessed 12 February 2019). 
616 See section III.2.5.3.b) below. 
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and national water balances617. These water balances are designed to express “the relationship 
characterising the natural water household of an entire river basin as to its components 
(precipitation, evaporation, surface and underground runoff)”, including “man-made effects 
originating from water use and influencing water quantity”618. Moreover, the Danube 
Convention requires riparian states to cooperate with regards to existing and planned river flow 
control measures (“water construction works, in particular regulation as well as runoff and 
storage level control of watercourses, flood control and ice-hazard abatement”) and other water 
uses (such as water power utilisation, water transfer and withdrawal, etc.) so long as these 
measures/uses are likely to give rise to transboundary impacts619. While water quantity 
management is expressly covered by the Convention, water allocation is not mentioned in the 
text even indirectly. Water balances are prepared for monitoring purposes only, rather than to 
establish water sharing principles, let alone quotas. All that the Convention provides for in this 
context is the observance of general principles of international water law – sustainable and 
equitable utilisation of water resources and the prevention of transboundary harm – and a set of 
notification and consultation procedures620. Against this limited consideration of water quantity 
management by the Convention, it is not surprising that the work programme of the 
International Commission for the Protection of the River Danube, the implementing basin 
organisation, reflects very limited political will to address potential water sharing questions in 
a substantial manner, even though the impacts of climate change and variability is now 
perceived as one of the top collective action problems in the basin621.   
 
The Rhine Convention focuses almost exclusively on water quantity measures, save a meagre 
reference to cooperation on flood protection622. Thus, the quantitative dimensions of 
transboundary water management come under the scope of the Convention indirectly, under the 
broad objectives of “environmentally sound and rational management of water resources” and 
the “principle of sustainable development”623. Despite this relatively narrow focus 
commentators underline that the Rhine governance regime is indeed based on the broad concept 
of integrated water resources management624. Consequently, in line with this integrated 
                                                          
617 Article 9.3., Danube Convention. 
618 Article 1.g), ibid. 
619 Article 3.2, ibid. 
620 Articles 6., 10., 11. and 12., ibid. 
621 SCHEIMER (2013) op. cit. p. 178. 
622 Article 2.e), Rhine Convention. 
623 Articles 3.1.e), 4.g), Rhine Convention.  
624 JEKEL, Heide (2015): Integrated Water Resources Management as a Tool to Prevent or Mitigate Transboundary 
Impact. In TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
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approach the implementing body of the Convention, the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) embraces a range of issues that are not of predominantly 
ecological character625. For example a special expert group has been established to address low 
water flow, a recent but recurring phenomenon in the Rhine basin (Expert Groups 
“Niedrigwasser”)626. Also, a specific technical report was recently commissioned by the ICPR 
that identifies a 10-30% decrease in summer flow volumes and 5-40% increase in winter flows 
in the remote future627. In summary, the activities of the ICPR confirm the recognition of the 
growing importance of quantity management, yet there appear to be no immediate plans to 
systematically address allocation questions, let alone revise the Convention to that effect. 
 
As opposed to the Danube and Rhine Conventions, the Framework Agreement on the Sava 
River Basin follows a different, more comprehensive regulatory approach. Instead of one 
specific focus area (e.g. pollution) or dominant approach (e.g. water quality management only) 
the Sava Framework Agreement is based on a more holistic view, encompassing all major water 
uses and transboundary impacts, including navigation, water quality, hydropower, etc.628. Thus 
the starting point of the Framework Agreement is the “water regime” that is the “quantity and 
quality conditions of the waters […] in space and time influenced by human activities or natural 
changes”629 (emphasis added). The core objective of the cooperation of riparian states is 
therefore to “regulate all issues” in order to secure the “integrity of the water regime in the Sava 
River Basin”630 (emphasis added). This requires the handling of water quantity and quality 
considerations on an equal footing. Consequently, the core obligation of riparian states is to 
ensure “water in sufficient quantity and of appropriate quality for […] aquatic ecosystems” and 
“[…] for navigation and other kinds of use/utilization” as well as the “effective control of the 
                                                          
Watercourses and International Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation, Leiden, Boston, 
Brill Nijhoff, pp. 228-248, p. 237.  
625 Ibid p. 240. 
626 https://www.iksr.org/en/international-cooperation/about-us/organisation/working-group-floods-and-low-
water-wg-h/ (accessed 12 February 2019). 
627 ICPR (2011): Study of Scenarios for the discharge regime of the Rhine, Technical Report No. 188, Koblenz. 
628 This broader approach flows from a number of conditions. First, the Sava Framework Agreement was born 
following the internationalisation of the Sava River due to the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (see section II.2.2.3.e) above). As a result, all of sudden the new riparian states had to address the 
totality of transboundary water issues at the same time, rather than selected issues emerging over decades of 
cooperation. Second, the Agreement was born at a time when the one-sided dominance of chemical pollution issues 
was gradually superseded by the new paradigm: integrated water resources management. Finally, the Agreement 
was an important peace-and-stability project with very strong influence by the powers behind the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. As a consequence, the Sava Agreement was influenced more heavily by the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention than other basin treaties adopted in the preceding decade (see section I.3.2.3. above). 
629 Article 1.3., Sava Framework Agreement. 
630 Article 8.1, ibid. 
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water regime”631. Regardless of this progressive regulatory approach, however, the Sava 
Framework Agreement does not go into details as regards the allocation of water resources 
among riparian states in case of conflict. It merely reiterates compliance with the equitable and 
reasonable utilisation principle and the no-harm rule as the fundamental obligation of parties 
when it comes to sharing the benefits of water use632. As in the case of other basins, this limited 
consideration of allocation questions may turn out to be insufficient in view of the increasing 
hydrological variability in the region. E.g. the Sava Basin Analysis Report, carried out for the 
International Sava River Basin Commission, forecasts that the expected 15-30%(!) reduction in 
mean annual runoff in the coming decades will alter water availability conditions significantly 
in the basin633.  
 
Unlike the Sava Framework Agreement, the other three major European basin treaties 
addressed by this study: the Elbe Convention, the Oder Convention and the Meuse Agreement 
almost completely ignore quantitative issues. In fact, the Elbe and Oder treaties are mainly 
concerned with institutional questions regarding the establishment and the operation of their 
respective basin commissions. These commissions are tasked with various programmatic 
exercises whose main focus is pollution prevention and control, monitoring, planning and early 
warning systems (although both are also supposed to measure and assess the general 
hydrological, including, quantitative situation of their respective river basins)634. As such, 
neither of the two Conventions contains rules governing water quantity management, let alone 
allocation mechanisms. While the primary focus of the Meuse Agreement is also water quality, 
it nonetheless makes reference to other important aspects of water management such as flood 
protection and droughts, or water uses relevant for spatial planning, agriculture, forestry. The 
Agreement also underlines the relevance of such considerations as “sustainable and integrated” 
water management and the “multi-functionality” of the resources of the river635. Beyond these 
distant references, however, the Meuse Agreement does not in any way address the issues of 
water quantity management and allocation among its riparians.  
 
 
                                                          
631 Article 11.a), b), e), ibid. 
632 Articles 7 and 9, ibid. 
633 KOMATINA and GROŠELJ (2014) op. cit. p. 13. 
634 Article 2, Elbe Convention; Article 2, Oder Convention.  
635 Article 2, Accord international sur la Meuse. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2019.003
147 
 
d) Bilateral water treaties 
 
As shown above, at UNECE, EU and multilateral basin level water quantity issues are afforded 
hardly any attention. At bilateral level, however, several treaties contain provisions that address 
water allocation in a substantive fashion.  
 
Most prominent in this respect is the Albufeira Convention, the comprehensive water 
management treaty between Spain and Portugal. Given the predominantly arid conditions 
prevailing in most of the Iberian Peninsula as well as the extensive use of storage and other 
flow manipulation facilities in both countries water sharing agreements are not at all a new 
feature of the bilateral relations636. The Albufeira Convention – as amended in 2008 by the 
Additional Protocol –, however, goes further than previous allocation schemes. It lays down an 
elaborate water sharing arrangement for each of the five river basins shared by the two countries 
both in terms of procedure and substance637. It sets precise minimum average volumes that each 
of the rivers entering the territory of the downstream riparian must carry. These quantities are 
expressed in cubic hectometre for annual, quarterly and weekly averages638. The relevant 
annexes also determine for each basin the conditions of exceptional circumstances – that is 
precipitation levels 30-40% below historic averages – when the minimum flow requirements 
are temporarily suspended. Importantly, these figures have not been derived from the august 
principles of international water law, but are based on historic uses, actual needs and future 
water availability projections. Empirical studies suggest that this complex river flow regime has 
contributed considerably not only to the stability of bilateral political relations, but also 
benefited both countries (even upstream Spain) in terms of net economic gain639.  
There exist a number of other bilateral treaties between EU member states that contain some 
kind of general or project (use)-specific water allocation rules. One of the best known of 
example is the 1958 French-Spanish Agreement regarding the Lake Lanoux640, adopted in the 
wake of the 1957 Lake Lanoux Arbitral Award641. The agreement defines the precise amount 
                                                          
636 CANELAS DE CASTRO (2009) op. cit. p. 5-6. 
637 Article 15-16, Albufeira Convention. 
638 Annex 2 to the Additional Protocol to the Albufeira Convention. 
639 CHATTERJEE, Indrani (2013): Evaluating International Water Treaty Impacts & Risks: The Albufeira 
Convention and the Spanish Experience, University of California at Riverside 
https://economics.ucr.edu/seminars_colloquia/2013-
14/applied_economics/I%20Chatterjee%20paper%20for%2011%206%2013%20seminar.pdf (accessed 12 
February 2019), p. 18. 
640 Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Spanish Government relating to Lake 
Lanoux, Madrid, 12 July 1958. 
641 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) (1957) 12 R.I.A.A. 281; 24 I.L.R. 101. 
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of water France must release to the Carol River that outflows to Spain from Lake Lanoux. 
Another important example of bilateral water sharing arrangement has been developed between 
Finland and the Russian Federation under the 1964 Finnish-Soviet frontier water agreement for 
the Vuoksi river basin that also includes the Lake Saimaa in Finland642. In accordance with the 
so-called Discharge Rule upstream Finland and downstream Russia cooperate closely on 
maintaining the flow quantity of the Vuoksi River in a “normal zone”, defined by the Rule with 
reference to historically prevailing natural flow volumes643. Should extreme floods or extreme 
low water levels appear, discharge rates are changed by Finland with a view to minimising 
adverse effects. Finland monitors the flow conditions continuously and forecasts indicative 
discharge rates. The discharge programme is negotiated annually by the two riparian states. 
According to commentators the water sharing scheme under the Discharge Rule has proved 
highly beneficial for both countries644. 
 
Less specific is the 1966 Austrian-Swiss-German agreement concerning withdrawals from the 
Lake Constance that mainly defines principles and procedures that riparian states must follow 
when planning to abstract water from the lake beyond a certain quantity645. Finally, there are a 
number of bilateral water frontier treaties that reinstate the rights of riparian states for the use 
of water quantities defined by “existing water rights” or lay down a 50-50% rule for sharing 
transboundary river flows646. 
 
III.2.1.4. Evaluation 
 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the above analysis is that transboundary water 
allocation considerations are almost completely absent from European water law. As such, the 
European model represents an outlier in the broader global context as, until relatively recently, 
the evolution of water treaties has been largely shaped by water quantity management issues 
worldwide647.  
 
                                                          
642 Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Frontier 
Watercourses, Helsinki, 24 April 1964. 
643 Vuoksi Agreement on Discharge Rule in Lake Saimaa and the Vuoksi River, 1989.  
644 BELINSKIJ (2015) op. cit. p. 315.  
645 Agreement Regulating the Withdrawal of Water From Lake Constance, Berne, 30 April 1966. 
646 WOLF (1999) op. cit. p. 16-30. 
647 GIORDANO et al. (2014) op. cit. p. 259. 
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The dominance of ecological issues in contemporary European water law could very well be 
justified by the abundance of freshwater in north-western European countries – the core states 
of European integration – as well as by the prevalence of cross-border pollution issues in the 
first decades of the development of UNECE/EU water policy. In other words: the character of 
the collective action problems in co-riparian relations did not raise much attention to the 
question of water allocation at the time.  
 
The relative recent stability of co-riparian relations in Europe has also given rise to a widely 
held view that wherever allocation issues nonetheless do arise (mainly in the Iberian Peninsula), 
they tend to be bilateral and/or use-specific in nature. Consequently, goes the conventional 
judgement, they are better left to be resolved by the concerned riparian states themselves. All 
the more so as this complacent approach is practically ossified in legal terms as the restrictive 
unanimity requirement under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union renders it 
almost impossible to adopt water sharing rules at EU level. As a result, legal literature and 
political discourse on European water governance almost completely ignores the issue of 
transboundary water allocation or downplays its significance. Götz Reichert even sees such 
“bileteralisation” as a guarantee of (upstream) sovereignty underlining that “it seems 
appropriate not to allow an affected Member State to be overruled on such a potentially 
contentious issue” since “with regard to the delicate decision on water apportionment […] it 
seems more suitable […] to leave it to the regulation of the actually affected riparian states 
within the domain of international water law”648.  
 
Such complacency seems to be ill-founded on several grounds.  
 
First, while most regions of the European Union have, thus far, been spared from dramatic water 
shortages caused by extreme droughts, over-abstraction or flow manipulation, all relevant 
studies project that water quantity fluctuations with significant transboundary repercussions 
are on the rise649. In other words: transboundary water allocation may not have been a 
contentious issue historically, but it is likely to become so in the foreseeable future. Against 
this background, the absence of allocation mechanisms in the EU bodes significantly for 
increased hydropolitical vulnerability. 
 
                                                          
648 REICHERT (2016) op. cit. p. 40.  
649 See Figure 11. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2019.003
150 
 
Second, EU countries and their immediate neighbours share some of the geographically most 
complicated river basins in the world, characterised by relatively short streams and high 
numbers of riparian states. As a result, should major changes emerge in flow volumes and/or in 
the timing of flow release in a given basin, their consequences are likely to cascade through a 
large number of countries within a short period of time. Thus water allocation challenges tend 
to have a basin-wide, rather than bilateral scope, multiplying the political complexity of the 
question.   
 
Third, given the dominance of water quality and ecological requirements at UNECE, EU and 
basin level, EU states are subject to a gross regulatory asymmetry. On the one hand, they have 
to comply, individually and collectively, with uniform and precise water quality requirements 
whose implementation cannot be separated from the sufficient availability of water. On the 
other hand, EU water law, especially the WFD, takes hardly any notice of the growing 
competition for water resources either internally or in a transboundary context650. 
Consequently, member states are almost completely deprived of legal rights and mechanisms 
to demand that the necessary amount of water is made available to them. As a result, riparian 
states with high exposure to exogenous water sources may infringe their EU and international 
water quality obligations for the lack of sufficient volumes despite their best intentions and 
efforts. 
 
Finally, the complacent official view of EU institutions and some basin organisations suggest 
that they grossly ignore or downplay the highly contentious nature of water allocation 
negotiations. While Europe has not yet seen the type of colourful, widely mediatised disputes 
(“water wars”) that frequently occur in the western or southern United States or the Aral Sea 
basin, there are a number of negative examples in the EU, too, that should caution decision-
makers. These examples illustrate that the highly sophisticated transboundary governance 
regime of the EU does not, on its own, increase the cooperative behaviour of an upstream 
riparian when it comes to releasing more water downstream. Take, for example, the best-known 
recent international legal conflict, the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, which in its current stage is 
essentially a water allocation dispute. Upstream Slovakia and downstream Hungary have not 
been able to implement the 1997 judgement of the International Court of Justice that – in view 
                                                          
650 ZIKOS, Dimitros and HAGEDORN, Konrad (2017): Competition for Water Resources from the European 
Perspective. In ZIOLKOWSKA, Jadwiga R. and PETERSON, Jeffrey M. (Eds.): Competition for Water Resources 
Experiences and Management Approaches in the US and Europe, Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp. 19-35, p. 20, 32. 
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of the equitable and reasonable utilisation principle – unambiguously calls for the release of 
more water by Slovakia into the joint section of the River Danube651. Here, the accession of the 
two countries to the EU in 2004 and their (unchallenged) compliance with the Water 
Framework Directive has not moved the parties an inch closer to the resolution of the allocation 
issue652.  
 
In summary, the almost complete absence of water quantity and allocation considerations and 
rules from European water law is likely to become a critical hydropolitical gap in the European 
Union as the effects of climate change with significant impacts on transboundary river flow 
variations and competition for shared water resources intensify.  
 
III.2.2. Water quality protection 
 
III.2.2.1. The correlation between water quality management and hydro-political resilience 
 
Water quality has become a key feature of transboundary water governance schemes relatively 
lately, despite its direct correlation with the health and well-being of humans and ecosystems 
as well as its impact on social and economic development. Yet, in many parts of the world water 
quality management is still seen as a luxury investment that only comes second to water 
quantity considerations in co-riparian relations653. As such, water pollution or other related 
ecological problems are considered to be less contentious (“malign”) vis-à-vis other pressing 
questions of transboundary water management, e.g. allocation654. Accordingly, a great number 
of hydropolitical assessments do not even consider water quality management in any significant 
way. This is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that the highly complex political, economic 
and topographic implications of pollution control elevate the issue among the most difficult 
transboundary collective action problems worldwide655.  
 
                                                          
651 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgement, ICJ Reports 1997, 7, 
para 140. 
652 BARANYAI and BARTUS (2016) op. cit. p. 48.  
653 SCHMEIER (2013) op. cit. p. 68. 
654 Ibid p. 71.  
655 GIORDANO, Meredith A. (2003), Managing the Quality of International Rivers: Global Principles and Basin 
Practice, Natural Resources Journal 43, pp. 111-136, p. 114. 
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Institutionalisation of cross-border water quality management has several stages. In her 
comprehensive survey of water treaties Meredith Giordano clusters quality control mechanisms 
into three categories: 
- an indefinite commitment by riparian states to some aspects of water quality 
management, 
- arrangements that define water quality-related actions but lack specific standards or a 
comprehensive management framework, 
- arrangements with detailed water quality standards, actions plans and/or 
comprehensive management frameworks656.  
 
Importantly, water quality management is not limited to pollution prevention and control. More 
advanced regimes also address broader environmental and social aspects, going far beyond the 
actual chemical status of the transboundary water body concerned. In fact, such comprehensive 
ecological requirements as the consideration of ecosystem services have become standard treaty 
features in the past decade, displaying an almost exponential expansion in recent water 
treaties657. The spectacular expansion of water quality management considerations in water 
treaties is no doubt a token of the growing importance of pollution control and riverine ecology 
in the stability of hydropolitical relations.  
 
III.2.2.2. Water quality protection in international water law 
 
Although water quality and the environment have risen to dominance in transboundary water 
law only relatively lately, water pollution considerations have indeed shaped the evolution of 
the basic principles of contemporary water law significantly right from the outset658. Yet, 
qualitative requirements in water treaties started to expand drastically only since the 1950s. 
Ever since the number of agreements addressing water quality issues has multiplied almost 
tenfold. Even more spectacular is the recent emergence of broader environmental 
considerations into the forefront of transboundary treaty-making: since 1990 three quarters of 
all new international agreements contained some reference to the protection of the environment. 
A recent survey on the key features of water treaties by Mark Giordano et al. found over 160 
                                                          
656 Ibid, p. 119. 
657 GIORDANO et al. (2014) op. cit. p. 259. 
658 GIORDANO (2003) op. cit. p. 115. 
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existing water agreements that include some language on water quality management and/or 
environmental services659.  
 
The general requirements of international law regarding water quality protection in a 
transboundary context are accurately summarised by the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. 
The Convention deals with water quality and environmental questions extensively. In the first 
place, the overarching principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation, the no-harm rule as 
well as the general cooperation obligation explicitly call for the “adequate protection of the 
[shared] watercourses”660. In that spirit, the Convention dedicates an entire part to the protection 
and preservation of water quality and the aquatic environment661. It stipulates the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution of international watercourses as one of the core obligation of 
riparian states662. To that end, the Convention calls on parties to adopt joint measures such as 
setting joint water quality objectives, to establish techniques and practices to address pollution 
from point and non-point sources, to draw up lists of hazardous substances whose discharge 
must be eliminated, limited, monitored, etc.663. The Convention also addresses the ecological 
repercussions of emergency situations664. While the Convention provides a basic framework 
for the adoption of concrete measures by riparian states, it has nonetheless been criticised for 
its vague language and narrow scope when it comes to environmental protection665.  
 
Regional and basin treaties also address water quality considerations substantively. The 2000 
SADC Revised Protocol repeats the relevant sections of the UN Watercourses Convention more 
or less verbatim666. More precise provisions on water quality management are laid down in the 
numerous basin treaties and actions plans adopted under the Revised Protocol. Some African 
treaties – like the 2003 Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin – also 
contain quite specific and measurable water quality control and improvement measures667. In 
Asia, the 1995 Mekong Basin Agreement provides an example of comprehensive, yet rather 
general approach to water quality management and environmental protection. The Agreement 
defines the “[protection] of the environment, natural resources, aquatic life and conditions, and 
                                                          
659 GIORDANO et al. (2014) op. cit. p. 258. 
660 Articles 5, 7 and 8, UN Watercourses Convention. 
661 Part IV, ibid. 
662 Article 21.2, ibid. 
663 Article 21.3, ibid. 
664 Article 27, ibid. 
665 GIORDANO (2003) op. cit.  p. 118. 
666 Article 4.2, SADC Revised Protocol. 
667 Article 6, Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin, Arusha, 29 November 2003. 
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ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from pollution and other harmful effects” as one 
of the core objectives of co-riparian cooperation668. The Agreement also calls for the prevention 
and cessation of harmful effects jeopardising water quality, aquatic ecosystem conditions and 
the ecological balance of the Mekong system669.  
 
Finally, there exist a large number of bilateral treaties addressing water quality at various levels 
of detail. Outside the EU the most advanced and effective such agreements are those concluded 
in the US-Canada and US-Mexico relations with regards to particular shared water bodies as 
the Colorado River670 or the Great Lakes671. 
 
III.2.2.3. Water quality protection in the European Union 
 
Water quality management and the preservation of riverine ecology take centre stage in 
European Union water law and policy. As outlined earlier, the development of all three layers 
of multilateral European water management – i.e. the UNECE, the EU and basin level – has 
been shaped by the persistent water pollution problems of the continent more than any other 
considerations672. This somewhat one-sided approach was vigorously reinstated in the EU 
context in 2000 for three further decades by the Water Framework Directive that placed water 
quality improvement at the heart of water management all the way through 2027673.  
 
It must also be underlined that the consistent ecological commitment of the EU and its member 
states has resulted in some bright examples of freshwater quality improvement worldwide (e.g. 
the return of the salmon to the Rhine674). These achievements justify the EU’s efforts in this 
field, even if progress in meeting the ecological and water quality objectives of the WFD is 
seriously lagging behind the statutory schedule in many parts of the bloc675.  
 
                                                          
668 Article 3, Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. 
669 Article 7, ibid. 
670 International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), Minute No. 242, Permanent and Definitive Solution 
to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, 30 August 1973.  
671 Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Ottawa, 22 November 1978. 
672 See section II.2.2.1. above. 
673 See section II.2.3.3. above. 
674 https://www.iksr.org/en/international-cooperation/rhine-2020/salmon-2020/salmon-2000/ (accessed 12 
February 2019). 
675 Section 5, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The Water 
Framework Directive and the Floods Directive: Actions towards the 'good status' of EU water and to reduce flood 
risks, COM (2015)0120 final   
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a) EU law 
 
The quality-related and ecological obligations of the EU’s internal water regime constitute a 
very high level of policy ambition and regulatory complexity not only in global comparison, 
but also vis-à-vis other EU environmental legislation676. As outlined in Part II EU law defines 
a sophisticated set of chemical (and in the case of surface waters: ecological) objectives under 
the notion of “good water status” that are to be achieved through strict pollution prevention and 
control measures broken down by pollution sources, activities, pollutants, etc.677 It also requires 
the protection of terrestrial ecosystems closely linked to water, in line with the EU’s internal 
nature conservation legislation678. The regulatory approach of EU water law reflects a number 
of important policy innovations vis-à-vis other contemporary cross-border governance regimes. 
These include: 
- holistic view: the Water Framework Directive covers all aspects of water quality and 
riverine ecology. The WFD goes beyond the traditional chemical pollution-focused 
regulatory model in so far as it requires the integrated consideration and comprehensive 
improvement of the biological, hydromorphological and physico-chemical conditions 
that determine the quality of life in freshwaters679, 
- uniform ecological classification of all freshwater bodies: the WFD contains precise 
normative parameters for the ecological classification of rivers, lakes, transitional and 
coastal waters680. To ensure that the values assigned by member states to the various 
ecological class boundaries are consistent and comparable, a so-called intercalibration 
exercise had been carried out by the European Commission before the real 
implementation of the programmes of measures were to commence681. This resulted in 
a largely uniform water quality snapshot for Europe that helped member states to 
introduce homogenous (or at least similar) assessment levels and protection measures. 
Ever since the initial characterisation the comparability of water quality and ecological 
data has been ensured by the uniform monitoring standards of the WFD, 
- integration into a broader environmental policy framework: EU water law forms part 
of the Union’s broader environmental policy. Consequently, transboundary water 
                                                          
676 REICHERT (2016) op. cit. p. 50. 
677 See section II.2.3.3. above.  
678 Article 4.1.c), WFD. 
679 Annex V, WFD 
680 Ibid. 
681 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003): Towards a Guidance on Establishment of the Intercalibration Network and 
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bodies in the EU also benefit from numerous other environmental measures such as the 
control of diffuse agricultural pollution, nature conservation, industrial emissions, waste 
management, etc.682  
 
In summary, the elaborate water quality objectives, the iterative planning process, the detailed 
reporting requirements of EU water law and the systematic compliance checks by the European 
Commission results in a significant reduction in the pollution of transboundary waters in Europe 
as well as the improvement of the quality of the aquatic environment.  
 
b) UNECE law 
  
The UNECE Water Convention builds on earlier efforts undertaken by UNECE member states 
for “the prevention, control and reduction of transboundary pollution, sustainable water 
management, conservation of water resources and environmental protection”683. Consequently, 
the tasks of riparian governments centre around a number of general environmental 
requirements such as pollution prevention and control, ecologically sound water management 
or the conservation of aquatic resources and ecosystems684. The Convention requires the 
introduction of a range of national legal, administrative, economic, financial and technical 
measures, including the prior licensing of waste water discharges, various emission limits for 
the discharge of hazardous substances, the collection and treatment of municipal waste, 
reduction of nutrient inputs, etc.685 Not only are riparian states required to control the discharge 
of pollutants into transboundary waters, they are also obliged to adopt quality objectives that 
limit the amount of pollutants in the aquatic environment686. Examples of such environmental 
measures include687: 
- the protection and restoration of a given percentage of surface water bodies with the aim 
of achieving good surface water status by a certain date, 
- the protection and restoration of a given percentage of groundwater bodies, and ensuring 
a balance between abstraction and recharge of groundwater, 
                                                          
682 See section II.2.3.3. above. 
683 Recital (4), Preamble, UNECE Water Convention. 
684 Article 2.2, ibid. 
685 Article 3.1, ibid. 
686 Article 3.3, ibid. 
687 BUJDOS (2017) op. cit. p. 122-123. 
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- the provision of access to a given percentage of the population to improved sanitation 
systems by a certain date, 
- the termination of the discharge of untreated urban wastewaters into natural water 
bodies from a given number of wastewater treatment plants by a certain date, 
- the identification of a given percentage of particularly contaminated sites (pesticides, 
oil products, or certain hazardous chemicals) by a certain date688. 
 
Even though these water quality and ecological requirements are rather general in nature, they 
nonetheless stand out in global comparison as representing one of the most environmentally 
conscious multilateral water governance regimes689. Importantly, however, in the context of EU 
member states the Water Framework Directive and the various other EU directives fully 
implement and, even, take further the general ecological programme foreseen by the 
Convention690. Consequently, in this respect the Convention has very limited practical 
significance in intra-EU co-riparian relations.  
 
c) Multilateral basin treaties 
 
All studied European basin treaties were negotiated and adopted in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Treaty-making during that period was predominantly inspired by environmental quality 
considerations, corresponding to the political priorities of the era when pollution control was 
the major concern and the impacts of climate change were much less prevalent. Consequently, 
the main focus of contemporary European basin treaties is pollution control and, to a lesser 
extent, riverine ecology.  
 
The earliest of all, the 1990 Elbe Convention, defines the prevention of the pollution of the Elbe 
and its drainage as the ultimate objective of the cooperation of the parties691. Thus, the priorities 
identified by the Convention revolve around environmental considerations, such as the 
elimination of waste water and other point source pollution, reduction of discharges resulting 
from accidents, etc.692 (The relevant provisions of the 1996 Oder Convention follows very 
closely those of the Elbe Convention).  
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689 GIORDANO (2003) op. cit. p. 125. 
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691 Article 1.1, Elbe Convention. 
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While the focus of the Danube Convention is broadly similar, it is more elaborate and 
comprehensive in its ecological objectives. It defines “sustainable water management” and 
“stable, environmentally sound development” as the purpose of transboundary cooperation693. 
To that end, the Convention lays down a number of precise pollution prevention and control 
requirements as well as calls for the adoption of corresponding measures by the ICPDR and the 
riparian states in their respective capacities694.  
 
The Rhine Convention is also centred on water quality management and the restoration of the 
river’s riverine ecology. Importantly, the Convention covers not only pollution control and 
biodiversity measures, but also such important hydrological conditions as the natural flow of 
solid matter or the interactions between the river, groundwater and alluvial areas695. Compared 
to other basin agreements, the Rhine Convention imposes precise direct obligations on parties 
with regards to water quality management. Thus, under the Convention riparian states are 
required to adopt autonomous measures to ensure that wastewater discharges are subject to prior 
authorisation, discharge of hazardous substances are gradually reduced, the risk of pollution 
from incidents and accidents is reduced, etc.696 
 
The Meuse Agreement was designed as a collective vehicle for implementing the EU’s Water 
Framework Directive by the affected riparian states. Consequently, it follows the ecological 
objectives and structure of the WFD in so far as it calls for the joint analysis of the Meuse Basin, 
the preparation of a single river basin management plan and programme of measures as well as 
the coordinated implementation of all supporting monitoring activities697.  
 
As regards water quality management the Sava Framework Agreement can be seen as an outlier. 
In view of its comprehensive and balanced approach towards water resources management, 
quality and ecological considerations are far less prominent than in the case of the above basin 
treaties. Thus, the prevention of water pollution stands on equal footing with other water 
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management tasks of the Sava Commission such as flood prevention, utilisation of waters of 
the basin, extraordinary impacts on the water regime, etc.698 
 
d) Bilateral water treaties 
 
Cooperation over water quality has been a standard feature of general bilateral water treaties 
adopted since World War II in Europe. Importantly, water pollution questions were not only 
covered by agreements concluded between western European nations, but also by those under 
Communist rule (e.g. the 1955 Romanian-Yugoslav, the 1956 Austrian-Hungarian, the 1958 
Czechoslovak-Polish or the 1967 Austrian-Czechoslovak frontier water treaties all address 
transboundary pollution)699.  
 
Among the relevant contemporary bilateral water treaties the Albufeira Convention deserves 
special attention as it lays down not only the water quality objectives of transboundary 
cooperation, but also defines precisely the types of measures parties are required to undertake 
to improve water quality under normal conditions as well as upon pollution incidents700. On the 
other end of the spectrum lie those European bilateral treaties that address quality 
considerations only superficially. These include some of the early frontier treaties mentioned, 
many of which are still intact after several decades. A more recent example is the 2009 Finnish-
Swedish frontier water agreement which exhausts the subject by requiring the parties to 
cooperate in the formulation of their national water quality objectives701.  
 
In must be pointed out, however, that EU member states remain bound by the robust ecological 
programme laid down by EU water law in their bilateral relations, even if their respective 
agreements address pollution control or riverine ecology only superficially. Therefore, the 
occasional absence of explicit ecological requirements at the lowest level of transboundary 
water governance has very limited practical implications on the actual quality of shared waters.  
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699 GIORDANO (2003) op. cit. p. 129-130. 
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III.2.2.4. Evaluation 
 
International water law and policy has witnessed a notable shift towards ecological issues in 
the past decades. It is, however, the European Union where such environmental consciousness 
has gone furthest both in terms of regulatory rigour and policy complexity. This is clearly 
illustrated by the dominance of ecological considerations at all levels of transboundary water 
governance within the EU. Indeed, under EU law practically all possible water management 
questions are subordinated to the protection and improvement of the aquatic environment. Non-
ecological uses, such as navigation, irrigation, industrial consumption or energy production 
must all be adjusted to the ecological imperatives of the Water Framework Directive702. New 
interventions that impair freshwater quality and jeopardise the achievement of good water status 
can only be permitted if they are warranted by “imperative reasons of overriding public interest” 
and must be limited to the strict necessary minimum703.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the rather one-sided ecological focus of EU water law will 
withstand the new hydrological pressures of the Anthropocene. In any case, EU member states 
are subject to a regulatory framework of such a highly policy ambition and complexity that it 
is very unlikely that issues relating to water quality will give rise to persistent political tensions 
within the European Union.  
 
III.2.3. Cooperation over planned measures  
 
III.2.3.1. Unilateral interventions as a source of water conflict 
 
It is a well-documented fact that most interstate water disputes are linked to some kind of a 
deliberate unilateral intervention into the basin implemented by one (typically upstream) 
riparian state to the detriment of others704. These interventions (measures) can take several 
shapes, but they mostly relate to flow quantity and timing or the installation of water 
infrastructures. The anatomy of water conflicts suggests that in the absence of a robust 
cooperation regime unilateral measures can quickly turn into a flashpoint triggering disputes 
                                                          
702 Article 4.1, WFD. 
703 Article 4.7, ibid. 
704 DELLI PRISCOLI and WOLF (2009) op. cit. p. 14. 
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among riparian states that often leads to long term tensions in the basin705. Indeed, the recent 
history of co-riparian relations is replete with examples of serious interstate disputes that 
erupted around dams, dykes, diversions, be it the blocking by India of the flow of the Indus 
river into Pakistan in 1948706, the diversion by Slovakia of the Danube from the joint Slovak-
Hungarian riverbed in 1992707 or the highly publicised recent conflict between Egypt and 
Ethiopia surrounding the construction of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam708.  
 
Not surprisingly, the prevention of disputes arising out of unilateral riparian action has been a 
key concern of international water law and policy from the outset. The Montevideo Declaration 
on Industrial and Agricultural Use of International Rivers, adopted as early as in 1933, already 
called on riparian states intending to implement projects affecting water use by other basin 
states to give an advance notice and three months for evaluation of the information provided709. 
The 1966 Helsinki Rules also contained a recommendation on the procedure to be followed by 
the “moving” state710. Today, there is no ambiguity as to the fact that cooperation over planned 
interventions in shared river basins is one of the core principles of international water law711. 
Given its centre-stage in transboundary water dispute prevention the subject is also a standard 
feature of hydropolitical assessments.  
 
III.2.3.2. Cooperation over planned measures in international water law  
 
As mentioned above, prior notification of planned measures is considered today as one the three 
core principles of international water law712. Its central role is eloquently illustrated by the fact 
that the UN Watercourses Convention actually dedicates more articles to the subject than any 
other topics. The Convention clearly spells out that riparian states are under a horizontal 
obligation to exchange information and consult on the possible effects of a planned intervention 
on an international watercourse713. Should the need arise riparians are also obliged to engage in 
                                                          
705 Ibid p. 20. 
706 See section I.3.2.4.b) below. 
707 BARANYAI and BARTUS (2016) op. cit. p. 42. 
708 Ethiopia diverts Blue Nile for controversial dam build, BBC, 28 May 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-22696623 (accessed 12 February 2019). 
709 Declaration on Industrial and Agricultural Use of International Rivers, Art. 7, in Seventh International 
Conference of American States, Final Act 113 at 114 (1933). 
710 Article XXIX.2-4, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Helsinki Declaration, 
14-20 August 1966. 
711 MCCAFFREY (2015) op. cit. p. 58. 
712 Ibid. 
713 Article 11, UN Watercourses Convention. 
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negotiations. This general requirement is broken down to precisely defined procedural steps. 
The first step is the “timely” notification of a planned measure that must take place well before 
a decision on the permit or implementation is made. Such notification must contain all the 
information that enables the affected riparian state to evaluate the possible effects of the planned 
project714. The Convention also sets a basic timeframe – six months – during which the recipient 
state should communicate its findings, a period that can be extended by additional six months715. 
During this period the state of origin must refrain from permitting or implementing the 
project716. If the recipient state considers that the planned measure contravenes the substantive 
principles of international water law (i.e. equitable and reasonable utilisation and no-harm), it 
must substantiate its findings with the corroborating documentation717. In such a case the parties 
must enter into consultations with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution. During this 
time, but no longer than for an additional six months, the state of origin is obliged to withhold 
project authorisation or implementation718. If a riparian state finds out that another riparian aims 
to go ahead with a planned measure without prior notification, it can demand the notification 
documents and procedure described above. If the state of origin denies the need for prior 
notification, the states concerned must enter into consultations. If during that period the 
recipient so requests, the state of origin must suspend the project up to six months719. It must 
be pointed out that the Convention does not call on the state of origin to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment (“EIA”). It merely provides that the results of an eventual 
EIA must be transmitted to the other basin states720. The International Court of Justice, however, 
usefully clarified the status of EIAs in its 2010 judgement on the Pulps Mills case, underlining 
that “it may now be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed […] activity may have 
a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context”721.  
 
Other international legal instruments also lay down procedures of prior notification. E.g. the 
SADC Revised Protocol contains exactly the same general obligations, procedural steps and 
                                                          
714 Article 12, ibid. 
715 Article 13, ibid. 
716 Article 14, ibid. 
717 Article 15, ibid. 
718 Article 17, ibid. 
719 Article 18, ibid. 
720 MCCAFFREY (2016) op. cit. p. 38. 
721 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgement, ICJ Reports 2010, 14, 
para 204. 
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timelines as those outlined in Part III of the UN Watercourses Convention722. Several basin 
treaties actually set up a collective system of notification and authorisation through the 
competent basin organisation. For example, the Charter of Waters of the Senegal River requires 
any party planning an intervention with significant impacts to notify the project to other riparian 
states through the High Commissioner. Projects of a magnitude that can permanently change 
the basic characteristics of the river (e.g. flow volume, navigability, etc.) require the prior 
approval of all riparian states723. The Mekong cooperation arrangement also goes beyond the 
basic rules contained in the UN Watercourses Convention as it lays down a collective 
notification and evaluation procedure coordinated by the Joint Committee of the Mekong River 
Commission724. Under this mechanism – whose rules are specified in a side agreement – 
notifications of planned measures are to be made by the state of origin not to the other affected 
states, but directly to the Joint Committee, which is tasked with the distribution of information 
and soliciting comments by the affected riparian states. With a view to ensuring a consensus 
around all planned projects, the Joint Committee is tasked to reconcile all differences in advance 
and to adopt a decision on every project subject to notification725. Another example for prior 
notification mechanisms is the Statute of the River Uruguay between Argentina and Uruguay 
that calls for notification of planned projects and the relating consultations through the 
Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay. The Statute aims to ensure consensus among 
the riparian states concerning each planned project. Consequently, if differences remain 
between the parties as to the acceptability of the project in question, any party may – following 
a conciliation procedure – trigger the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (as it 
actually happened in the Pulp Mills case)726.  
 
III.2.3.3. Cooperation over planned measures in the European Union 
 
Cooperation among EU member states over planned interventions affecting water quality or 
quantity in other member states is regulated by the parallel (in fact: almost identical) 
international environmental impact assessment regimes of the EU and the UNECE. In other 
                                                          
722 Article 4.1, SADC Revised Protocol. 
723 Article 26, Charter of Waters of the Senegal River, 28 May 2002 (Charte des eaux du fleuve Sénégal). 
724 Article 26, Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. 
725 Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA), adopted by the Council of the 
Mekong River Commission, 2003. 
726 Articles 7-13 and 60, Statute of the River Uruguay, Salto, 26 February 1975. 
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words, the relevant notification and consultation procedures remain outside the narrow remit of 
water law both in the EU and the UNECE.  
 
a) EU law 
 
Since 1985 the authorisation of projects with likely significant transboundary effects has been 
subject to a notification and consultation procedure within the EU. The bloc’s first 
environmental impact assessment legislation – Directive 85/337/EEC – already made sure that 
the authorisation of the most significant water-related projects were made subject to an early 
assessment and transboundary consultation, if their impacts were likely to be felt outside the 
national borders727. Importantly, these included not only hydraulic works per se (such as 
canalisation, flood-relief works, dams and other water storage installations), but also large 
industrial facilities, transport and other infrastructure projects, water management projects for 
agriculture, mining and projects, etc. with a potential impact on water728 Although the original 
EIA regime has evolved considerably since the 1980s, the current EU legislation, Directive 
2011/92/EU, very much follows the provisions of the original directive and the UNECE’s 
relevant instrument: the 1991 Espoo Convention729. Thus, where a project of likely 
transboundary impacts is proposed by an EU member state (country of origin), it has to notify 
all affected riparian states. The notifying state must provide the same information to the affected 
member state as it has made available nationally. The affected member state must consult its 
own public, allowing at least for 30 days for commenting on the environmental impact study. 
The results of these consultations then must be communicated to the country of origin. The 
affected riparian state may seek consultations with the country of origin that should be 
completed within a reasonable timeframe730. Importantly, the permitting authority of the 
country of origin must provide detailed reasons why the comments of the affected riparian 
state(s) have or have not been taken into consideration731.  
 
                                                          
727 Article 7, Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment. 
728 Annex I-II, ibid. 
729 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment 
of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. 
730 Article 7, ibid. 
731 Article 9.1, ibid. 
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This procedure more or less mirrors the Espoo Convention (described in detail below732). 
Importantly, however, in certain aspects the EU directive goes further than the Convention. For 
example, Directive 2011/92/EU contains an important guarantee for the involvement of the 
lower riparian states in case doubt arises as to the likelihood of transboundary impact. Unlike 
under the Espoo Convention, any potentially affected riparian state may trigger the consultation 
procedure at its own initiative, even if the country of origin fails to make a notification733. This 
removes any incentive for any country of origin to downplay the presence or the significance 
of transboundary impacts, a recurring feature of international EIAs relating to highly 
contentious projects. It also provides a shortcut vis-à-vis the cumbersome inquiry procedure 
foreseen by the Espoo Convention in cases of complacency or non-cooperation by the riparian 
of origin.  
 
b) UNECE law 
 
At first sight, the UNECE Water Convention seems to address the issue of prior notification of 
planned measures relatively lightly. The Convention calls upon riparian states to “provide for 
the widest exchange of information, as early as possible, on issues covered by the provision of 
[the] Convention”734. This obligation is specifically extended to “measures taken and planned 
to be taken to prevent, control and reduce transboundary impact”735. The Convention also 
foresees parties to undertake environmental impact assessment in their national authorisation 
schemes for water projects736. Moreover, it encourages them to set up bilateral or multilateral 
regimes and joint bodies so as to “serve as a forum for the exchange of information on existing 
and planned uses of water and related installations that are likely to cause transboundary 
impact” and “to participate in the implementation of environmental impact assessments relating 
to transboundary waters, in accordance with appropriate international regulations.”737. 
Consequently, the Convention basically refers the question of prior notification and 
consultation into the realm of international impact assessment procedure.  
 
                                                          
732 See section III.2.3.3.b) below. 
733 Article 7.1, Directive 2011/92/EU. 
734 Article 6, UNECE Water Convention. 
735 Article 13.1.d), ibid. 
736 Article 3.1.h), ibid. 
737 Article 9.2.h), j), ibid. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2019.003
166 
 
This partial approach was no doubt justifiable at the time of drafting the Convention by the fact 
that UNECE already had a specific horizontal instrument on transboundary EIAs in place. The 
so-called Espoo Convention, adopted in 1991, sets out precisely the procedure parties are 
required to follow in case where planned interventions are likely to trigger transboundary 
environmental consequences738. The procedure comprises the preparation of an environmental 
impact study (“assessment documentation”), the notification of the results of the environmental 
assessment to the affected riparian states and consultations upon request by the recipient 
state739.The state of origin must afford due consideration to the comments made by the recipient 
state and notify its final decision740. When there is a difference among the parties as to the 
likelihood of environmental impact – i.e. the party of origin fails to notify a project and denies 
the risk of transboundary impact – the affected party may trigger a mandatory fact finding 
mechanism through an inquiry commission741.   
 
Given the complementarity of the two regimes, the Espoo Convention provides a sufficient 
framework for prior notification and consultation with regards to water-related projects with a 
transboundary impact between UNECE countries742. Nevertheless, some authors have criticised 
the lack of an appropriate regime of prior notification within the UNECE Water Convention 
text as imprudent draftsmanship743. This shortcoming may indeed turn out to be a critical lacuna 
if the Convention is ratified by countries outside the UNECE region not bound by the Espoo 
regime.  
 
c) Multilateral basin treaties 
 
The relevant multilateral basin treaties address the issue of planned measures in a highly 
inconsistent fashion with no identifiable regulatory pattern. The earliest relevant instrument, 
the Elbe Convention covers planned measures only indirectly, in so far as it tasks the 
Commission for the Protection of the Elbe to “discuss planned […] types of utilisation of the 
waters which may have serious international repercussions, including hydraulic structures and 
                                                          
738 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25 February 1991. 
739 Articles 2-5, ibid. 
740 Article 6, ibid. 
741 Annex IV, ibid. 
742 UNECE (2013) op. cit. p. 53. 
743 MCCAFFREY (2016) op. cit. p. 39. While the shortcomings of the Water Convention in this respect do not 
amount to a regulatory gap in intra-EU water relations, they may indeed become a critical gap between countries 
that are party to the Water Convention, but do not apply the Espoo Convention.  
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regulation of the waters”744. The same language is contained in its sister agreement, the Oder 
Convention745. In a similar fashion, the Meuse Agreement mentions planned interventions only 
in relation to the responsibilities of the International Commission of the Meuse. The Agreement 
calls on the Commission to “strengthen the exchange of information and opinions […] 
concerning projects subject to environmental impact assessment […] that may have a 
significant transboundary impact”746. The Rhine Convention does not mention the issue even 
indirectly. These noticeable lacunas, however, do not have any practical importance as the 
relevant riparian states are either EU members or parties to the Espoo Convention.  
 
Against this background the Danube Convention constitutes as outlier in so far as it creates a 
sui generis basin-wide notification mechanism. The Convention specifically covers “planned 
activities […] and measures as far as they cause or are likely to cause transboundary impacts” 
and defines them very broadly747. These planned measures and activities have to be reported to 
the ICPDR748. If no other bilateral or multilateral mechanism is followed by the affected states, 
the affected riparian may request a consultation with the state of origin. As a general rule, such 
a consultation must take place in the framework of the ICPDR “with the aim to achieve a 
solution”749. During the consultation period authorisation of the project must be suspended. 
Should consultations fail to deliver a mutually acceptable solution within one year, the state of 
origin may go ahead with the project750. 
 
Even more rigorous is the Sava Framework Agreement. It considers cooperation over planned 
measures such a priority that it calls for the adoption of a specific protocol regulating the 
issuance of permits for installations and activities that “may have a transboundary impact on 
the integrity of the water regime”751. While such protocol has never been produced, the parties 
to the Framework Agreement can still rely on the procedures of the Danube Protection 
Convention, the Espoo Convention or (partially) EU law.  
 
                                                          
744 Article 2.1.k), Elbe Convention. 
745 Article 2.1.j), Oder Convention. 
746 Article 4.4.g), Accord international sur la Meuse.  
747 Article 3.2, Danube Convention. 
748 Article 10, ibid. 
749 Article 11.1, ibid. 
750 Article 11.2, ibid. 
751 Article 9.2, Sava Framework Agreement. 
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d) Bilateral water treaties 
 
Cooperation concerning planned measures has been a key feature of bilateral water treaties in 
Europe from the outset. Even, some of the earliest water frontier treaties required not only 
notification and consultation, but also the consent of the other riparian to major works that 
affected water quantity or quality in the relevant frontier catchment area752. More recent 
bilateral agreements also lay down precise notification and consultation requirements. For 
instance, the 1987 German-Austrian Agreement on cooperation with regards to the Danube 
basin defines the types of projects and works that are subject to prior notice. Parties are under 
an obligation to avoid or minimise adverse transboundary impacts and to endeavour to find a 
mutually acceptable solution should differences remain753.  
 
The Albufeira Convention submits the most relevant such projects to a transboundary 
environmental impact assessment procedure754. Parties must hold extensive consultations with 
regards to any planned measure with possible transboundary impact through the implementing 
commission of the Convention. Should parties fail to reach an agreement over the planned 
project any party may trigger the dispute settlement mechanism of the Convention755. The 
frontier waters agreement between Finland and Sweden also establishes a detailed notification 
and consultation procedure. No permit can be granted to major watercourse projects (i.e. hydro-
power plant, water transfer or regulation) with transboundary impacts before bilateral 
consultations have taken place with a view to finding a mutually acceptable outcome756. 
Importantly, in the national authorisation procedures the Agreement grants the same legal 
standing to the citizens and groups of the other riparian as those enjoyed by its own757.   
 
 
                                                          
752 See e.g. Article 2.1, Treaty Between the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Republic of Austria Concerning 
the Regulation of Water Economy Questions in the Frontier Region, Vienna, 9 April 1956; Article 3, Agreement 
between the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Government of the Polish People’s Republic 
Concerning the Use of the Water Resources in Frontier Water, Prague, 21 March 1958. 
753 Articles 2-4, Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Economic Community, 
on the one hand, and the Republic of Austria, on the other, on cooperation on management of water resources in 
the Danube Basin. 
754 Article 9, Annex II, Albufeira Convention. 
755 Article 8, 26, ibid. 
756 Article 20, Agreement between Finland and Sweden Concerning Transboundary Rivers, Stockholm, 11 
November 2009. 
757 Article 16, ibid. 
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III.2.3.4. Evaluation 
 
As regards cooperation over planned measures the provisions of the UNECE Water Convention 
or those of EU water law appear highly deficient when compared to those of the UN 
Watercourses Convention. This virtual regulatory lacuna, however, does not in any way 
compromise co-riparian relations within the EU since the issue is sufficiently regulated by the 
UNECE Espoo Convention and the EU’s environmental impact assessment directive. The same 
applies to the inconsistent coverage of prior notification and consultation procedures by the 
major European basin treaties. In summary: cooperation over planned measures with likely 
transboundary impact seems sufficiently regulated within the European Union at multiple 
layers. No hydropolitical risk can therefore be identified in this context. 
 
III.2.4. Managing hydrological variability  
 
III.2.4.1. The impact of variability management on hydropolitical resilience 
 
Fluctuation of flow quantities is an inherent feature of any natural river system, even in 
temperate basins characterised by modest intra-annual variability758. The variation of high and 
low water levels plays an important regulating role in riverine ecology and in traditional 
agriculture. On the other hand, a high degree of natural variability may also act as a precursor 
to transboundary water conflict. Rivers with outstanding hydrological variability and economic 
importance display a considerable tendency to trigger or contribute to political tensions among 
basin states. As Wolf et al. conclude “extreme events of conflicts were more frequent in 
marginal climates with highly variable hydrological conditions, while the riparians of rivers 
with less extreme natural conditions have been more moderate in their conflict/cooperation 
relationship”759.  
 
Consequently, managing hydrological variability can be a major challenge in co-riparian 
relations even at best of times. Given, however, the impacts of climate change on the 
hydrological cycle and human responses thereto (e.g. more irrigation in times of drought), 
controlling flow variability beyond previously recorded ranges will give rise to new levels of 
                                                          
758 See section I.1.4. above.  
759 WOLF, Aaron T, STAHL, Kerstin and MACOMBER, Marcia F. (2003): Conflict and cooperation within 
international river basins: The importance of institutional capacity, Water Resources Update 125, pp. 31-40, p. 31. 
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political difficulty all over the world. Not surprisingly, the question features high in recent 
hydropolitical analyses. In fact, based on a mathematical assessment Dinar et al. actually 
suggest that adaptation mechanisms for hydro-variability are one of the few key factors of 
resilience760. 
 
In the broadest sense of the word variability management is essentially about dealing with 
naturally occurring hydrological extremes, including floods, droughts and other specific 
variations761.  It must be pointed out that while both floods and droughts can be considered as 
hydrological extremes, their impacts on hydropolitics are quite different. Floods are typically 
short term events with a(n almost) mechanical knock-on effect on downstream riparians. The 
downstream motion of water can be predicted fairly precisely by widely available satellite-
based technologies. On mid- and downstream areas, where population density tends to be the 
highest, this allows authorities and citizens to choose the adequate level of protection. Droughts, 
on the other hand, do not follow precisely calculable patterns and can prolong through several 
months or years. Severe droughts trigger a variety of response measures by water managers, 
many of them actually resulting in the intensification of water use with severe impacts on water 
availability downstream. As a consequence, flood management features among the most 
“benign” collective action problems of shared river basins, while natural or man-made water 
shortages or scarcity tends to be the most powerful driver of transboundary conflict (Figure 3). 
Either way, variability management is closely linked to water quantity regulation. 
 
The potentially very broad range of measures dealing with hydrological variability in a 
transboundary context can be clustered as follows: 
- short term measures: 
- flexible water allocation mechanisms (e.g. water sharing based on percentages) 
that require the automatic adjustment of cross-border river flow to changes in 
water availability762, 
- domestic water management measures aimed to minimise the transboundary 
impacts of hydrological extremes (emergency use of reservoirs to store or 
release water, stricter irrigation procedures, etc.)763, 
                                                          
760 DINAR et al. (2014) op. cit. p. 20. 
761 Ibid p. 8. 
762 DRIESCHOVA et al. (2008) op.cit. p. 290. 
763 DE STEFANO et al. (2012) op. cit. p. 196. 
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- emergency communication and cooperation mechanisms (data collection and 
sharing, early warning, immediate consultations, mutual assistance among 
riparian states, etc.)764. 
 
- long term measures: 
- regular review of water allocation and relevant water uses765, 
- joint construction and/or operation of water infrastructure to increase water 
supply or store excess water766, 
- joint long-term planning for and management of hydrological extremes (e.g. 
transboundary flood risk mapping), 
- broadened cooperation with regards to issues that go beyond flow variability or 
the quantitative aspects of water767.  
 
III.2.4.2. Variability management in international water law 
 
Concerns about the natural variability of transboundary river flow are not a new phenomenon 
in international relations. As Drieschova et al. point out as early as in 1863 the Netherlands and 
Belgium made allocation of the water resources of the Meuse conditional on annual variability. 
Yet, until relatively lately neither water treaties nor academic research have paid sufficient 
attention to the issue. As a result, general international water law scarcely addresses variability 
management in any explicit fashion. Thus, the various principles of the UN Watercourses 
Convention – equitable and reasonable utilisation, the obligation not to cause significant harm 
and the obligation to cooperate – regulate the issue only indirectly. The principles imply the 
duty of watercourse states to manage hydrological extremes with due attention being paid to 
the interests of other riparians. (Indeed, it is suggested by some authors these principles have 
been formulated with intentional ambiguity on purpose so as to allow flexibility to meet 
unexpected changes in water availability and other conditions768). The Convention also calls on 
watercourse states to prevent and mitigate, individually and/or jointly, “harmful conditions”, 
e.g. floods, droughts or desertification that may have a negative impact on other riparian 
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766 DRIESCHOVA et al. (2008) op.cit. p. 290. 
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768 Ibid p. 285. 
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states769. When such conditions amount to an emergency situation, i.e. a sudden event actually 
or potentially causing serious harm to other watercourse states, the state of origin must 
immediately notify the (potentially affected) other riparians and take all practicable measures 
to prevent, mitigate or eliminate the harmful effects of the emergency770. Such emergency 
cooperation, however, does not apply to gradually unfolding events such as droughts and 
desertification. In a similar fashion, the SADC Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses 
addresses hydrological variability only marginally, calling on riparian states to act individually 
and/or jointly to prevent and mitigate harmful conditions resulting from such natural causes as 
floods, droughts or desertification771.  
 
As the scale of treaty area decreases, specific variability management schemes become more 
frequent. In fact, a studious review of 50 relevant basin treaties concluded between 1980 and 
2002 by Drieschova at al. found that 68% of the water agreements explicitly mention flow 
variability772. E.g. the Mekong Cooperation Agreement contains general and specific rules for 
water quantity management for the monsoonal wet and dry seasons773. In “cases of historically 
severe droughts and/or floods”, however, the application of regular allocation rules is 
suspended774. Such exceptionally severe hydrological events are subject to early notification 
and the mandatory involvement of the Joint Committee of the Mekong River Commission with 
a view to adopting appropriate remedial action775. The Charter of Waters of the Senegal River 
also foresees such consultation procedures in the event pre-fixed water allocations must be 
revisited due to floods, other natural disasters or water shortages of natural character776.  
 
Apparently, water treaties primarily concerned about water allocation are more likely to contain 
some kind of mechanisms to handle extreme flow variations. For instance the 1996 Ganges 
Treaty between India and Bangladesh calls for immediate consultations should the flow at the 
Farakka Dam at the border fall below a commonly agreed threshold so as “to make adjustments 
                                                          
769 Article 27, UN Watercourses Convention.  
770 Article 28, ibid.  
771 Article 3.4.a), SADC Revised Protocol. 
772 DRIESCHOVA et al. (2008) op. cit. p. 287. 
773 Articles 5 and 6, Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. 
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on an emergency basis, in accordance with the principles of equity, fair play and no harm to 
either party”777.  
 
III.2.4.3. Variability management in the European Union 
 
a) EU law 
 
EU water law addresses several facets of natural hydrological variability. In fact, one of the 
objectives of the EU’s core water legislation, the Water Framework Directive, is to contribute 
to mitigating the effects of floods and droughts778. Yet, the coverage of these phenomena by the 
WFD is far from being comprehensive, especially in a transboundary context. One major 
exception however stands out: the Floods Directive creates an elaborate system of flood risk 
mapping and management that pays particular attention to the vulnerabilities of downstream 
riparian states779. 
 
Following the above classification the measures aimed at managing hydrological variability in 
the EU’s existing legal toolbox can be summarised as follows. 
 
As regards short term management of hydrological extremes all that the WFD does is to create 
a temporary derogation from the obligation to comply with the objectives of good water status. 
These circumstances include in particular “extreme floods and prolonged droughts” or other 
conditions of natural cause or force majeure that are “exceptional or could not reasonably have 
been foreseen” 780. If a member state intends to invoke such derogation, it must, ironically, 
define in advance in the river basin management plan the conditions under which the 
“unforeseeable” emergency situation can be declared. It also must specify what measures will 
have to be taken under such circumstances781.  
 
As regards long term adaptation to hydrological variability the WFD goes several steps further. 
First, it imposed an obligation on member states to undertake a detailed analysis of the main 
                                                          
777 Article II, Treaty between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh on sharing of the Ganga/Ganges waters at Farakka, New Delhi, 21 December 1996. 
778 Article 1.e), WFD. 
779 Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment 
and management of flood risks. 
780 Article 4.6, WFD. 
781 Article 4.6.b), c), WFD. 
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characteristics of each river basin by 2004 that had to contain an analysis of all relevant water 
uses, human and natural impacts on river flow and groundwater status, including 
abstractions782. Ever since Member states have been required to continuously monitor any 
developments in these factors, including the volume and rate or level of flow783. The impacts 
of natural and man-made fluctuations in stream flow had to be reviewed by 2014 and 
appropriate adaptation measures had to be included in the revised river basin management 
plans and programme of measures784. The coordination framework of the WFD, however, 
ensures not only the collection and exchange of information among EU member states on 
hydrological variability in shared basins. Through the consultation procedures in the context of 
international river basins it also provides an (limited) opportunity to influence each other’s 
plans and measures to manage existing and emerging hydrological extremes.  
 
Finally, EU law lays down sophisticated transboundary cooperation mechanisms in relation to 
floods. The so-called “Floods Directive” sets up a scheme that complements the ecological 
programme of the WFD with regards to flood risk management. The Directive is not concerned 
with short term emergency cooperation among riparian states. Rather, it obliges member states 
to assess, develop and coordinate their flood control activity with a long term and 
comprehensive focus. Thus, EU governments are required to carry out a preliminary flood risk 
assessment and, subsequently, to establish flood hazard and flood risk maps785. Based on these 
maps member states must adopt flood risk management plans that are coordinated at basin or 
at least sub-basin level786. The Directive requires flood risk management plans to address all 
aspects of flood management from prevention to emergency preparedness. The plans may also 
contain long term national adaptation measures such as the promotion of sustainable land use 
practices, improvement of water retention or controlled emergency flooding787. Importantly, 
the Directive prohibits member states to adopt measures that are liable to significantly increase 
flood risks upstream or downstream in the same basin, unless it has been specifically agreed 
upon by the affected riparians788. As in the case of international river basins, member states 
must, as a priority, produce a single flood risk management plan or a set of coordinated plans 
                                                          
782 Article 5, Annex II, WFD. 
783 Article 8, WFD. 
784 Article 5, Annex VII, WFD. Also see EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009): River basin management in a changing 
climate, CIS guidance document No. 24, Luxembourg.   
785 Articles 4-6, Directive 2007/60/EC. 
786 Article 7.1, ibid. 
787 Article 7.3, ibid. 
788 Article 7.4, ibid. 
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for the entire basin. Should the riparian states concerned fail to deliver joint plan(s), the 
Directive simply calls on individual member states to produce their own flood risk management 
plan. A similar procedure applies vis-à-vis basin states outside the EU with the difference, 
however, that member must only “endeavour” to arrive at a single plan with fellow co-riparians 
that are not bound by the Directive789.  
 
b) UNECE law 
 
The UNECE Water Convention does not directly address variability management. Nonetheless, 
it contains a number of obligations that require riparian states to cooperate with respect 
hydrological extremes. In addition, during the past two decades the Convention bodies have 
developed a number of soft-law documents that provide guidance to manage the various 
impacts of climate change, the primary driver of increasing hydrological variability in the 
European Union. While the latter instruments are legally non-binding, they are seen to 
contribute significantly to controlling the hydropolitical risks relating to intensifying river flow 
fluctuations790.  
 
The starting point under the Convention is the general obligation to prevent, control and reduce 
transboundary impact791. Transboundary impact is defined as “significant adverse effect […] 
caused by a human activity” (emphasis added). Yet, the progressive reading of the Convention 
text and two decades of practice confirm that the impacts of naturally occurring hydrological 
extremes also fall under this obligation as, eventually, human acts and omissions contribute to 
the occurrence, magnitude or the damage potential of these phenomena792. Hand in hand with 
the prevention/mitigation obligation goes the general duty of riparian states to cooperate on a 
multitude of water management issues, such as the joint monitoring and regular assessment of 
transboundary impacts (including the quantity of transboundary waters, floods and ice drifts)793 
or the early exchange of information794. Also, in their basin treaties and/or bilateral 
arrangements riparian states have to establish warning and alarm procedures as well as 
                                                          
789 Article 8, ibid. 
790 BERNARDINI (2015) op. cit. p. 43-44. 
791 Articles 1.2, 2.1, UNECE Water Convention. 
792 KOLLIOPOULOS, Alexandros (2015): The UNECE Model Provisions on Transboundary Flood Management. In 
TANZI, Attila et al. (Eds.): The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes – Its Contribution to International Water Cooperation, Leiden, Boston, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 
367-378, p. 369. 
793 Article 4, 9.2, 11.1, 13.3, UNECE Water Convention. 
794 Article 6, 13.1, ibid. 
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contingency plans that cover hydrological extremes795. In case of critical situations parties are 
under a duty to assist each other following the procedures laid down by the Convention796.  
 
In addition to the above general framework, the various Convention bodies have adopted a 
range of soft-law instruments that provide further assistance to basin states as to the short and 
long term management of hydrological variability. First and foremost, the 2009 guidance 
document on water and climate adaptation is designed to assist states to tackle a range of 
climate change-related water issues in a transboundary context, including flood and drought 
mitigation and response797. Equally important are the UNECE Model Provisions on 
Transboundary Flood Management798, endorsed by the Meeting of the Parties in 2006, that 
provide a concrete legislative text that can be used by riparian states in their specific basin-wide 
or bilateral arrangements to tackle the challenges of transboundary flood control. The Model 
Provisions follow a similar logic as the EU’s Floods Directive, but, unlike the former, they also 
cover short term risk assessment and emergence response799.  
 
c) Multilateral basin treaties 
 
Despite its primary ecological focus, the Danube Convention contains a number of substantive 
and procedural provisions that help riparian states address hydrological variability in a 
systematic and structured fashion. The preamble to the Convention directs specific attention to 
“the occurrence and threats of adverse effects, in the short and the long term, of changes in 
conditions of watercourses within the Danube River Basin” (emphasis added)800. It follows that 
the primary obligation of Danubian states is to cooperate in the prevention, control and 
reduction of transboundary “adverse impacts and changes occurring or likely to be caused”801. 
Joint action thus extends not only to man-made transboundary impacts, but must also 
encompass the monitoring and evaluation of the natural water household and all of its 
components (precipitation, evaporation, surface and groundwater run-off) in the entire basin802. 
From this general objective flow a number of precisely defined obligations. First, riparian states 
                                                          
795 Article 3.1, 9.2, 14, ibid. 
796 Article 15, ibid. 
797 UNECE (2009): Guidance on Water and Adaptation to Climate Change, Geneva. Also see BERNARDINI (2015) 
op. cit. p. 44. 
798 Model Provisions on Transboundary Flood Management, ECE/MP.WAT/2006/4.  
799 KOLLIOPOULOS (2015) op. cit. p. 369. 
800 Second Recital, Preamble, Danube Convention. 
801 Article 5.2, Danube Convention. 
802 Article 1.c.g), ibid. 
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must monitor, record and assess, jointly and individually, the conditions of the Danube’s natural 
water resources through a number of quantitative parameters, including water balances, flood 
forecasts or any change in the riverine regime803. Second, under the general obligation to 
prevent, control and reduce transboundary impacts riparian states are obliged to exchange all 
relevant data, including the operation of existing hydrotechnical constructions (e.g. reservoirs, 
water power plants) and measures aimed at preventing the deterioration of hydrological 
conditions, erosion, inundations and sediment flow, etc.804 Regular exchange of information 
must be supplemented by coordinated or joint communication, warning and alarm systems as 
well as emergency plans to address critical water conditions, including floods and ice-
hazards805. Should such a critical situation of riverine conditions arise, riparian states must 
provide mutual assistance upon the request of the affected basin state806. 
 
The daughter treaty of the Danube Convention, the Sava Framework Agreement goes even 
further when it comes to managing hydrological variability. The Agreement specifically refers 
to droughts and water shortages as critical hazards jeopardising the integrity of the water regime 
of the river807. It therefore calls upon riparian states to establish a coordinated or joint system 
of “measures, activities and alarms in the Sava River Basin for extraordinary impacts on the 
water regime, such as […] discharge of artificial accumulations and retentions caused by 
collapsing or inappropriate handling, flood, ice, drought, water shortage […]” (emphasis 
added)808. To that effect, parties even committed themselves to conclude a special protocol “on 
the protection against flood, excessive groundwater, erosion, ice hazards, drought and water 
shortages”809. Out of this ambitious variability management programme, however, only a 
protocol on flood management cooperation was adopted by the riparian states in 2010810. This 
protocol, on the one hand, provides for the coordinated implementation of the EU’s Floods 
Directive in the basin (even though half of the riparian states are not EU members)811. On the 
other hand, in creates an operative system of flood defence, comprising forecasting, warning 
                                                          
803 Articles 5.2.a) and 9.1, ibid. 
804 Articles 3.2 and 12, ibid. 
805 Article 16, ibid. 
806 Article 17, ibid. 
807 Articles 2.1, 13, Sava Framework Agreement. 
808 Article 13.1, ibid. 
809 Article 30.1.a), ibid. 
810 Protocol on Flood Protection to the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin, Gradiška, 1 June  2010. 
811 Articles 3-8, ibid. 
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and alarm, information exchange as well as the handling of emergency situations and mutual 
assistance812.  
 
The Rhine Convention addresses variability management along similar lines, although in a far 
less elaborate fashion. The key objectives of the Convention – the maintenance and restoration 
of the natural functions of the Rhine basin waters, the environmentally sound management of 
water resources and general flood protection and prevention – imply the broad cooperation over 
flood protection and other hydrological hazards813. Thus, riparian states must inform the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine and other riparian states likely to be 
affected of imminent flooding814. They must also draw up warning and alert plans for the Rhine 
under the coordination by the Commission815. As mentioned above, Rhine basin states also 
actively cooperate on certain long term variability questions such as extreme low water levels 
and declining water availability even in the absence of explicit treaty requirements to that 
effect816.  
 
The Meuse Agreement defines the mitigation of the effects of floods and droughts as one of the 
key objectives of transboundary cooperation817. In both cases joint riparian action should extend 
to the development of preventive measures818. To that end, the International Meuse Commission 
is tasked to develop recommendations on flood prevention and protection, flood management 
coordination as well as on the mitigation of the effects of droughts819. The Meuse riparians are 
also obliged to inform each other of any major hydrological events, including imminent 
floods820. 
 
The 1990 Elbe and the 1996 Oder Conventions make no reference whatsoever to hydrological 
variability, not even flood protection cooperation. The two basin commissions are, however, 
tasked to monitor the general hydrological situation in their respective catchment areas821. 
 
                                                          
812 Articles 9-11, ibid. 
813 Article 3, Rhine Convention. 
814 Article 5.6, ibid. 
815 Article 8.1.c), ibid. 
816 See section III.2.1.3.c) above. 
817 Seventh and eight recitals, Preamble, Accord International sur la Meuse. 
818 Article 2.c), ibid. 
819 Article 4.4.a), b), ibid. 
820 Article 3.2.d), ibid. 
821 Article 2, Elbe Convention; Article 2, Oder Convention. 
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While explicit treaty justification to do so remains limited or entire missing, all relevant river 
basin commissions are extensively engaged in climate change adaptation and flood 
management. E.g. the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube adopted, in 
2012, a climate change strategy which outlines the guiding principles of adaptation and their 
integration in the ICPDR’s activities, especially in implementing the Water Framework 
Directive and the Floods Directive. Similar strategies have been adopted for the Rhine or in 
progress for the Sava basin822. 
 
d) Bilateral water treaties 
 
The most comprehensive of all bilateral water treaties, the Albufeira Convention addresses 
hydrological variability in a substantive and sophisticated manner. The Convention expressly 
defines the prevention, elimination, mitigation or control of the effects of exceptional situations 
as a key priority of cooperation between the Spain and Portugal823. Consequently, the 
Convention sets out a robust water allocation regime that caters for natural variations in river 
flow that also include extreme situations. (Extremes hydrological situations are determined with 
reference to historic precipitation levels)824.  Should such a situation emerge, parties must 
inform each other and the joint Commission and exchange all relevant information825. The 
Convention also sets out concrete substantive measures parties must implement in case of 
floods and droughts. With regards to floods the applicable regime goes further than the usual 
forecasting-warning-emergency-preparedness provisions most regional or bilateral similar 
regimes contain. It also gives upper and lower riparian states a right to demand the other party 
to implement pre-defined (or any other) interventions that are necessary to prevent, control or 
mitigate the effects of floods826. Even more elaborate are the measures relating to droughts and 
water scarcity. In this context the Convention defines a set of concrete drought management 
measures to prevent and control the effects of low precipitation and discharge. These relate to 
water demand control (abstractions for consumption), infrastructure management 
(impoundment, storage and release), waste water discharges, etc.827 The conditions of 
exceptional situations – both floods and droughts – are to be defined for every two years and 
                                                          
822 JEKEL (2015) op. cit. p. 247. 
823 Article 10.1.f), Albufeira Convention. 
824 Annex II to the Additional Protocol, Albufeira Convention.  
825 Article 11, Albufeira Convention. 
826 Article 18.5, ibid. 
827 Article 19.2, ibid. 
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subsequently reviewed. The Convention also calls for the joint study of water scarcity and 
floods with a view to long term prevention and mitigation828. 
 
Several other European bilateral water treaties make some reference to cooperation over flood 
prevention and protection. Most of these treaty provisions are, however, relatively basic, 
reinstating the general will or duty of the parties to cooperate and/or referring the subject to the 
activities of the joint commissions829. In a limited number of cases bilateral water treaties 
contain substantive obligations parties must observe in flood protection or other emergency 
situations. E.g. the Hungarian-Ukrainian frontier water treaty requires parties to refrain from 
permitting any interventions that may raise flood volumes above previously agreed-upon levels. 
In the spirit of solidarity riparian states are also obliged to provide technical assistance in times 
of exceptional floods upon demand (the costs of such technical assistance is to be borne by the 
beneficiary)830. As opposed to flood protection the management of droughts rarely features in 
bilateral water treaties. Exceptions are those bilateral agreements that are primarily concerned 
with transboundary flow regimes or water allocation anyway. Thus, as mentioned above, the 
1991 Discharge Rule between upstream Finland and downstream Russia for the Vuoksi river 
basin calls on riparian states to maintain the flow quantity of the river in a “normal zone”, 
defined by the Rule with reference to historically prevailing natural flow volumes. Should 
extreme low water levels appear discharge rates must be changed by Finland with a view to 
minimising adverse effects831. The 1970 amendment of the 1958 French-Spanish Agreement 
regarding the Lake Lanoux also takes into account natural flow variations, although it does not 
specifically address droughts or floods. The allocation regime calls for the increased discharged 
towards Spain in the summer months “in order to take account of the evaporation from the 
enlarged surface area of the Lake”832. 
 
 
                                                          
828 Articles 18.7 and 19.5, ibid. 
829 Article 2.1.b), Agreement between Finland and Sweden Concerning Transboundary Rivers; Articles 2.2.b) and 
6, Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Economic Community, on the one 
hand, and the Republic of Austria, on the other, on cooperation on management of water resources in the Danube 
Basin. 
830 Articles 9.1 and 9.4, Convention between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of 
Ukraine on water management questions relating to frontier waters, Budapest, 11 November, 1997. 
831 See section III.2.1.3.d) above.  
832 Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement between France and Spain Amending the Arrangement of 12 
July 1958 relating to Lake Lanoux, 27 January1970. 
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III.2.4.4. Evaluation 
 
The four layers of European water law regulate an important aspect of variability management, 
notably flood prevention and protection at an exemplary level of sophistication. Given the high 
number of catastrophic inundations most international basins witnessed only during this 
millennium, the complementary regimes of the EU Floods Directive, the UNECE Model 
Provisions and the extensive cooperation at basin and bilateral level seem to constitute an 
adequate response to the collective action problems posed by excess water levels. 
Consequently, insufficient cross-border collaboration with regards to river floods is unlikely to 
result in major political tensions in the European continent.  
 
Less positive is the picture when it comes to long term adaptation to hydrological extremes, 
especially prolonged droughts. Here, the systematic review of the main characteristics of each 
basin, as foreseen by the Water Framework Directive, ensures that riparian states address 
changing hydrological conditions on regular and substantive basis. Also, it allows riparian states 
to have an impact on the joint river basin management plans and, to a lesser extent, on each 
other’s programmes of measures. Yet, neither EU and UNECE law, nor basin treaties call for 
real adaptation interventions. The various climate change adaptation strategies developed by 
the river basin organisations only provide general guidance as to future measures and do not 
address the potential of political risks prolonged droughts are likely to pose in transboundary 
relations. 
 
Finally, European water law addresses the short term consequences of prolonged low river 
flows only marginally. Undoubtedly, the basic principles of transboundary water cooperation 
(equitable and reasonable utilisation and the no-harm rule) together with the various 
information exchange and notification procedures provide a basic framework to address such 
critical situations. These, however, do not provide any operative guidance to riparian states as 
to the immediate adaptation measures to be taken, including adjustments in transboundary flow 
allocation. This shortcoming can, in part, be explained by the fact that hitherto basin-wide 
extreme droughts have been relatively rare (apart from the Iberian Peninsula), so there was no 
real need and political will to address the contentious issue of national water use restrictions or 
curtailing transboundary flows. In part, however, the root of the problem lies in the notoriously 
complacent approach of EU law and decision-makers vis-à-vis the question of transboundary 
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water allocation833. This regulatory lacuna and political timidity may in the future prove a 
critical hydropolitical risk, if droughts and scarcity continue to intensify in a transboundary 
context as projected.  
 
III.2.5. Conflict resolution  
 
III.2.5.1. Conflict resolution mechanisms and hydropolitical resilience 
 
Conflict resolution mechanisms834 are key institutional components of hydropolitical resilience. 
They provide a means of settling differences over the interpretation or implementation of the 
relevant governance scheme. They may also serve as a forum for discussing issues that are not 
envisaged in the underlying legal framework835. The sheer presence of a conflict resolution 
mechanism, however, is not a mechanical indicator of hydropolitical stability. In fact, a recent 
study by Dinar et al. found a surprising absence of formal dispute settlement procedures in the 
many of the highly cooperative co-riparian relationships and a higher number of such 
mechanisms in conflict-prone basins. This suggests that it is those regions that incorporate 
conflict resolutions mechanisms in their treaties that expect to be in conflictive situations836. 
Moreover, there is also an observable tendency to avoid recourse to conflict resolution 
mechanisms by riparian states even where they do exist. As Johan Lammers, a renowned 
scholar and water diplomat, notes in the context of the UNECE Water Convention: “experience 
has shown that Parties are often not inclined to bring cases against one another, particularly 
when the case does not directly affect them individually, or when they find themselves in a 
similar situation”837. 
 
Naturally, conflict resolution mechanisms are not a speciality of water treaties, but a 
cornerstone of general international law and politics. Consequently, transboundary water law 
heavily draws on the institutional solutions developed over the centuries in the broader context 
of interstate relations. International practice differentiates between a number of soft, hard and 
alternative mechanisms of resolving conflicts. These include:  
                                                          
833 See section III.2.1.4. above. 
834 The terms “conflict” and “dispute” will be used interchangeably for the purposes of this analysis, irrespective 
of the existence of divergent interpretations in the relevant conflict resolution literature.  
835 DE STEFANO et al. (2012) op. cit. p. 198. 
836 DINAR et al. (2014) op. cit. p. 21. 
837 LAMMERS, Johan G. (2014): The Helsinki Water Convention: A New Implementation Mechanism and 
Committee, Environmental Policy and Law 44/1-2, pp. 117-224, p. 119. 
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- negotiations (involving only the affected parties), 
- enquiry and fact-finding (a third party is engaged to clarify the facts underlying the 
dispute), 
- mediation, conciliation, good offices (a third party is engaged with a view to facilitating 
the adoption of a mutually acceptable solution), 
- arbitration (upon the joint request of the parties an independent arbitrator or a body of 
arbitrators renders a binding decision or award based on the legal argumentation of the 
parties), 
- litigation (upon the request by one or all parties an established court renders a binding 
decision on the legal argumentation of the parties). 
 
In the past decades additional avenues of conflict prevention and settlement have emerged, 
dominantly in the form of compliance and implementation mechanisms developed under 
international human rights and environmental law838. While these treaty-based mechanisms 
differ greatly, they normally perform four major functions: gathering of performance review 
information, consideration of instances of non-compliance, response to instances of non-
compliance (assistance or penalties) and the formal resolution of disputes839.  
 
III.2.5.2. Mechanisms of transboundary water conflict resolution in international law 
 
The general obligation of states to settle their disputes peacefully stems from UN Charter840. 
The Charter also enumerates a number of mechanisms states may seize in their effort to resolve 
their differences pacifically. These include “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice”841. While countries remain free to choose the means of settlement 
that best suit their specific circumstances, they are not free to undertake any action that might 
aggravate the situation842.  
 
                                                          
838 BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, Laurence (2013b): Dispute Settlement Procedures and Fresh Water: Multiplicity 
and Diversity at Stake. In BOSCHIERO, Nerina et al. (Eds.): International Courts and the Development of 
International Law, The Hague, TCM Asser, pp.109-120, p. 113-115. 
839 UNEP (2007b): Compliance Mechanisms under Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Nairobi, p. 
10-12. 
840 Article 2.3, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945. 
841 Article 33.1, ibid. 
842 SHAW, Malcolm N. (2003): International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 918 
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In that spirit the UN Watercourses Convention regulates dispute settlement extensively. In the 
first place, it calls upon states to resolve their differences over the interpretation or application 
of the Convention by way of negotiations. Should negotiations fail to materialise or produce a 
mutually acceptable outcome, the affected riparians may jointly seek the involvement of a third 
party, be it a mediator, conciliator or any joint basin organisation843. Alternatively, if no 
agreement is reached after six months following the request for negotiations, any of the parties 
affected may trigger an investigation by a mandatory fact-finding commission. This 
commission has broad investigative powers to establish the facts of the dispute and to formulate 
recommendations as it sees fit for the resolution of the dispute in an equitable manner844. While 
such recommendations are not legally binding, the parties concerned are required to “consider 
[them] in good faith”845. Finally, parties may accept the mandatory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal established in accordance with the detailed 
rules laid down by the Convention846. While most of the mechanisms outlined by the 
Convention are standard treaty practice, the mandatory fact-finding mechanism represents a 
true outlier. The choice of the Convention’s draftsmen to include this procedure was celebrated 
by some authors as a progressive step towards mandatory dispute settlement. It was also 
criticised, however, as a major deterrent against ratification, contributing to the grossly delayed 
entry into force of the Convention847.  
 
Major regional and basin treaties also contain provisions on dispute settlement. The SADC 
Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses provides for a mandatory court procedure before the 
Tribunal established under the Treaty on the Southern African Development Community, 
should parties fail to resolve their dispute under the Protocol through non-judicial means848. 
The Statute of the River Uruguay between Argentina and Uruguay also provides for mandatory 
judicial settlement by way of stipulating the automatic jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice849. Before seizing the Court, however, the riparian states must attempt to resolve the 
issue through the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay and, subsequently, direct 
negotiations850. The Mekong Cooperation Agreement also places the relevant basin 
                                                          
843 Article 33.2, UN Watercourses Convention. 
844 Article 33.2-8, UN Watercourses Convention. 
845 Article 33.8, UN Watercourses Convention. 
846 Article 33.10, Annex, UN Watercourses Convention. 
847 TANZI and CONTARTESE (2015) op. cit. p. 325. 
848 Article 7.1, SADC Revised Protocol.  
849 Article 60, Statute of the River Uruguay. 
850 Articles 58, 59, ibid. 
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organisation, the Joint Committee of the Mekong River Commission, at the centre of dispute 
settlement851. If the Joint Committee fails to find a solution to the disagreement, the duty to find 
a peaceful outcome falls back on the governments concerned. The parties may, by mutual 
agreement, also request the assistance of mediators and “proceed according to the principles of 
international law”852. 
 
III.2.5.3. Dispute settlement in the European Union 
 
a) EU law 
 
The EU maintains the world’s most effective supranational legal enforcement mechanisms. The 
most important sui generis enforcement procedure within the European Union is the so-called 
infringement procedure. This procedure can be initiated by the European Commission for any 
given infraction of EU law by any member state. It can lead to the condemnation of the erring 
state by the European Court of Justice and the eventual imposition of significant financial 
penalties853. This procedure, however, works top-down between the Commission and the 
member state concerned since it is not designed and capable of handling intra-EU disputes 
adequately. In fact, member states may also signal alleged instances of non-compliance by other 
member states to the Commission which can take up and investigate the matter. If this relates 
to an EU law compliance issue that also happens to be a subject of a bilateral dispute between 
two (or more member) states – e.g. persistent transboundary water pollution – the 
Commission’s intervention may eventually solve the interstate problem too. Recourse to this 
avenue for the purposes of dispute settlement, however, can yield success only in a limited 
range of cases. In the first place, the actual problem must relate to clearly identifiable provisions 
of EU law. Since these are predominantly concerned with water quality questions or certain 
(non-sanctioned) cooperation procedures, the restricted material scope of the infringement 
procedure automatically omits the most pertinent types of transboundary disputes such as those 
relating to allocation, short term variability management, etc.854 Moreover, the Commission has 
no obligation whatsoever to take up the matter and investigate it in full. This is a critical 
consideration since the Commission is traditionally reluctant to engage in the bilateral legal 
                                                          
851 Article 34, Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. 
852 Article 35, ibid. 
853 Articles 258, 260, TFEU. 
854 See section II.2.3.6. above. 
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disputes of member states whose prime subject is not a gross violation of EU law855. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that the infringement procedure will ever emerge as a mechanism 
that can be readily triggered to solve transboundary water disputes.  
 
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union a member state can also sue 
another member state directly before the European Court of Justice856. This procedure, 
however, suffers from a series of structural shortcomings that render such avenue almost 
completely ineffective. First of all, prior to seizing the Court, the applicant member state must 
submit the matter to the Commission for pre-litigious consideration. Thus, only if the 
Commission fails to take over the case within three months, can the applicant member state 
proceed with the case to the Court. The latter, however, also implies that the Commission is not 
convinced of the legal (or political) merit of the case, so it is likely to intervene in the procedure 
against the applicant member states, reducing the chances of success dramatically. Finally, 
member states themselves are very reluctant to challenge each other directly under EU law. 
Therefore, not only are such cases extremely rare (only four such judgements have been 
delivered since 1958), they are also regarded as politically unfriendly gestures and a legally 
risky enterprise857. 
 
Mention can also be made of the so-called preliminary ruling procedure which concerns the 
abstract interpretation of EU law by the European Court of Justice upon the initiative of a 
national court. It cannot be excluded that a particular question submitted by the national judge 
to the ECJ is also subject to a water-related dispute by two (or more) EU basin states858. In such 
a specific case the verdict of the ECJ can significantly contribute to the resolution of the 
problem. Nevertheless, such an eventuality is likely to remain extremely rare. As outlined 
above, the range of EU provisions that directly relate to the most contentious transboundary 
water problems is inherently narrow. Thus, in the first place, apart from certain water quality 
issues, it is difficult to find a question that would make an adequate subject of preliminary 
ruling. Second, even if such a question can be isolated, the national judge can only engage the 
                                                          
855 As information on individual infringement cases in the prejudicial phase of the procedure are disclosed by the 
European Commission only sporadically, this statement can be best corroborated by the general infringement 
statistics of the Commission and the case law of the European Court of Justice. These two sources do not identify 
a single case where the Commission voluntarily took over an explicit bilateral dispute between member states. 
Also see section II.2.3.5. points a) and b) above. 
856 Article 259, TFEU. 
857 BARANYAI (2015) op. cit. p. 99. 
858 See section II.2.3.5. point b) above. 
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ECJ, if he or she identifies profound and hitherto unresolved uncertainties as to the proper 
meaning of the legal provision that is (also) the subject of the transboundary water dispute. But 
transboundary water disputes usually emerge not because the erring state is unable to correctly 
construe e.g. an important definition of the Water Framework Directive, rather, because of 
actual implementation gaps. The evaluation of implementation gaps, however, cannot become 
the subject of preliminary ruling by the ECJ (as they belong to the infringement procedure). 
Third, a preliminary ruling procedure presupposes the existence of a judicial process before a 
national court of law. Since EU member states cannot directly sue each other before national 
courts for non-compliance with EU law – that would pre-empt the prerogatives of the ECJ under 
Article 259 of the TFEU – any such procedure can only be triggered by a proxy actor (e.g. a 
like-minded NGO). Yet, even if the aggrieved state finds a suitable proxy to act before a 
national court (preferably one located in the erring riparian), the applicant in that national 
procedure can only propose recourse to preliminary ruling by the ECJ, but cannot compel the 
judge to do so. Consequently, even where the aggrieved riparian can identify an EU legal issue 
that can actually be transformed into a litigation before a national court by a proxy actor with 
adequate standing, its actual influence on the progression of the case – let alone the procedure 
before the ECJ – remains close to zero. Of course, it may exceptionally happen that an EU 
riparian state maliciously orchestrates such legal action to cause nuisance to the other basin 
state. Overall, however, the very design of the preliminary ruling procedure will always render 
it an unsuitable avenue to resolve transboundary water disputes.  
 
The inherent weaknesses of bilateral conflict resolution under general EU law are not corrected 
in the context of transboundary water issues either. Under the Water Framework Directive a 
member state that has identified “an issue that has an impact on the management of its waters 
but cannot be resolved by that member state” – a euphemistic description of a transboundary 
problem – may report to “any other member state concerned”859. Such “other member state”, 
however, is not obliged to engage in any meaningful dialogue to resolve the problem. 
Alternatively, the WFD also allows member states to refer all potential interpretative or 
implementation differences to the European Commission860. Under this quasi mediation 
procedure all the Commission is required to do is to “respond” to the submission within six 
months (such “response” has no legal effect whatsoever). This procedure has been rightly 
                                                          
859 Article 12, WFD.   
860 Ibid. 
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criticised as lacking any enforcement power, with no reported instance of recourse to it as yet861. 
Given the European Commission’s well-known reluctance to engage in the bilateral disputes of 
EU member states, the soft good offices procedure is unlikely to ever fulfil the role of a 
meaningful water dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
Finally, EU law effectively bars member states from recourse to judicial settlement under 
multilateral treaties (e.g. the UNECE Water Convention or basin treaties ratified by the EU). 
Most international water treaties allow parties to accept the ultimate jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal to resolve their disputes. Yet, EU member 
states can undertake these kind of general submissions only vis-à-vis non-EU countries. This 
restriction flows from the expansive jurisprudence by the European Court of Justice aiming to 
safeguard its monopoly to interpret EU law. In the landmark Mox Plant case – that concerned 
a dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom under the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Seas – the Court concluded in 2006 that EU member states cannot trigger the dispute 
settlement mechanisms of international treaties to which the EU is a party. Recourse to such 
external settlement mechanisms for intra-EU affairs – goes the verdict – would “create a 
manifest risk that the jurisdictional order laid down by the Treaties and, consequently, the 
autonomy of the [EU] legal system may be adversely affected”862. As a result, member states’ 
freedom to use established international judicial mechanisms to settle disputes among 
themselves is limited to issues that can in no way be connected to the application of EU law863 
(as it happened e.g. in the Rhine chloride arbitration between Netherlands and France)864. Even 
in such narrow pool of cases, however, member states are required to inform and consult the 
European Commission before any submission is made to any non-EU judicial mechanism865. 
While the Mox Plant case applies squarely to binding mechanisms of dispute settlement, 
uncertainties still remain as to the legal impacts of the judgement on non-binding mechanisms 
                                                          
861 KEESSEN, Andrea M., VAN KEMPEN, Jasper and VAN RIJSWICK, Helena (2008): Transnational river basin 
management in Europe, Utrecht Law Review 4 pp. 35-56, 21 p. 
862 C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland, ECR 2006, I-04635. 
863 SZABÓ, Marcel (2008): The Mox Plant Case: the way towards Euro-chauvinism? In BÁNDI, Gyula (Ed.): The 
Impact of ECJ Jurisprudence on Environmental Law, Budapest, Szent István Társulat, pp. 143-166, p.152-153. 
864 The Rhine Chlorides Arbitration concerning the Auditing of Accounts (Netherlands-France), 12 March 2004, 
PCA Award Series 2008. Here, while the underlying treaty – the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine 
against Pollution by Chlorides – is concerned with a par excellence water pollution issue (thus subject to EU law), 
the actual dispute revolved around the correct interpretation of its 1991 Additional Protocol on the financial 
obligations of the riparian states.  
865 C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland, ECR 2006, I – 4657, para 179-182. 
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such as negotiations, conciliation, meditation or the activity of the Implementation Committee 
of the UNECE Water Convention866.  
 
In summary: EU law fails to provide effective mechanisms for the resolution of transboundary 
water disputes. At the same time it deprives member states from the use of important dispute 
settlement mechanisms under international law. What it offers instead is a set of procedures 
almost completely left to the initiative and judgement of the European Commission867.  
 
b) UNECE law 
 
The UNECE Water Convention foresees regular consultations between the parties as well as 
provides for the establishment of joint bodies as a primary forum of co-riparian communication 
and cooperation868. These provisions are meant to ensure the prevention of major transboundary 
water disputes. Should, however, such disputes nonetheless arise, parties are called upon to 
settle the matter through negotiations or “any other means of dispute settlement acceptable to 
the parties”869. The Convention does not define any further mandatory steps. However, it allows 
parties to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal to 
be established under the Convention for disputes not resolved through non-judicial channels870. 
By a decision of the Meeting of the Parties in 2013 an additional body: the Implementation 
Committee was established to complement traditional mechanisms of conflict prevention and 
resolution871. The Implementation Committee provides parties with further means to deal with 
alleged breaches of obligations stemming from the Convention combining features of 
mediation, conciliation or simple advisory assistance872. While to some extent the judicial 
procedures and the implementation review process can have overlapping elements, Attila Tanzi, 
monographer of the issue and member of the Implementation Committee, underlines the 
complementarity of the two systems: “non-compliance procedures are not formal and strict 
procedures aimed at breaches of [obligations] and related legal responsibility, but rather flexible 
means aimed at providing assistance to parties in addressing problems of implementation and 
                                                          
866 See section III.2.5.3.b) below. 
867 BARANYAI (2015) op. cit. p. 99. 
868 Articles 12, 9.2, UNECE Water Convention. 
869 Article 22.1, ibid. 
870 Article 22.2, ibid. 
871 Decision III/2 on the review of compliance with the Protocol, ECE/MP.EIA/23.Add.3-
ECE/MP.EIA/SEA/7.Add.3 
872 TANZI and CONTARTESE (2015) op. cit. p. 326. 
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compliance”873. In conclusion: UNECE water law provides parties with a full menu of soft and 
proper legal mechanisms to avoid and/or resolve transboundary water conflicts. 
 
c) Multilateral basin treaties 
 
The Elbe Convention and the Oder Convention do not contain dispute settlement clauses. This 
obvious shortcoming may be due to the fact that, formally speaking, both conventions are 
concerned with the establishment and operation of river basin organisations. Moreover, the Elbe 
Convention is essentially a bilateral Czech-German treaty, while the Oder Convention mainly 
concerns Germany and Poland only, thus, the parties may address their differences in relation 
to the two conventions through the bilateral cooperation mechanisms. The Agreement on the 
Meuse goes further only slightly. In case of differences, parties are merely called upon to seek 
a solution by way of negotiation or any other acceptable means of dispute settlement874.  
 
The Danube Convention provides for the usual dispute settlement mechanisms. As a first step, 
parties must strive to resolve their differences by way of negotiations or any other means 
acceptable to the parties to the dispute. The basin organisation, the International Commission 
for the Protection of the River Danube, may be invited to assist “if appropriate”875. If no solution 
is found by the parties within 12 months after the notification of the issue to the ICPDR, the 
issue must be submitted for a final and legally binding decision to the International Court of 
Justice or an arbitral tribunal. Parties have the option to choose either means of compulsory 
jurisdiction. Importantly, however, if a party fails to commit itself to any mechanism, it will be 
considered as having accepted arbitration876. The Rhine Convention follows a similar regulatory 
pattern, except that the default mandatory forum of dispute settlement is arbitration877.  
 
The most extensive system of dispute settlement is contained in the Sava Framework 
Agreement that is modelled closely on the relevant chapter of the UN Watercourses Convention. 
Accordingly, parties must first settle their dispute through negotiation. If this fails to produce 
an acceptable outcome, they may jointly invite a third party to provide good offices, mediation 
or conciliation. They may equally refer the issue to arbitration or the International Court of 
                                                          
873 Ibid p. 328. 
874 Article 8, Accord international sur la Meuse. 
875 Article 24.1, Danube Convention. 
876 Article 24.2, Danube Convention. 
877 Article 16, Annex, Rhine Convention. 
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Justice. If they cannot, within six months, solve the issue through third-party involvement, any 
riparian states can trigger a mandatory fact-finding mission by a committee composed of three 
independent experts878. While participation in the fact-finding procedure is mandatory, the 
report of the committee has no binding force879. Importantly, as the Sava is a sub-basin of the 
Danube, Sava basin states are also parties to the Danube Convention. Hence, with regards to 
their Sava-related disputes that are also covered by the Danube Convention (practically all 
matters except for navigation), they can rely on both mandatory mechanisms: fact-finding and 
compulsory arbitration. 
 
d) Bilateral water treaties 
 
Most European bilateral treaties, either concerned with general water cooperation or individual 
watercourses and/or projects, provide for some kind of dispute settlement mechanism. Of the 
treaties examined by this study the least elaborate is the 2010 Finnish-Swedish agreement that 
only calls for the settlement of disputes by way of negotiations through diplomatic channels880. 
The 1987 Austrian-German Danube cooperation treaty first calls on parties to settle their 
differences through negotiations, to be followed by arbitration should negotiations fail881. A 
similar solution is employed by the Hungarian-Ukrainian frontier water treaty that defines the 
mandatory jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to be set up under the UNECE Water 
Convention882. The Albufeira Convention refers disputes of predominantly technical nature to 
an inquiry commission before the matter is submitted to arbitration883. Specific or single issue 
water treaties tend to specify the competence of general bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms 
to adjudicate water-related matters. Examples include the 1958 French-Spanish agreement 
concerning the Lake Lanoux884 or the 1984 Belgian-Luxembourgish convention on the 
construction on waste water treatment plants along the river Sure885.  
                                                          
878 Article 22, Sava Framework Agreement. 
879 Article 24, ibid. 
880 Article 30, Agreement between Finland and Sweden Concerning Transboundary Rivers. 
881 Article 9, Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Economic Community, on 
the one hand, and the Republic of Austria, on the other, on cooperation on management of water resources in the 
Danube Basin.  
882 Article 15, Convention between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Ukraine 
on water management questions relating to frontier waters. 
883 Article 17, Albufeira Convention. 
884 Article 7, Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Spanish Government relating to 
Lake Lanoux. 
885  Article 17, Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg relating to the 
Waters of the Sûre, Brussels, 17 March 1980 (Convention entre le Royaume de Belgique et le Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg au sujet des eaux de la Sûre). 
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III.2.5.4. Evaluation 
 
As in the case of all previous subjects, the legal framework for the resolution of transboundary 
water disputes has multiple layers within the European Union. What distinguishes this 
particular topic from the preceding issues is, however, the gross incoherence among the 
overlapping regulatory levels. In the case of major water policy questions such as allocation, 
water quality or variability management the, EU, the UNECE, basin and bilateral arrangements 
follow more or less similar directions. The various water law instruments thus do not contradict 
one another. Rather, in most cases they are positively complementary, to some extent filling 
critical regulatory gaps.  
 
The resolution of transboundary water disputes, especially when it comes to binding (judicial) 
mechanism, is, however, seen as a horizontal constitutional question in the EU rather than a 
sublet of water policy. Consequently, the supremacy of primary EU law must be upheld at any 
price, even if this imperative gives rise to potentially gross repercussions on the functioning of 
the broader international legal order.  
 
As European primary law overrides the provisions of the UNECE Water Convention as well as 
basin and bilateral treaties it automatically deprives member states of important and relevant 
dispute settlement mechanisms under international law. What EU law offers in the stead is the 
inadequate infringement procedure or the toothless “reporting” of transboundary water 
problems to the European Commission. Ultimately, member states may also have direct 
recourse to the European Court of Justice against fellow EU riparian states, but such procedure 
faces such legal and political obstacles that render such an exercise a more or less futile 
adventure.  
 
In conclusion: European water law displays an important hydropolitical gap as it fails to 
provide effective mechanisms for the resolution of a potentially very wide spectrum of 
transboundary legal disputes between EU member states. 
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Chapter 3 
Adaptive capacity of EU transboundary water Governance: the dynamic 
dimension of resilience 
 
III.3.1. The role of adaptive capacity in hydropolitical resilience 
 
The application of “conventional” hydropolitical indicators to the resilience of transboundary 
water cooperation in the previous chapter has revealed important vulnerabilities in the 
collective management of shared watercourses within the European Union. These 
vulnerabilities may become critical drivers of political tension, if the current trends of 
hydrological change continue to unfold as projected within the existing system of transboundary 
water governance. The likelihood of conflict can, however, be significantly reduced or even 
eliminated, if the governance of shared waters among EU member states can be flexibly 
adjusted to these emerging pressures.  
 
The ability of a governance system to adjust to changing external circumstances is captured by 
the notion of adaptive capacity that has entered the water policy discourse from the resilience 
and systems science literature. According to this literature adaptive capacity is a central feature 
of resilience for it enables a social-ecological system to absorb disturbance while retaining the 
same fundamental structure, function and identity886. Gupta et al. define adaptive capacity as 
the “characteristics of institutions that empower [the relevant] actors to respond to short and 
long-term impacts either through planned measures or through allowing and encouraging 
creative responses from society both ex ante or ex post”887. Here, the focus is on the ability to 
proactively plan for change (top-down) and/or to create the conditions for bottom-up action by 
social actors. Others, like Claudia Pahl-Wostl, place the emphasis on the learning capacity of 
systems to move from incremental improvements of established routines to fundamental 
transformation888.  
 
 
 
                                                          
886 HILL, Margot (2013): Adaptive Capacity of Water Governance: Cases From the Alps and the Andes, Mountain 
Research and Development 33(3), pp. 248-259, p. 249. 
887 GUPTA, Joyeeta et al. (2010): The adaptive capacity wheel: a method to assess the inherent characteristics of 
institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society, Environmental Science and Policy 13, pp. 459-471, p. 461. 
888 PAHL-WOSTL, Claudia (2009): A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and multi-level 
learning processes in resource governance regimes, Global Environmental Change 19, pp. 354–365, p. 358-361. 
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III.3.2. Measuring adaptive capacity: the indicators used 
 
Adaptive capacity is a latent property of a governance system that is activated only in response 
to a crisis or an opportunity. Such latency, coupled with the inherent elasticity of the underlying 
concept, renders the measurement of adaptive capacity an uncertain and somewhat arbitrary 
exercise889. Yet, various resilience indicator sets have been developed over the years to evaluate 
the adaptive capacity of governance systems. The main characteristics of adaptive capacity are 
usually summarised along the following features: 
- open and frequent lines of communication, 
- the ability to learn and store knowledge and experience, 
- flexibility in decision-making and problem solving, 
- responsive power structures that consider the need of all stakeholders. 
- collaboration and action between both formal and informal institutions at multiple 
scales890. 
 
In the context of transboundary water governance Barbara Cosens, a multidisciplinary 
researcher of the resilience of water governance regimes, applies a similar but slightly expanded 
indicator set:  
- multiple, overlapping levels of control with one level of either control or strong 
coordination at the scale of the particular social-ecological system,  
- horizontal and vertical transfer of information and coordination of decision-making 
among entities and individuals with a decision making role,  
- meaningful public participation,  
- local capacity building, and  
- authority to respond (adapt) to changes in circumstances across a range of scenarios891. 
 
In the context of the EU’s Water Framework Directive this set of indicators has been expanded 
with two additional items: monitoring and system feed-back and enforcement by Green et al.892  
                                                          
889 LOCKWOOD, Michael at al. (2015): Measuring the dimensions of adaptive capacity: a psychometric 
approach, Ecology and Society 20(1), pp. 37-50, p. 38. 
890 GARMESTANI et al. (2013) op. cit. p. 10. 
891 COSENS (2010) op. cit. p. 256. 
892 GREEN, Olivia O. et al. (2013): EU water governance: striking the right balance between regulatory flexibility 
and enforcement? Ecology and Society 18(2), pp. 10-20, p. 11. 
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While the above indicators have been applied to the assessment of the adaptive capacity of 
water governance regimes extensively, they do not, however, seem fully suitable for the 
evaluation of co-riparian relations, let alone to address the legal and institutional gaps identified 
in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, they provide a general toolkit, whose certain elements can 
be adapted to the particular purposes of this analysis as follows. Indicators relating to sub-state 
level actions or actors – such as public participation or local capacity building – are mostly 
irrelevant in a state-to-state context and are therefore omitted. Certain other issues – e.g. the 
existence of polycentric, multilevel governance structures in the EU – have been already 
discussed extensively in the foregoing, thus no specific indicators to that effect needs to be 
employed subsequently893. In view of these limitations the following set of indicators is 
proposed for the assessment of the adaptive capacity the system of transboundary water 
governance within the European Union:  
- coordination among the different levels and actors; 
- transfer of information and feedback;  
- authority and flexibility in decision-making and problem-solving. 
 
Evidently, none of the above indicators or characteristics can be measured quantitatively 
through a robust matrix of variables. Neither are they capable of defining the boundaries of the 
actual learning capacities of the relevant governance regimes. Yet, by way of identifying certain 
critical legal, institutional and political hurdles the indicators chosen may provide useful 
information about the fundamental ability or inability of the EU system of transboundary water 
governance to adapt to emerging hydropolitical challenges.  
 
III.3.3. Coordination among the different levels and actors of 
transboundary water governance 
 
The multiplicity of governance layers can enhance resilience as it allows flexibility to develop 
policy measures at the scale most appropriate for the problem894. In order, however, to achieve 
the optimal outcome, coordination among the various players must be ensured both horizontally 
and vertically.  
 
                                                          
893 See section II.2.4. above. 
894 GREEN et al. (2013) op. cit. p. 12. 
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Obviously, the nature and intensity of coordination depends predominantly on the legal 
relationship among the relevant actors. Where the legal link is weak or missing between the 
various decision-makers of transboundary water governance, the coordination also tends to be 
weak or non-existent. In such cases, coordination is left to the mutual political will of the 
relevant actors. Contrariwise, coordination tends to be robust and meaningful where the 
relationship among the various actors is based on a solid legal instrument.  
 
III.3.3.1. Horizontal coordination 
 
As regards horizontal coordination the most relevant relationship is the one between the two 
relevant policy-making bodies: the UNECE and the European Union. As discussed extensively 
above, the interplay of the two regimes is characterised by the clear dominance of EU water 
law and policy895. Although the European Union and its member states constitute the largest 
group among the parties to the UNECE Water Convention, the political engagement of the 
European Commission – the external representative of the EU – in the work of the Convention 
bodies remains limited. According to the publicly available documents of the large number of 
relevant meetings held by the UNECE (minutes, lists of participants, etc.) the European 
Commission is present only at a selected number of events. Even if present, it hardly makes 
significant contribution to the deliberations896. This goes against the repeated invitation of 
Convention bodies to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and the UNECE in the field 
of water policy897. On the other hand, none of the Convention bodies have any formal role in 
the formulation of EU water policy and law, let alone its implementation. Consequently, the 
institutional interaction between the relevant EU and UNECE bodies remains limited, with 
almost no coordination whatsoever on their work programme, implementation experience, etc. 
This is a serious shortcoming as the lack of overall synchronisation between these two 
universally praised regimes leads to suboptimal practical outcomes on either side: the EU fails 
to directly benefit from the dynamic and problem-oriented work programme of the Convention, 
whereas the Convention bodies cannot directly rely on the wealth of experience accumulated 
by the European Commission in the implementation of decades of EU water law and policy. It 
must be pointed out, however, that there have been a number of issue-specific areas – e.g. the 
                                                          
895 See section II.2.4. above. 
896 See the relevant meeting documents at: https://www.unece.org/environmental-
policy/conventions/water/envwatermeetings.html#/ (accessed 12 February 2019). 
897 UNECE Report on the Workshop on Approaches and Tools for River Basin Management: Experience Drawn 
from the Implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive, MP.WAT/WG.1/2001/8. 
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implementation of the EU’s Water Initiative898 or the preparation of certain technical and expert 
documents899 – where the mutual benefits of cooperation have been successfully realised 
between the two entities.  
 
An additional critical segment of horizontal coordination is the interaction between riparian 
states. As shown in Part II, EU member states are inter-linked through an almost seamless web 
of multilateral and bilateral cooperation treaties900. These all contain institutional arrangements 
that create a framework for formal cooperation. Although, the level of actual interaction very 
much depends on the scope and character of the given treaty and the political willingness of the 
riparian states concerned, each EU member state can expect and even enforce a certain degree 
of cooperation vis-à-vis its fellow riparians. Yet, as the experience of the first implementation 
cycle of the WFD confirms, horizontal coordination among member states is often 
inconsistent901.  
 
III.3.3.2. Vertical coordination 
 
Vertical coordination among the various actors of transboundary water governance seems more 
comprehensive. The UNECE maintains an intense and structured relationship with bodies 
operating at basin or bilateral level. Given that the establishment of “joint bodies” is a core 
obligation under the UNECE Water Convention, the Convention bodies pay particular attention 
to the activity of the formal institutions of co-riparian cooperation, e.g. by way of providing 
assistance to the their establishment, operation, promoting inter-RBO coordination, allowing 
participation in various Convention meetings and events, etc.902 In turn, the various basin 
commissions take an active part in the practical implementation of the Convention903. 
 
As regards basin treaties and organisations, the EU itself seems to be more engaging as well. 
The EU is party to the Rhine and the Danube Conventions. Therefore, the European 
Commission follows the activity of the two relevant basin commissions closely. In turn, as 
shown above, all basin organisations within the EU actively participate in the implementation 
                                                          
898 https://www.unece.org/env/water/npd.html (accessed 12 February 2019). 
899 http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=45241 (accessed 12 February 2019). 
900 See Figure 12 above. 
901 GREEN et al. (2013) op. cit. p. 13. 
902 http://www.unece.org/env/water/workshop_joint_bodies_2013.html, 
http://www.unece.org/env/water/joint_bodies_workshop_2014.html (accessed 12 February 2019). 
903 JEKEL (2015) op. cit. p. 235-248. 
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of the Water Framework Directive904, providing a direct link between the EU and basin-wide 
activities. Occasionally, the EU actively relies on the support of basin organisation. As regards 
the Danube, for instance, the European Commission, has, over the past two decades, launched 
a number of initiatives – such as the Danube-Black Sea Task Force (2001)905 or the EU’s 
Danube Region Strategy (2011)906 – in whose implementation the International Commission 
for the Protection of the Danube has played an important part. Yet, given the rigid structure of 
EU decision-making none of the basin organisations at issue have any official role in the 
formulation of EU water law and policy.  
 
Finally, mention also must be made of the coordination between EU institutions and member 
states. Here, the relationship is based on Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 
secondary EU legislation. In terms of formal decision-making member states – through the 
Council of the European Union – strongly influence the adoption of legal and policy instruments 
relevant for transboundary cooperation. At the level of implementation the network of EU water 
directors also play an important role besides the European Commission, even though their 
activity is not based the primary or secondary law of the EU, but on an autonomous initiative 
of the European Commission907. Equally powerful is the impact of the Commission on national 
water policy. Through the systematic supervision of the implementation of EU law, the 
Commission can enforce the legal requirements of transboundary cooperation and, to a lesser 
extent, can mediate co-riparian disputes908. In summary, vertical interaction between EU 
institutions and member states is robust, lively and reciprocal in nature.  
 
III.3.4. Transfer of information and feedback 
 
Any system of governance can only adapt to changing circumstances in its operating 
environment, if it receives sufficient information of these changes and such information is fed 
into the complex and operational review mechanism909.  
 
                                                          
904 See section II.2.2.3. above. 
905 https://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/dablas (accessed 12 February 2019). 
906 https://www.icpdr.org/main/activities-projects/icpdr-eu-strategy-danube-region (accessed 12 February 2019). 
907 See section II.2.3.1.b) above. 
908 See section II.2.3.5. above. 
909 COSENS (2010) op. cit. p. 239. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.JAK.2019.003
199 
 
III.3.4.1. Horizontal flow of information 
 
As shown above, horizontal coordination among the multilateral actors of transboundary water 
governance remains fragmented, unbalanced and somewhat occasional. This condition is also 
reflected in the quality and extent of exchange of information between the UNECE and the 
European Union. The reporting requirements under the UNECE Water Convention apply to 
state parties only910. Consequently, the European Union remains exempt from this obligation, 
although at its own initiative it could participate in the reporting exercise911. In the opposite 
direction – i.e. from the UNECE towards the EU – there are no established formal channels of 
information exchange. 
 
As regards the mutual provision of information at co-riparian level all four – i.e. UNECE, EU, 
basin and bilateral – layers of governance contain various obligations. These extend from 
regular water quality monitoring and data exchange, through notification of planned measures 
all the way to early warning in emergency situations912. These obligations undoubtedly cover 
many or most of the legitimate information needs of affected riparian states. Yet again, the 
practical experience of the Water Framework Directive suggests that these information 
channels often prove insufficient or they are not used efficiently913.  
 
III.3.4.2. Vertical flow of information 
 
Contrary to the foregoing, the vertical flow of information between the UNECE and state 
parties, on the one hand, and the European Commission and EU member states, on the other, 
has legally clearly defined robust channels. As mentioned above, since 2015, state parties of 
the UNECE Water Convention are obliged to report to the Convention Secretariat on their 
implementation according to a template defined by a decision of the meeting of the parties914. 
(More experience is available under the Convention’s Water and Health Protocol which 
contains specific reporting obligations under Article 6915). As 2016-2017 were a pilot phase for 
the reporting exercise, no systemic conclusions can yet be drawn about the efficiency of the 
                                                          
910 Decision VII/1 on reporting under the Convention, ECE/MP.WAT/49/Add.2. 
911 Ibid point 3. 
912 See sections II.2.2. and II.2.3. above. 
913 GREEN et al. (2013) op. cit. p. 13. 
914  See section III.3.4.1. above. 
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vertical flow of information. Importantly, however, as the reporting template covers a number 
of key governance questions, this will surely expand the knowledge base available to the 
Convention bodies in the review of the existing arrangement.  
 
Even more robust are the reporting obligations imposed on EU member states vis-à-vis the 
European Commission. These reporting obligations are related to the implementation of the 
Water Framework Directive as well as other water legislation916. Additional EU legislation on 
the environment also call for reporting to the Commission on various water-related subjects917. 
As shown above, member states can, exceptionally also report to the Commission on a 
voluntary basis issues that cannot be dealt by them individually918. Importantly, the flow of 
information between the Commission and member state authorities is neither imbalanced nor 
unidirectional. Member states can also grossly benefit from the rich databases the Commission 
makes available to them. Thus, the vast array of raw information and analyses provided by the 
Commission, the European Environment Agency, Commission’s Joint Research Centre and 
Eurostat on water are fed into the EU’s open access water database (Water Information System 
for Europe, WISE)919 that creates an informational common ground for member states to plan 
and implement water policies at national level. Moreover, through the various implementing 
committees of the WFD and the regular gatherings of the water directors EU member states can 
obtain ample information about the Commission’s planned and on-going activities relative to 
transboundary water management920. The quality of the vertical flow of information within the 
EU should therefore not create any obstacle to flexible adaptation.  
 
III.3.5. Authority and flexibility in decision-making and problem-solving 
 
The transfer of information and coordination among the various actors of transboundary water 
governance is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for adapting to changing hydrological 
and political conditions. If the various actors have no authority to respond to the governance 
gaps identified, these are likely to grow into critical vulnerabilities threatening the continued 
functioning of the system as a whole. The authority to respond to emerging challenges is largely 
perceived as an institutional question that is defined by formal institutions. However, it is also 
                                                          
916 Article 3, 5, 8, 11, 13, 15, 24 and 25, Directive 2000/60/EC.  
917 See section II.2.3.3. above. 
918 Ibid. 
919 https://water.europa.eu/freshwater (accessed 12 February 2019). 
920 See section II.2.3.5.a) above. 
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strongly influenced by informal regimes and cultural-cognitive factors921. While these rather 
fluid categories are hardly amenable to precise measurement, their qualitative analysis can 
nonetheless identify important constraints that limit the overall adaptive capacity of the system.  
 
On a general level the UNECE Water Convention has proved to be a remarkably flexible 
instrument, being capable of addressing a wide range of issues not foreseen at the time of its 
drafting. This openness did not only manifest in the thematic expansion of the Convention to 
areas such as the nexus between water, food, energy or adaptation to climate change, but also 
in the creation of new and innovative institutional solutions (Implementation Committee, 
monitoring, etc.)922. Yet, the gradual expansion of the Convention’s system has taken place 
mainly through the decisions of the meeting of the parties (MOP) or soft-law instruments, rather 
than through formal amendments to the Convention text. The only amendments adopted to the 
Convention concerned the expansion of its scope ratione personae allowing regional economic 
organisations and non-UNECE countries to accede to the Convention923. The choice of MOP 
decisions and soft-law instruments over treaty amendments to expand the activities of the 
Convention seems to confirm the complacency of the parties to open up the Convention to 
substantial modifications. Such complacency, however, has not, as yet, seemed to amount to a 
critical barrier to the adaptation of the Convention to changing circumstances and the needs of 
parties. To the contrary, the Convention bodies have been able to bridge such critical 
institutional gaps such as the transfer of information (monitoring) or the efficiency of dispute 
settlement (implementation committee) successfully. The flexible language of the Convention 
and its expansive interpretation by the Convention bodies also allowed addressing pressing new 
issues such as transboundary water allocation and climate change adaptation in a substantive 
manner924. This consistent record of progressive achievements, supported by an inherent culture 
of openness, partnership and engagement, suggests that the UNECE transboundary water 
governance regime displays a very high capacity of adaptation. It remains to be seen, however, 
if this remarkable yet limited (formal) ability to adjust will be sufficient to withstand the test of 
much more conflictual co-riparian relations in the European heartland.  
 
                                                          
921 PAHL-WOSTL (2009) op. cit. p. 356-357. 
922 See section II.2.2.2.d) above. Also see BERNARDINI (2015) op. cit. p. 32-34. 
923 UNECE (2013) op. cit. p. 6. 
924 See section II.2.2.2.d) above. 
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More complicated are the legal, institutional and political conditions influencing the adaptive 
capacity of the EU’s water governance regime. While the Water Framework Directive is based 
on adaptive implementation cycles with clearly defined feedback mechanisms, this inherent 
review mechanism does not extend to the revision of the underlying water policy objectives 
themselves925. In other words: the monitoring-feedback-review process works fine so long as it 
does not question the dominance of ecological objectives under the WFD. This limitation 
renders the fact that the WFD, unlike several other environmental directives, does not contain 
a general policy review procedure all the more regrettable. Instead, it merely calls for a periodic 
evaluation of by the Commission of its implementation by member states and the necessary 
technical adaptation of the monitoring requirements926. As a result, the Commission will review 
every six years whether or not member states apply the WFD correctly. These reviews are, 
however, not supposed to address the question whether or not the WFD in its current form is 
the right instrument to respond to the changing hydrological realities in the EU.  
 
Such constraints are probably not surprising in view of the EU’s restricted authority of the EU 
– under Article 192.2. of the TFEU – to take on such critical water issues as transboundary 
water quantity management and river flow allocations927. As noted above, Article 192.2 does 
not prevent the EU to regulate transboundary water quantity management, it only makes in 
significantly more difficult to do so. Yet, the constant opposition of certain member states under 
the shield of the unanimity voting as well as its own complacency to engage in bilateral issues 
prompt the European Commission to systematically reject any substantial consideration of 
transboundary water quantity issues928. This means that the relative legal barrier (unanimity) 
created by the TFEU is elevated into an almost insurmountable institutional barrier by the 
prevailing political and cultural conditions. 
 
Even more complicated would be the elimination of the dispute settlement gap identified in the 
previous chapter929. Here, hydropolitical vulnerability is created by the latent competition of 
supranational courts for jurisdictional hegemony. This has led to a situation where EU’s own 
constitutional regime rejects the competence of any dispute resolution forum other than the 
                                                          
925 GREEN et al. (2013) op. cit. p. 5-6. 
926 Articles 18 and 20, WFD. 
927 See section III.2.1.3.a) above. 
928 BARANYAI (2015) op. cit. p. 100. 
929 See section III.2.5.3.a) above.  
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European Court of Justice which is largely unsuitable to adjudicate bilateral water disputes930. 
While in theory there may be transboundary water issues that do not fall under the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ (e.g. allocation), the uncompromising attitude of the European Commission to the 
supremacy of the ECJ suggests that it would challenge any recourse by member states to 
international courts and tribunals even in cases where the EU legal basis remains very weak (as 
it actually happened in the Mox Plant case)931. Consequently, EU law creates an absolute barrier 
to the elimination of the systemic gap as regards water dispute settlement between member 
states.  
 
III.3.6. Evaluation 
 
The system of transboundary water governance within the European Union displays a number 
of important vulnerabilities, such as the lack of water quantity management and allocation, 
limited tools for the management of hydrological variability and the limited availability of 
adequate dispute resolution mechanisms.  
 
The foregoing analysis of the adaptive capacity of the EU’s water governance systems shows 
that these vulnerabilities are likely to persist in the long term in view of the EU’s limited 
authority and flexibility in decision-making and problem-solving. Most importantly, the rigid 
EU legal framework, coupled with a number of political and cultural obstacles, does not allow 
the flexible adaptation of EU water policy objectives and measures to changes in basin 
hydrology and co-riparian politics. This applies particularly to the quantitative aspects of 
transboundary water management that is not only absent from contemporary EU water policy, 
but powerful legal constrains suggest that it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Even 
more limited is the EU’s adaptive capacity vis-à-vis transboundary water dispute settlement, 
an important precondition of hydropolitical stability. Here, the EU’s own constitutional system 
prevents member states to have recourse to established international judicial forums without 
offering suitable alternative mechanisms. Since this condition relates to the core of the EU’s 
legal architecture member states will remain deprived of external water dispute mechanisms 
probably indefinitely.   
                                                          
930 SZABÓ (2008) op. cit. p. 163. 
931 See section III.2.5.3. a) above. 
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PART IV 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
This study has investigated the resilience of existing transboundary water governance regimes 
in the European Union as well as their adaptive capacity in the face of changing hydro-political 
conditions. The assessment covered the regional multilateral treaty framework, the various river 
basin treaty regimes as well as the EU’s proper supranational legal and institutional system.  
 
The main conclusions of the assessment can be summarised as follows: 
- The European Union and its member states maintain one of the most extensive and 
elaborate system of transboundary water governance in the world. The regional 
UNECE regime, the basin and bilateral treaties of member states as well as the EU’s sui 
generis legal framework stand out as regards their comprehensive geographical 
coverage, strong ecological focus or cooperation over planned projects. 
- Despite such positive overall picture, however, significant structural deficiencies have 
been identified that may give rise to critical vulnerabilities, should the prevailing 
hydrological conditions of transboundary cooperation continue to change as projected 
due to increased climate variability.  
- As regards the key legal and institutional indicators of hydropolitical resilience the 
following gaps must be highlighted: 
- the absence of water quantity management: EU water law and the European 
treaty framework (apart from occasional bilateral water treaties) almost 
comprehensively ignore the quantitative aspects of transboundary water 
management. Such one-sided ecological focus could be very well justified by the 
relative abundance of freshwater resources and the dominance of environmental 
quality considerations at the place and time of the conception of these regimes. 
This lacuna, however, means that the EU and its member states cannot rely on a 
solid legal framework to address the transboundary implications of the most 
important hydrological impact of climate change: increased variability of river 
flows; 
- the absence of water allocation mechanisms: a direct consequence of the absence 
of water quantity management is that – apart from the basic principles of 
international water law –  there are no rules and mechanisms in place in the EU 
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to govern water allocation between riparian states. Given that water allocation 
disputes are the most common source of inter-state tensions in hydro-diplomacy, 
this omission may turn into a major vulnerability gap in several parts of Europe, 
if water stress or scarcity continues to intensify as projected. The dominance of 
water quality and ecological requirements at UNECE, EU and basin level results 
in a gross regulatory asymmetry. Basin states have to comply, individually and 
collectively, with uniform and precise water quality requirements whose 
implementation is closely linked to the availability of water. Yet, the same 
countries are almost completely deprived of legal rights and mechanisms to 
demand that the necessary amount of water is made available to them. As a result, 
riparian states with high exposure to exogenous water sources may infringe their 
EU and international water quality obligations for the lack of sufficient volumes 
despite their best intentions and efforts; 
- limited management of hydrological variability in a transboundary context: an 
additional consequence of the foregoing is the one-sided approach to the 
transboundary management of hydrological extremes. While the four layers of 
European water law regulate flood prevention and protection at an exemplary 
level of sophistication, less positive is the picture when it comes to the 
management of droughts. Even though member states are required to assess 
changing hydrological conditions in their share of international basins, neither 
EU and UNECE law, nor basin treaties call for real adaptation interventions in 
the case flow volumes decline. Undoubtedly, the basic principles of 
transboundary water cooperation (equitable and reasonable utilisation and the no-
harm rule) together with the various information exchange and notification 
procedures create a basic framework to address such critical situations. These, 
however, do not amount to any operative guidance as to the immediate adaptation 
measures to be taken, including adjustments in transboundary flow allocation. 
This shortcoming can largely be attributed to the complacent approach of EU law 
and decision-makers vis-à-vis the question of transboundary water allocation; 
- inadequate mechanisms of dispute settlement: the dispute settlement mechanisms 
available to EU member states are inadequate to channelize and resolve 
significant transboundary water conflicts. The EU’s own legal system places the 
European Commission at the centre of law enforcement, which, however, 
investigates parallel violations of member states and tends to avoid any 
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engagement in bilateral disputes. Consequently, there are no readily available, 
easy-to-access platforms in place to handle co-riparian differences. Also, EU law 
generally prohibits arbitration or recourse to the International Court of Justice in 
the context of most transboundary water issues. Instead, it only permits member 
states to sue each other before the European Court of Justice. This option, 
however, does not offer a viable alternative due to a series of political and 
institutional constraints. European water law therefore displays an important 
hydropolitical gap as it fails to provide effective mechanisms for the resolution 
of a potentially very wide spectrum of transboundary legal disputes between EU 
member states. 
- The analysis of the adaptive capacity of the EU’s water governance systems has shown 
that the above vulnerabilities are likely to persist in the long term for the following 
reasons:  
- weak coordination among the different levels and actors of transboundary water 
governance: horizontal coordination and flow of information between the two 
major multilateral blocks of transboundary governance – the UNECE and the EU 
– is insufficient, preventing the mutually beneficial optimisation of the two 
regimes. In fact, the EU’s relevant legal instruments, in particular the Water 
Framework Directive, dominate contemporary co-riparian relations in the Union 
to such extent that it has the tendency to side-line all other issues. This legal-
political asymmetry is also reflected in the attitude of the relevant water 
governance institutions, especially that of the European Commission, vis-à-vis 
other regimes; 
- fragmented flow of information and feedback: the shortcomings of coordination 
imply that the horizontal flow of information between the UNECE and the EU 
remains fragmented, unbalanced and somewhat occasional. The European Union, 
although a party to the UNECE Water Convention, remains exempt from the 
reporting obligations to the Convention bodies. The same applies in the opposite 
direction: the UNECE has no access to any established formal channels of 
information exchange with EU institutions; 
- limited authority and flexibility in decision-making and problem-solving: the 
rigid legal framework of the EU, coupled with a number of political and cultural 
obstacles, does not allow the flexible adaptation of the EU water policy to 
changes in basin hydrology and co-riparian politics. This applies particularly to 
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the quantitative aspects of transboundary water management that is not only 
absent from contemporary EU water policy, but powerful legal constrains suggest 
that it is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. Even more limited is the 
EU’s adaptive capacity to properly handle bilateral water disputes, an important 
precondition of hydropolitical stability. The current formulation of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, as interpreted by the European Court of 
Justice, suggests that the inability of member states to have recourse to 
international tribunals to adjudicate bilateral water issues is likely to persist 
indefinitely.  
 
In order to ensure the long term stability of transboundary water cooperation in the European 
Union the following measures are recommended: 
- address hydro-political vulnerability in a comprehensive manner: the competent 
UNECE and EU institutions (most prominently: the European Commission), basin 
organisations and member states should address hydropolitical vulnerability in a 
comprehensive, open and inclusive manner; 
- address transboundary water quantity management and water allocation: the 
constitutional limits to adopting water quantity management measures (i.e. the 
unanimity requirement) should not be used as a justification for ignoring the pressing 
issue of transboundary water allocations. Despite the popular perception, the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union does delegate powers to the EU to address 
transboundary water quantity management, it simply makes the adoption of binding 
rules on the subject more difficult. In view of its clear competence to do so, the European 
Commission should thoroughly explore existing and possible intra-EU tensions that 
may arise over transboundary water allocation. Should, as a result, the adoption of legal 
measures appear necessary, the Commission should investigate the political viability of 
such EU measures and alternative legal avenues (enhanced cooperation, intra-EU 
treaties, etc.). The transboundary implications of water quantity management should be 
taken on board along the same lines at UNECE, basin and bilateral level as appropriate; 
- expand the scope of vulnerability management: the progressive approach of the EU to 
transboundary flood prevention and control should be extended to other hydrological 
extremes. This should include at least risk mapping, substantive obligations as well as 
cooperation procedures with regards to droughts and desertification. Particular attention 
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should be paid to the short and long term transboundary impacts of national drought 
management measures; 
- review dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms in the EU: the availability and 
effective use of mandatory dispute settlement mechanisms is a major guarantee of the 
stability of co-riparian relations. The European Commission should therefore 
investigate options for bilateral dispute settlement that go beyond the feeble quasi 
mediation procedure under the Water Framework Directive, without affecting the 
judicial monopoly of the European Court of Justice. Relevant examples in and outside 
the EU include mediation, fact finding commissions, compliance mechanism, mutual 
evaluation, etc.  
- strengthen the effectiveness of the existing co-riparian cooperation mechanisms: the 
experience of the first two planning cycles of the Water Framework Directive leaves 
room for significant improvement. This may include the development of guidance 
materials or procedural recommendations on member state cooperation, enhanced 
supervision by the European Commission, strengthening the role of basin commissions, 
etc. With improved cooperation many of the looming hydropolitical challenges could 
be resolved or mitigated before they turn into interstate disputes; 
- strengthen cooperation among the different levels and actors of transboundary water 
governance: the currently suboptimal interplay among the various layers and actors of 
transboundary water governance could be significantly improved through enhanced 
collaboration. These do not require any legislative changes or additional resources, only 
vision and political effort. Most important in this context would be the more active 
collaboration of the European Commission and the Secretariat of the UNECE Water 
Convention. The European Commission could also play a more active role at basin 
level, making use of the diversity of its powers and its multi-faceted relationship with 
member states.  
 
*** 
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Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government 
of the Republic of Macedonia for the protection and sustainable development of Lake Ohrid 
and its watershed, Skopje, 17 June 2004 
Protocol amending the Convention on Co-operation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of 
the Waters of Luso-Spanish River Basins signed 30 November 1998, 4 April 2008 
Agreement between Finland and Sweden Concerning Transboundary Rivers, Stockholm, 11 
November 2009 
Protocol on Flood Protection to the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin, 
Gradiška, 1 June  2010 
Convention for the Prevention of Conflicts Related to the Management of Shared Water 
Resources in Central Africa, Brazzaville, 22 December 2018 
Legal acts of the European Union 
Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain 
public and private projects on the environment  
Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment 
Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters 
against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources 
Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of 
wild flora and fauna 
Council Directive 98/83/EC of 3 November 1998 on the quality of water intended for human 
consumption 
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Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy 
Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment 
Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
public access to environmental information 
Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage 
Directive 2006/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 
concerning the management of bathing water quality 
Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration 
Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on 
the assessment and management of flood risks 
Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy 
Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 
on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy 
Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) 
Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 
on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment 
Decision No. 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 
2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the 
limits of our planet’ 
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